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· .. 
"We are often- given to condemn the native method of 
agri cul ture ..... if trying to pt'oduce crops with the 
least element of risk or failure can be called indolence 
the:1 we are al,l equally guilty". 




The purpose of this study is to examine African agricultural develop-
ment in Southern Rhodesia duri.ng the years 1890 to 1950. Special 
attention has been paid to the inter-war years because it was during 
those years that there evolved a definite policy for the administration 
of the African sector. 
It mus t be stressed at the outset that Afri can agri cu1 tura 1 development 
cannot be studied in isolation from those influences exerted upon it 
by other sectors of the econol1\Y. Changing trends in the white agri-
cultural sector played a major role in the formation of Native 
policy, and development in the former will be examined in so far as 
they affected government policy towards African agriculture and changes 
therein. Land policy also played a role in determining changes in 
African agriculture. Furthermore, government legislation and the 
Native Affairs Department assumed vital roles in determining the path 
along which African development was '. to: be directed. All these 
contributing factors will be examined in relation to their influence 
on Afri can agri cui ture. 1 ) 
More specifically, the early pages of this work will outline the 
structure of the African agrarian econol1\Y in the years immediately 
preceding the arrival of the white pioneers in 1890. This will serve 
as a foundation upon which subsequent changes to this system, wrought 
by both indigenous and exogenous factors, may be compared and 
contrasted.
2
) For example it is conmonly believed that the Africans 
were poor agriculturalists, and that deterioration of the reserves 
during the years under review came as a result of an inherent inability 
to adjust their agricultural techniques as the need arose. 3) It is 
hoped that the inadequacy of thi s erroneous be 1 ief wi 11 be revealed 
in the following pages. 
Changes invoked in the economic base of the African agricultural sector, 
1) Details furnished in the main text. 
2) vide infra, Ch.2.1. 
3) vide infra, pp.12/13 
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arising from early contact ~ith the nascent social, economic and 
political system of whites, will then be examined. In the early 
years of the British South Africa , ~ompany's rule, the settlers were 
uninterested in the ,agricultural potential of Southern Rhodesia. 
Instead they desired the lucrative and rapid returns which mineral 
prospecting promised. Consequently, they ~ere content to allow 
Africans to supply their foodstuff requirements. African response 
to these demands will be examined in order to gauge their willingness 
to become involved in the nascent exchange economY. 4) 
In the second decade of the twentieth century, a change in Native 
policy became evident. The origins of this change will be sought 
as will the means employed in inaugurating this change. During those 
years, many whites no longer desired that Africans provide their 
foodstuff requirements. This was one of the major factors which led 
to the establishment of the Native Reserves Commission in 1914, the 
purposes and the results of which will be discussed in some detail. 5) 
It will be shown that little effort was made during this period to 
develop African areas: when pressure on the land was evident, and 
soil fertility declined, cultivation and settlement was merely 
extended into unused areas. Native policy, then, focused on augmenting 
rather than developing African areas. 
Attention will also be given to the apparent paradox which emerged in 
African policy during the 1920s. On the one hand, it appeared that a 
definite move towards racial segregation was being made in order to 
curtail future possibility of African competition with white farmers, 
and this culminated in the passage of the Land Apportionment Act in 
1931.6) On the other hand, however, African administration changed 
from a policy of merely controlling and pacifying the indigenous 
population, and came to include the provision of extension services 
in order to facilitate agricultural development in African areas. 7) 
4) vide infra, Ch.2.1. 
5) vide infra, Ch.2.2. 
6) vide infra, Ch.3.1. 
7) vide infra, Ch. 3.2. 
3. 
These extension services operated through the medium of African 
demonstrators whose function it was to encou~age the adoption by 
Africans of improved methods of cultivation and preservation of the 
soil. This apparant paradox, and the functions and achievement of 
demonstrators, will be examined in Chapter Three. 
The early 1930s witnessed a phase of acute depression in both white 
and African farming, and it was during that period that Native policy 
was again revised. For the first time, direct discrimination in the 
fields of agricultural marketing and production became evident. Events . 
in the white farming sector will be shown to have been largely res-
ponsible for this change in attitude; and the reasons for these 
changes, and the effects of such changes on the African agricultural 
sector, will be ana1ysed. 8) These trends of curtailing African 
agricultural production were maintained until the second half of the 
1930s, whereupon further changes in policy began to manifest themselves. 
The 1940s, in fact, represent a deviation from all previous policy: 
during the decade it became desirable that African production be 
increased in order to cater for the growi ng needs of the market. 9) 
During the 1940s, therefore, all efforts were devoted to the achieve-
ment of this aim by increasing the productivity of the African reserves. 
Extension programmes were modified and extended in these years, and 
the white farming sector also played a part in encouraging and 
facilitating these developments. Chapter Four discusses these changes, 
and examines the devices used in attempts to bring about these changes. 
Chapter Five is devoted to an analysis of the same period as that 
reviewed in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, however, different aspects 
of African policy will be examined: the African cattle industry, cash 
cropping, the development of Native Purchase Areas and the establish-
ment of rural credit facilities. The reason behind allotting an entire 
chapter to the above-mentioned development is that these movements 
represented deviations from all former extension facilities at the 
8) vide infra, Ch.4.1. 
9) vide infra, Ch. 4.2. 
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disposal of Africans. It was thus decided to outline the history of 
the p~ogression toward the adoption of these differing policies. 
In this way, it is hoped to re-emphasise the break with the past which 
resulted from the reformulation of policy in the 1940s. 
Throughout this work, therefore, the development of African agriculture 
will be examined in the light of developments in other sectors of 
the Southern Rhodesian economy; which, in many ways, will be shown 
to have determined African responses to the extension services 
proffered. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the nature and course 
of African agricultural development during the period under review. 
Up to the present time, very little has been written on the role and 
work of African agricultural demonstrators in Southe'rn Rhodesia '. 
Indeed, 1 i tt1e has been wri tten on Afri can agri cu1 tura 1 development 
in general; although much has been written on associated topics, and 
this has provided a useful source of information. There are several 
general texts on the history of Southern Rhodesia, but only a few of 
the more important works will be discussed here. 10 } Two general works 
which ought to be mentioned are P.E.N. Tindall's A History of Central 
Africa11 } and L.H. Gann's A History of Southern Rhodesia. 12 } While 
both works touch upon some of the issues discussed in this theSis, 
their very general nature has precluded any detailed treatment of 
African agricultural development. Indeed, this is the inevitable 
difficulty with all such general works: while they often provide an 
excellent overview of Southern Rhodesia's development, they often lack 
sufficient analytical detail. 
At a more specialised level, R.H. Palmer's Land and Racial Domination 
in Rhodesia examines the way in which white settlers ,used land policy, 
and consequent control over the land, in order to gain a position of 





See Bibliography, Secondary Sources, Books, for a list of the 
re levant 'works. 
P.E.N. Tinda11~ A History of Central Africa,(London, 1967}. 
L.H. Gann, A H~story of Southern Rhodesia, (Humanities Press, 
New York, 1969). 
R.H. Palmer, Land and Raaial Domination in Rhodesia, (Heinnemann, 
London, 1973). 
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the formation and implementation of land policy in the years 1890 to 
1936; and~ . in . this area was a constant source of reference. Nonethe-
less he devoted little attention to the origin and role of African 
~ . 
administration and African demonstrators~ noth of which comprise the 
central theme of this thesis. Furthermore, Palmer's work does not 
examine the period during and after the Second World War, a crucial 
period during which many changes in African policy became evident. 
Nevertheless, being one of the few works devoted entirely to African 
policy in Rhodesia, although devoted to land policy and not agricul-
ture, this work posed many vital questions, some of which have been 
I raised and answers attempted in this study. 
D.J. Murray's work, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, 
also proved to be a valuable text. 14 ) It offers a clear analysis of 
the administrative system in Southern Rhodesia in both white and 
African sectors. This was a useful source of information, placing 
development of African agriculture within its administrative context, 
and explaining comprehensively how the latter functioned. M.C. Steele's 
Foundations of a Native PoliCYy in Southern Rhodes,ia: 1923-1933, an 
unpublished thesis, devotes more attention to the evolution of Native 
policy rather than to the effects thereof. 15 ) He examines in detail 
the conflicts within the various sectors of the government and their 
effect on Native policy, but pays little attention to the growth and 
development of demonstrator effort in the African reserves. Further-
more, this work does not examine the period of the late 1930s and 
1940s wherein demonstrators began to gain a foothold in the reserves, 
and during which government policy towards African development became 
evident, and which forms an important part of the present study. 
The more specialised field of agricultural development is rather poorly 
served in the existing literature on Southern Rhodesia. Fortunately 
H. Weinmann ' s AgriauZtural Researeh and Development in Southern 
14) 
15) 
D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, 
(Oxford~ 1970). 
M. C. S tee 1 e, Foundations of a Native Po liCYy in Southern Rhodesia 
1923-1933, (unpublished PhD thesis, Simon Frazer University, 1972). 
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Rhodesia, is an exception to the trend. 16 ) Coveri.ng, in two volumes, 
the period 1890-1945, it examines the development of the white 
agricultural sector in great detail. This work was o~ great value: 
taking a narrative structure, Weinmann outlines trends in white 
agriculture, basing his work on statistical evidence; and by avoiding 
a thematical, analytical form, his work remains unclouded by models 
or theories. The statistics he offers, although relating to trends 
in white farming, help elucidate trends within the African farming 
sector. 
A.K.H. Weinrich's work, Afrioan Farmers in Rhodesia, offers a rare, 
intensive study of African agriculture. l 7) This work, however, is 
confined to a specific area within Southern Rhodesia and within a 
specific time period, primarily the 1960s, which lies beyo·nd the scope 
of this thesis. 
I t can thus be seen that the majori ty of these secondary texts, wi th 
the exception of that by R.H. Palmer, cover themes which are peripheral 
to the central theme of this study; and even Palmer's work does not 
examine in depth the later period under examination in this work. All 
additional secondary sources were derived from journal articles. 18) 
For the most part, these works review selected periods in African 
agricultural development: Native policy, land policy and the various 
pieces of legislation passed. None examined these themes within a 
wider context, or discussed their ramifications on various sectors of 
the Southern Rhodesian economY. Furthermore, none of these articles 
examined the important part played by African demonstrators, their 




H. Weinmann, Agrioultural Researoh and Development in Southern 
Rhodesia~ 1890-1923, University of Rhodesia, Department of 
Agriculture, Occasional Paper 4 (Salisbury 1972); Agricultural 
Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia~ 1924-1950, 
Universit~ o! Rhodesi.a, Series in .Science 2 (Salisbury 1975). 
A .. K. H: W:l n rl ch, Afnoan Farmers -z..n Rhodesia, (OUP 1975). 
See Blbllography, Secondary Sources Articles and Pamphlets for 
ali s t of the re levant works. ' 
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Virtually all the vitally important information required for this 
study - relating to African .agricultural techniques and work under-
taken by demonstrators and African .responses to them - \!las. gleaned from 
primary sources housed in the National Archives of Rhodesia (NAR)19) 
The main records referred to in the period of: BSA Company rule were 
the annual reports of the Chief Native Commissioner and Native 
Commissioners. After the grant of self-government in 1923, the 
yearly and half-yearly reports of the Chief Nati ve Commi ssi oner and 
Native Commissioners were examined. In addition, the correspondence 
of the Chief Native Commissioner was scrutinised. These valuable 
sources shed much light on the nature and course of African agricul-
tural development; and, indeed, this study could not have been written 
wi thout them. 
Also of great value were the proceedings and report of the Native 
Production and Trade Commission of 1944, in which both white and 
African were interviewed. 20) This work has the added value of being 
one of the few sources which provided some insight into African 
oplnlon.. Reports of other commissions were also of great use: the 
Hadfield Commission report of 1924 examined the African educational 
system and advocated changes therein; while the Keigwin report of 
1920 on 'The Industrial Training of Natives' contained the seeds of 
what was later to take the form of agricultural development programmes. 21) 
Apart from the official records housed in the National Archives of 
Rhodesia, perhaps the most important sources were the annual reports 
of E.D. Alvord, Agriculturalist for Instruction of Natives during the 
years 1926 to 1943, and Director of Native Agriculture from 1944 
until he reti red in 1950. These reports provi de an in-depth account 
of all work undertaken in the Afri can areas and the resu1 ts thereof. 
Furthermore, Alvord wrote numerous published and unpublished articles 
on the nature and scope of his work, and it was from these that most 
of the chronological pattern of African development work was traced. 22 ) 
19) See Bibliography, primary sources for list of relevant sources 
20) See B~bl~.ography, primary sources for list of relevant sources: 
21) See Blb110graphy, primary sources for list of relevant Reports. 
22) See Bibliography, primary sources, for a list of E.D. Alvord's 
works. 
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These works were als.o important because they' gave a greater depth of 
understanding and insight into the principal figure behind the origin 
and growth of these schemes. Indeed, much of the success of develop-
ment programmes prior to 1940 may be attributed solely to E.D. Alvord.
23
) 
One major obstacle ought to be mentioned here: much difficulty was posed 
from the necessity of having to refer primarily to white opinion in 
the years under review. Being a work essentially involved in an 
examination of the African people, it would have been of great oenefit 
to consult African opinion. Unfortunately, this was not possible. 
Owing to the war situation in Rhodesia at present, it was not possible 
to visit the Tribal Trust Lands to interview old chiefs and headmen, 
or reti red demons trators. 
In an effort to overcome this obstacle, interviews were conducted 
with certain white officials. Mr. Beaumont, Chief Extension and 
Training Officer for Derag, offered much useful information on the 
history and development of African administrative policy and their 
response to the latter. In addition, R. Dinnis, retired Native 
Convnissioner, and later founder of the Co-operative Movement for 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia, offered much information on African 
agricultural development during the years 1934 to 1950. Dinnis also 
presented fi rs thand experience of Afri can atti tudes to demonstrators, 
and substantiated the opinions gleaned from various official reports 
and commissions. Finally, D. Hampton, ex-principal of Domboshawa 
School, was of considerable assistance in explaining the training of 
demonstrators, the mechanics behind the running of the school, and 
success achieved therein. D. Hampton also offered invaluable informa-
tion on the receptivity of the African population to demonstrator 
efforts, also having had firsthand experience in this area. 
Within the limits outlined above, then, it is hoped that this study 
23) LD. Alvord wrote a lengthy paper on the development and conse-
quences of his programmes: I The Gospel of the Plow ' . This work is 
on microfish in the National Archives of Rhodesia. Unfortunately, 
page numbers were excluded in order to fit this paper onto film· 
an~ therefore, where this paper is referred to in the text of ' 
thls 'w.'ork, page numbers have been excluded. 
9. 
wi 11 help to provide an understanding of the nature and course of 
African agricultural development in Southern Rb.odesia during the years 
1890-1950. Not only will this help to shed 1.ight upon an important 
constituent part of Southern Rhodesia's overall development, but might 
also make a modest contribution to filling the gap which exists in 
the available literature on this subject. 
"The inheritance of the past is important because 
the past has shaped the outlook of the people and : 
their values, and any radical departure from 
traditional practises is likely to cause insecurity 
and arouse suspicion". 
A.K.H., Weinrich, African Farmers in Rhodesia, P.S 
PROSPECTORS OR FARMERS: 
TI-E CDNSOLIDATION a= WHITE SUPREMACY, 1890 - 1923 
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2.1 The Age of African Agricultural Prosperity: 1890 to 1908 
To appreciate the full impact of colonisation on the African agricul-
tural sector in Southern Rhodesia, it is necessary to understand the 
geography of the country. Southern Rhodesi a is di vi ded into three 
main regions: the fertile highve1d, the midd1eve1d, and the hot, arid 
1 owve 1 d. 1 ) 
The highve1d comprises land over 4,000 feet in altitude, and runs 
north-east to south-east across the centre of the country, with an 
offshoot north-west of Salisbury. The land in this region is pre-
dominantly flat, and forms the watershed between the Zanbezi, Limpopo 
and Sabi rivers. This area is the most fertile of the three main 
regions, and receives the largest portion of the rainfall. The high-
ve 1d forms 25 percent of the enti re country, and it was in thi s area 
that the Ndebe1e, and later the white settlers, chose to live. 2) 
Bordering the highve1d on the north-west and south-east lies the 
midd1eve1d. This land ranges between 3,000 and 4,000 feet in a1titude. 3) 
In sorre places the midd1eve1d is flat, particularly from Bu1awayo to 
the area near Wankie, where the railway runs in a strai ght line for 
nearly seventy-two miles. The major porti on of the mi dd1eve 1 d, however, 
is far more undulating than the highve1d; it comprises 40 percent of 
the country and most of the African reserves were to be established in 
thi s area. 
Finally, beyond the midd1eveld lies the hot, arid and often malarial 
10wve1d. This area consists of the Zambezi and Sabi-Limpopo valleys; 
the latter, predominantly flat country, and the forrrer, mountainous. 
The 10wve1d comprises 35 percent of Southern Rhodesia, and most of the 
land in this region is below 3,000 feet in altitude. It was not 
attractive to human settlerrent, lack of rain making it difficult to 
1) See Appendix I, Map 1, showing the three principal regions. 
2) The majority of the mineral wealth of the country is also to be 
found in this region, which is what attracted white settlers in the 
late nineteenth century. 
3) R.H. Pa1rrer, 'The agricultural History of Rhodesia', in R.H.Palrrer 
and Q.N. Parsons, (Eds.), The Roots of RuraZ Poverty in CentraZ 
and Souther.n Africa, (1971), pp.22l/2. 
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cultivate crops and tsetse fly inhibiting the breeding of cattle. 
There are two major soil types to be found in Southern Rhodesia. The 
predominant soils are the light sandveld variety, which are of low 
inherent fertility, and constitute 70 percent of the country's soil. 
These sandy soils are to be found mainly in the midd1e- and 10wve1d, 
the areas in which most of the African reserves were to be situated. 
The heavier red and brown loam and clay soils comprise 7 percent, and 
are found primarily on the highve1d, the principal area of white 
settlement. These soils are of a much higher fertility than the sandy 
sOils. 4) 
There are also two principal tribes in Southern Rhodesia: the Shona 
and the Ndebe1e. Although there were differences in their cultural 
convnunities in the nineteenth century, both tribes practised methods 
of shifting cultivation. This system was not as inefficient and 
primitive as the settlers, and later historians, believed. If one 
looks at the agricultural prospects prior to the arrival of the white 
settlers in 1890, taking into consideration climatic conditions -
erratic rainfall and the nature of the soil, in conjunction with popu-
lation-land ratios and the needs of the peop1e5) - it becomes increas-
ingly apparent that the general consensus as to the nature of African 
agricultural methods is grossly inaccurate. As M. Yude1man has put it, 
liThe methods of cultd vati on used at the ti me Europeans moved into the 
area were remote from those evolved by Jethro Tull, the father of the 
European agricultural revolution. Because there was no use for 
intensive land use, low yielding extensive methods of production were 
eJ1ll10yed. 1I6 ) This does not, however, imply that methods were 
inefficient; rather, as Lord Hailey put it, "shifting cultivation is 
less a device of barbarism than a concession to the character of the 
soil." 7) 
4) NAR ZAD 1/1/1 Resident Commisioner Salisbury to High Commissioner, 
8/9/1912. 
5) The estimated total African population in 1890 was only 250,000 
thus each man had sufficient land at his disposal. 
E.D. Alvord, 'Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure in 
Southern Rhodesia ' , Unpublished Paper, p.l. 
6) M. Yudelman, Afrioans on the Land, (1964), p.12. 
7) W. Allan, 'Changing Patterns in African Land Use l in JournaZ of 
RoyaZ Afrioan Sooiety of Arts, 108, 1960, p.612. ' 
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Under this system of cultivation, land was tilled continuoiJs·ly for up 
to four years, whereupon it was abandoned and allowed to lie fallow 
for a period of approximately fifteen years before being brought into 
use once more. During the interim, the natural coverage was allowed 
sufficient time to recover. B) 
When an area of land was selected for cultivation, all the trees were 
cut down, with the exception of those bearing edible fruit and those 
used for ritual purposes. The branches were then piled around the 
remaining boles. This task was undertaken by the men as only they were 
permitted to handle the axe. The land was then hoed by the women,9) 
after which it was left for a time, during which the wood piles dried 
out. The piles of wood were then burnt and the land left untouched 
again. Once the first rains had fallen, usually 'in December or 
January, planting was undertaken. There was no seed selection and 
seeds were not planted at regular intervals, but broadcast in a 
haphazard fashion. 10) The ashes from the burnt trees were hoed into 
the ground as a fertilizer. 
Fields were usually planted to a variety of crops: a small portion was 
planted to groundnuts, another to bambarra groundnuts - these being 
grown separately. On a large part of the field a mixture of kaffir 
com (mapfunde), finger millet (PUpoko), bullrush millet (munga), 
curcurbits and cowpeas (nyimo), were broadcast and hoed into the soil. 
Although maize was grown on the same land and mixed with other crops, 
small holes were made with the hoe, and several maize seeds planted 
in each. This method of mixed planting, later condemned by the 
settlers, was actually well-suited to the extensive systems of agri-
culture employed by Africans, particularly to those practised on 
sandy so11s. As different crops matured at different times, mixed 
planting ensured that, there was an adequate ground coverage throughout 
the planting season, thus preventing the soil from becoming scorched 
and dry from the fierce rays of the sun. Furthermore, it ensured there 
8) E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow', Unpublished. 
9) If virgin land was cultivated, the men assisted in this task 
because the ground was usually hard and unmanageable. 
10) NAR.ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission. 
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would be little or no water loss through run-off during periods of 
excessi ve rai nfa 11. 11) In W. Roder's words, 
... under conditions of thin soils and a tropical 
ecology, the Shona were in man~ ways, ~xce11ent . 
agriculturalists. Their practlses avolded the maln 
problems that plague Southern Rhodesia: soil 
erosion and declining fertility of the soil. Soil 
erosion was reduced by thick, mixed plantings of 
low leafy crops which leave no bare ground between 
grain stems, while roots of tree stumps and 
pollarded trees held the soil together. By 
shifting fields and letting land return to bush, 
they avoided prolonged periods of baring soil to 
eros ion. 12) 
Thus, contrary to attitudes prevailing in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Africans did have well-thought out reasons for 
the type of tillage methods they practised. 
New fields were up to four acres in size, and every year adjacent virgin 
land was brought under cultivation. After approximately four seasons, 
the whole area would be between 4 and 6 acres. At that stage, a portion 
of the first land would be abandoned and a new section added each year. 
In this way, each portion was cultivated for about four years and then 
allowed to revert to bush and grass. Alternatively, if over time 
fields came to be located too far from the village, the entire village 
was moved to a new site. This system of cultivation had a carrying 
capaci ty of 20 persons per square mi 1e, of whi ch 25 percent was 
cultivated, 5 percent wasteland, and the remainder was grazing land. 
Before the penetration of whites, when human and cattle numbers were 
sufficiently low relative to the availability of land, this system 
could be carried out effectively. Yields were low, but sufficient to 
cater to the subsistance requirements of the indigenous population. 
Demands on the ferti 1i ty of the soi 1 were not great because the bush 
fallow system allowed recovery. With the hoe as the only implement 
for CUltivation, and the practise of mixed planting, soil losses were 
11) Nevertheless, it was claimed that as a result of this practice, 
the land was supporting more plants per square yard than would 
ensure optimum output, thus crop yields were lower than would have 
been the case had more efficient tillage methods been employed. 
NAR ZBS 1/1/1, Native Production and Trade Commission. 
12) Wolf Roder, The Sabi VaZZey Irrigation Projects, (1965), p.57. 
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minimised. 13) In this regard W. Allen has written, 
We may assume, therefore, that as communities of 
men changed their methods of land use from 
hunting and food gathering, or herding and shep-
herding, to an increasing dependence on hoe 
cultivation, they acquired a substantial knowledge 
of the soils they used as a means of recognising 
and distinguishing them ... The shifting culti-
vator knew and understood his environment. He 
could assess the fertility of a piece of land and 
its suitability for one or other of his crops by 
the vegetation which covered it and the physical 
characteristics of the: soil, and he knew how long 
he could cultivate each varient and thi4Reriod 
required for restoration of fertility. ) 
The above passage would also refute the belief, held by many, that 
pre-colonial agricultural practises were static, and as such, 
inefficient and primitive. 
Agriculture was communal: the extended family was the main unit of 
production, and kinsmen were often called in to aid in the tasks of 
weeding, reaping, threshing and the breaking of new land. The older 
men usually supervised the work which was carried out primarily by 
the women and younger men. Specific tasks were allocated to each 
group: the females carried out most of the work of cultivation; while 
the tasks of preparing the land, herding the cattle, making decisions 
relating to cropping times, the planting of new lands and abandoning 
of old, were the preserve of the ma1es. 15 ) 
Prior to the arrival of the whites, the Shona lived on the high and 
midd1eve1d in the north-east of the country. Crop production was 
central to the Shona economY and the principal crop cultivated was 
~poko, which, due to its hardy, drought-resistant nature, was best 
suited to the sandy soils in this region. 16 ) 
13) This was because with mixed planting different crops matured at 
varying times, thus the earth was seldom exposed to the fierce 
rays of the sun. 
14) W. Allan, 'Changing Patterns of African Land Use', p.613. 
15) The traditional allocation of tasks was to have profound conse-
quences later, with the beginnings of the migrant labour system, 
particularly after the introduction of the plough, when culti-
vation too, became the task of the male. 
16) D.N. Beach, 'The Shona EconomY: Branches of Production', in R.H. 
Palmer and Q.N. Parsons (Eds.), The Roots of RuraZ Poverty, 
pp.42/43. 
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The main difficulty experienced was that of storage: grain could not 
be stored for long periods, and with no markets, storage of grain 
was not a viable proposition. To store grain in expectation of a 
dry period would result in the seed going bad if the drought was not 
forthcoming. If additional crops were cultivated each year in a 
similar expectation, they would go to waste as extra grain supplies 
we re not requi red in good years. In most cases, retenti on of grain 
from one season to .another was not possible anyway, owing to the 
vagaries of climate and the prevalence of insect pests. 17 ) 
The inherent fragility of the Shona economy, made cattle play an 
important role. Cattle lived longer, and were not subject to the 
vagaries of nature to the degree that crops were. In addition, they 
served important ritual and social purposes. It was these social 
roles designated to catt1e ·which compelled the Shona to increase their 
herds; they were only used as an insurance against drought in cases of 
absolute necessity. 
In contrast to the Shona, the Ndebe1e are usually classified as 
pastora1ists. Before white settlement in Southem Rhodesia, the 
Ndebe1e occupied the highve1d in the south-west of the country. The 
Matabe1e1and highve1d was free of tsetse fly and therefore ideal cattle 
country. It was usually claimed that the Ndebe1e relied for their 
agricultural requirements on raids into Mashona1and. Although 
raiding constituted an important part of the Ndebe1e way of life, they 
did cultivate their own crops, often using captured Shona (HoZi) for 
this task. 18) The regular raids on the Shona by the Ndebele were 
partly responsible for the decentra1ised nature of Shona tribes in 
comparison to the highly centralised Ndebe1e state. 
When the first white pioneers arrived in Mashona1and in 1890, it was 
17) 
18) 
W.J. Barber, 'Economic Rationality and Behaviour Pattems in an 
Underdeveloped Area: A Case Study of African Economic , Behaviour 
in ~he Rhodesias', in Eoonomic Development and CUltural Change, 
8, $960, p.239. 
This factor, that is, the different nature of the Shona and Ndebe1e 
ways of l~fe, was to ha~e important bearings in the early part of 
the ·twentleth century when the compact Ndebele homeland was dis-
rupted by white settlers, Vide Infra, p.17. 
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the mineral wealth of the country to which they were attracted, and 
not its land or agricultural potential. The development of a railway 
network, which followed the initial white settlement in, Southern 
Rhodesia, did much to open up the country, and was built mainly with 
the view to serving the interests of the mining industry. The first 
railway line to be opened was that linking the main mining centres. 
Between Bu1awayo and Gwe10, it followed the watershed along the high-
veld; but between Gwe10 and Salisbury, it passed through the midd1e-
veld in order to serve the principal gold mines. This main line of 
rail was completed by 1894, and that connecting Salisbury and Umtali 
by 1899 (this latter was a continuation of the Beira-Umta1i line which 
had been opened the previous year). By 1904 the rails had reached 
Wankie and Victoria Falls, thus connecting the Wankie coalfields with 
Bu1awayo. During the following years branch lines were constructed, 
mainly with the purpose of serving some mine or group of mines. At 
the onset of the Fi rst World War, the railway network servi ng Southern 
Rhodesia was almost complete, and very little construction took place 
thereafter. 19) It was sheer coincidence that the main route traversed 
the highve1d on which white farming came to predominate in the second 
decade of the twentieth century. 
Although the early settlers were lured to Southern Rhodesia by its 
mineral prospects, each white settler in Mashona1and was promised a 
farm of 1,500 morgen (approximately 3,000 acres). These farms could 
be pegged out anywhere, except on the gold belt whic~, until 1903, was 
reserved for the mines. By the end of 1891, over half of the pioneer 
land rights were in the hands of speculative companies, and by March 
1899, approximately 7,300,000 acres had been alienated in Mashonaland, 
mainly in the vicinity of the mining centres in Salisbury, Umtali and 
Fort Victoria (that is, on the fertile highveld); and in Matabeleland 
8,500,000 acres had been alienated on the highveld. 20 ) 
Land alienation in Matabeleland followed a different pattern from that 
in Mashona1and. In 1893 white settlers refused to assist the govern-
ment in pacifying the Ndebe1e unless granted certain concessions. These 
19) J.R. Day, Rai~ays of Souther-n Afriaa, (1963), p.95. 
20) R. H. Pal me r, Land and Racia Z Domination, p. 36 . 
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as stipulated in the Victoria Agreement of 189~ included fifteen 
reef and fifteen alluvial gold claims and a farm of 3,000 morgen 
(approximately 6,000 acres) anywhere in Matabe1e1and. In addition, 
Ndebe1e cattle were to be shared equally amongst the British South 
Africa Company (BSA Company), its officers and men.
21
) 
After the conquest of the Ndebe1e in 1893 white settlers moved into 
this area. The land that the settlers selected on which to peg out 
their farms was the fertile highve1d which had long been the Ndebe1e 
homeland. A Land Commission was set up in 1894 to seek a solution to 
the conflicting interests of the Ndebe1e and white settlers over land. 
In the same year a Matabe1e1and Order-in-Council instructed the 
Commission to set aside land for Africans in Matabe1e1and, sufficient 
for their occupation and to allow them to continue their agricultural 
and pastoral pursuits. 22 ) These areas were to be endowed with 
sufficient water supplies to cater for the inhabitants' needs. The 
Land Commission then assigned two large reserves, the Gwaai and the 
Shangani, which were 3,000 and 3,500 square miles respective1y.23) 
These measures were not deemed necessary in Mashona1and where the 
areas selected by the settlers did not usually encroach upon large 
areas of Shona settlement. The whites tended to choose the heavy soils 
of the highve1d, whereas the Shona usually cultivated light sandy soils; 
in addition, the scattered nature of the Shona popu1ation24 ) indicated 
21) The BSA Company claimed that the reasons behind the 1893 invasion 
of Matabe1e1and, was to bring to an end the Ndebe1e raids on the 
Shona. In addition, the mines required a labour force, and after 
disappointlTe.nts as to the extent of the mineral wealth in Mashona-
land, became convinced that the real wealth must lie in Matabe1eland. 
22) Offioia~ Year Book of the Co~ony of Southern. Rhodesia No.1 J924, p.203. 
23) See Appendix II, Map 2, 'Native Reserves 1894'. 
24) The decentra1ised nature of the Shona settlement may be attributed 
largely to the results of the Ndebe1e raids, and the necessity to 
seek shelter in hilly, naturally fortified areas. This also ex-
plains the so-called Shona preference for sandy soils. The 
predominantly flat highve1d offered no natural protection against 
the frequent onslaughts from the Ndebe1e, hence many Shona 
sought refuge in the rocky outcrops of the midd1eve1d. 
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that there were no densely populated areas such as existed in 
Matabe1e1and. 
The pressures exerted on the Ndebe1e when the white settlers occupied 
Matabe1e1and in 1894 were 1a'rge1y responsible for the 1896 uprisings. 
Tribal activities had been disrupted: raiding was banned, land and 
cattle were expropriated, and 1895/6 was a drought year accompanied 
by a plague of locusts and rinderpest which decimated both crops and 
cattle. 25 ) The combination of these factors led the Ndebele to rise 
up in open revolt in 1896, foll~wed by the Shona in 1897. 26 ) After 
these uprisings- reserves were assigned throughout Southern Rhodesia. 
This was partly a consequence of pressure exerted from the British 
governrrent; and partly ow,ing to an awareness ' on the part of the BSA 
Company that the mineral wealth of the country was not as vast as was 
originally anticipated, and that land w,es a viable alternative source 
of wealth. 
The British governrrent viewed the creation of 'native reserves' as a 
temporary expedient which would disappear once Africans became wage 
labourers and were incorporated into the exchange economy. They did 
not envisage the eviction of Africans from white owned land once white 
agriculture had becorre firmly entrenched. 27 ) The BSA Company entrusted 
the assigning of reserves to Native CommiSSioners, and the 1848 Order-
in-Council passed to this end had the same stipulations as that of 
1894 in Matabeleland, but it now applied to the whole country. 
By 1899, 16 reserves comprising 7,700,000 acres were allocated in 
Matabeleland, and by 1902 80 reserves comprising 17,100,000 acres in 
Mashonaland. In 1902 the Executive Council approved the boundaries 
and these were ratified in 1908 by the Colonial Secretary with the 
reservation that they were to be regarded as provisional and subject 





E.A. Nobbs, 'The Native Cattle of Southern Rhodesia', in South 
Afriaan JournaZ of Saienae, vol.XXIV, 1927, p.331. 
The reasons b'ehind"the-StfOha -riSirigs'-,were of a different nature: 
they feared that if the Ndebele conquered the whites, then the 
raids would continue as they had done of old, only with more in-
tensi ty than before because the Shona had not co-operated in the 
settlers' defeat. 
For further information on this, Vide Infra, pp.32/34. 
NAR ZAO 1/1/1 Southern Rhodesia Native Reserves Commission. 
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The reserves were allocated in a haphazard fashion by Native 
Commissioners who had no criteria upon which to base their selection 
of land. The only stipulations presented to them were that they could 
not select land already alienated to whites, land on the gold belts, or 
land adjacent to existing or projected railways. By 1900, 15,800,000 
acres had already been alienated to whites, and this constituted 
one-sixth of the entire country including the entire Ndebele homeland.
29
) 
In additior(,' 'tt was maintaine1t- that" the land selected for African 
occupation was, in most cases, of inferior quality. "Native reserves 
thus established," wrote Steele, "were often poor, sandy, low lying 
and arid, located in districts remote from main roads and railways. 
They were essentially an afterthought. The settlers had already taken 
the best land for mining and speculative purposes.,,30) 
During this period the only other sphere in which whites directly 
interfered in African affairs was that of labour. In 1894 a 10/- hut 
tax was imposed, the principal reason being the need for an abundant 
supply of cheap labour for the mines. 31 ) In 1904 this hut tax was 
superceded by a poll tax of £1 on each male, with an additional 10/-
for every wife after the first. 32) The African administrative sector, 
set up in 1894, came partly in response to this need for labour, and 
partly to control Africans and prevent a repetition of the 1893 
Ndebe1e rebellions. In the Order-in-Council of 1891, provision had 
been made for the "appointment of Executive Officers under the direction 
of the High Commissioner.,,33) Although not actually termed Native 
Commissioners, these officers did have control over the Africans as 
part of their duties. In 1894, following the Ndebe1e rebellion. the 
Native Department appOinted its first Native Commissioner (NC), and 
the following year Southern Rhodesia was divided into two provinces 
each under a chief Native Commissioner (CNC).34) These provinces were 
further subdivided into native districts (of which there were 32 by 







R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp.66/67. 
M.C. Steele, 'Foundations of a Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia, 
1923-19331 , (unpublished thesis, 1972), p.7. 
R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp.43/44. 
Ibid, pp.72/73. 
Official Year Book of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No.1 1924, 
p.203. 
See Appendix 3, Map l, showing 'The Two Provinces of Southern 
Rhodesia ' . 
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1896/97 rebellions the Native Department was reformed and reorganised, 
and stricter discipline was enforced under the control of NC's in 
order to ensure that such incidents would not re-occur.
35
) In 1902, 
the Native Affairs Department was formally constituted by the High 
C .. 36) ommlSSloner. 
The role of the Native Affairs Department in these years was primarily 
one of maintaining law and order and administering justice, collecting 
taxes and inducing Africans to seek work in the mining areas. The 
imposition of the hut tax, and even its doubling in 1904, was not 
sufficient incentive to induce the indigenous population to seek 
emp10yment. 37 ) Demands for African labour were growing, and when a 
steady supply was not forthcoming, attempts were made to improve con-
ditions on the mines to make work more attractive. In addition, 
organised recruiting was undertaken by the government-sponsored Rhodesia 
Native Labour Bureau, first established in 1904. 38) 
In these early years, Africans had little incentive to seek work on the 
mines because they were usually able to meet their financial obliga-
tions through the sale of agricultural surplus. The land policy 
prior to 1908 and the embryonic Native Affairs Department were not 
intended to curtail African responses to the agricultural demands of 
the mining sector. All interventions in land rights and allocations 
in Southern Rhodesia occurred on a purely speculative level: land was 
viewed as an additional source of income should the gold mines not 
produce the expected volume of wealth. This was especially true of 
the BSA Company itself which had spent a large amount of capital on 
railway construction. In addition, it was not thought that this sale 





By the early 1900's the post of one of the eNC's was withdrawh and 
H.J Taylor became CNC over the whole of Southern Rhodesia. 
Official Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No.1 1924, 
pp.202/3. 
This was because in these years Africans were still able to 
supply the food requirements of the mines, hence there was no 
need to seek wage labour. 
P. Scott, 'Migrant labour in Southern Rhodesia', in Geog~hical 
Review, No.44, 1954, p.30. 
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supply. This was largely because most of the labour needs in these 
years were met by foreign Africans who were attracted by the relatively 
higher wages offered on Southern Rhodesian mines. 
There were numerous obstacles militating against the expansion of 
white agriculture prior to 1908, and these explain the lack of inter-
ference with African agricultural practises in these years. It was 
gold which initially attracted the settlers, offering a quick and 
lucrative return. Some viewed the land they had been given as a 
speculative asset, but · very few were aware of its agricultural poten-
tial. In addition to the preoccupation with gold, there were other 
factors preventing the advancement of the whi te agri cultura 1 sector: 
the 1896/7 rebellions were the focus of much attention in the 1890's; 
rinderpest decimated the cattle population in 1895, and cattle numbers 
decreased from some 500,000 at the beginning of white settlement to 
25,000 in 1896-1898. 39 ) 
Furthennore, the transport network was still inefficient in these years, 
and the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 worsened the situation 
by bringing about the suspension of all traffic from the south. 40 ) 
1. Phimister has argued that this increased the dependency on African 
agricultural production when the severing of the rail link with the 
south caused a cessation in the importation of food supplies by some of 
the larger companies. He quoted the CNC for Matabeleland as saying, 
II(CMing to) the interruption of railway conununication with the south, 
and the high price of grain occasioned by the war, the natives have 
been able to trade their grain at a considerable Profit.,,41) Finally, 
the extent of settlement at thi s stage di d not offer suffi cient 
market opportunities for capital-intensive fanning on a profitable 
scale, and the settlers lacked sufficient capital to inaugurate an 




LA. Nobbs, 'The Native Cattle of Southern Rhodesia', in South 
Afriaan Journal of Saienae~ voLXXIV, . '1927, p.331. 
Offiaial Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No.1 1924~ 
p.293. 
loR. Phimister, IPeasant Production and Underdevelopment in 
Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914 1 , in Afriaan Affairs 1974 73 
p.222, quoting CNC Matabe1eland 1901. ~ ~ , 
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A report of the Civil Commissioner for Bulawayo in March 1895 stated 
that only 150 of the 1,070 white farms in his area were occupied, and 
that white farmers were cultivating an overall total of approximately 
900 acres or six acres per farm. 42 ) A settler in the 1890s was quoted 
as saying, "In those days no farmer grew grain, it being cheaper to 
trade the country's requirements from the natives."
43
) Any farming 
that was undertaken was done so in the same manner as that practised 
by Africans: hoe cultivation, the broadcasting of seeds and only 
scanty cultivation was undertaken. 44 ) 
The Africans responded readily to the demands placed upon them by the 
white mining sector. As yet, they were unaffected by land policy, and 
many of them remained on unoccupied white farms, no effort being made 
to evict them or push them into reserves. While there was still little 
pressure on the land, Afri cans were ab le to increase thei r acreages in 
order to produce a surplus for sale to whites. This is evident in the 
annual reports of several NCs of the time, " ... (the) acreage under 
cultivation is increasing considerably every year and mealies are very 
much more plentifully grown, this is due to trade." 45 ) Many Africans 
actually migrated to areas in the vicinity of the mines in order to be 
closer to centres of demand, "natives sell a good deal of meal to 
those working on the mines, and a general tendency is observable to 
migrate nearer to the mines so as to be nearer those markets for the 
more advantageous sale of produce. 1146) 
Prior to the arrival of the whites the principal crop cultivated by 
Africans had been rupoko. Soon after white settlement, however. the 
acreage of maize expanded at the expense of rupoko in order to meet 







R.H. Palmer, 'The Agricultural History of Rhodesia ' , p.228. 
Ibid. 
OffiaiaZ Yearbook of the CoZony of Southern Rhodesia No.1 1924, 
p.129. 
NAR N9/1/4 NC Annual Reports, NC Chi1imanzi, 1898. 
NAR N9/1/9-ll NC Annual Reports ., NC Lomagundi, 1906. 
~etween 1902/3 and 1908, the estimated acreage under all crops 
1ncreased from 556,974 to 736,265, and estimated probable yield 
of grain in 2001b bags, from 1,273,027 to 2,175,367, L.H. Gann, 
The History of Southern Rhodesia, p.149. 
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titre, "Mea1ies formerly were not grown in any quantity, it is only 
since the occupation that they have gone in for it on a large scale 
with the purpose of trading it to the white man." 48) Not only were 
acreages of maize increased, but Africans soon began to cultivate 
the variety introduced by the whites. In this connection, the NC 
for the Range convnented, 
Until 1907 the whi" te popu1 ati on depended on Afri can 
produced staples. The grain produced increased in 
response to this demand .... Africans grew a variety 
of maize with small flinty cobs in 1890. For this 
plant they soon substituted a variety introduced 
by Eu ropeans wi th 1 a rge r cobs. By 1909 the 1 oca 1 
variety had almost given way in the Umta1i district. 
With the new variety catre the expansion of ma~fe 
cultivation at the expense of finger millet. ) 
From the above it would appear that Africans were not as insensitive 
to market demands as was later maintained; and these points are worth 
bearing in mind when examining African responses to demand in later 
years, particularly in the 1940s. 
The opening of trading-stores in the reserves was partly responsible 
for the migration of SOtre Africans to areas in the vicinity of the 
mines. They were aware that in selling their grain to traders they did 
not achieve such high returns. Much of the profit from such sales 
accrued to middletren and not to the producers themselves. Many did 
make use of these trading stores, however, requiring only sufficient 
capital to treet their limited needs - mainly the pay trent of taxes. 
Contact with whites had not, as yet, created larger wants amongst the 
African population. The very existence of trading-stores, however, 
had the effect of creating new wants and needs among Africans, bringing 
them into contact with goods which the exchange economY was able to 
provide. In order to acquire such goods, they required a larger amount 
of capital, and the NC for Mrewa was of the opinion that this would have 
the effect of forcing more Africans into the labour market, 
The opening of trading stations of which there were 
three in this district last year, has had the effect 
of making the natives in proximity to these stations 
plant much bigger lands than usual, and most of 
\ . . . 
48) NAR N9/1/5-6 NC Annual Reports, NC The Range, 1899. 
49) Wolf Roder, op. cit., pp.84/85. 
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these stations do a big cash business. They have 
a good effect on the 1 abour question, as whenever 
you create a want, the native must have money to 
satisfy it .... most of the grain traded here finds 
its market in Salisbury as there are no mines in 
the district to supp1y.50) 
The following year the sarre NC stated, liThe purchase of grain by the 
traders for cash (from the Africans) ought to be restricted, as if 
it is going to continue at all, it will have a very bad effect on the 
supply of labour. 1151) In later years, many traders actually refused 
to pay Africans cash in exchange for their produce, but did so in 
goods. This acted as a device to force Africans onto the labour 
market: for once the desire for additional goods had been awakened 
in Africans. They required capital in order both to satisfy these and 
rreet their tax obligations. 
During the period 1890 to 1908 the Shona were more recepti ve to 
demands made on them from the mining sector than were the Ndebe1e. The 
labour once used by the Shona in maintaining defensive positions against 
the Ndebele could now be employed in agricultural production, and 
Shona manpower was no longer incorporated into the Ndebe1e state as a 
result of raids. 52) The Shona, then, preferred to meet their tax 
cOlllTlittrrents through the sale of crops . and cattle rather than by 
becoming mi grant 1 abourers. Thi sis veri fied by the fact that mi ne 
wages were rai sed - from between 5/- and 10/- a month in 1896 to between 
30/- and 80/- in 190353 ) - in order to make wage labour more attractive. 
In 1903, African sales of grain and livestock amounted to £350,000, and 
in the sarre year, wage earnings amounted to £100,000 - £150,000. In 
other words, agricultural sales totalled 70 percent of all cash earnings. 54) 
In 1902 13 percent of the Shona worked for three months, compared to 
48 percent of the Ndebele. 55 ) In view of this large discrepancy between 
the percentages of the two tribes involved in wage labour there must '< 
be explanations other than the cessation of raiding. The shattering 
50) NAR N9fl/5-6 NC Annual Reports, NC Mrewa, 1899. 
51) NAR N9/1/6 NC Annual Reports, NC Mrewa, 1900. 
52) L.H. Gann, A Histo~ of Southe~ Rhodesia, (1969), p.174. 
53) R.H. Palmer, Land and RaciaZ Domination, pp.71/72. 
54) Ibid. 
55) Ibid., p.72. 
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of the Ndebe1e economY after the 1893 revolt must be taken into con-
sideration. Their land was expropriated, their cattle seized by the 
settlers, and their raidi.ng brought to an end. Over and above this 
the Shona lived on the middle and highve1d in Mashona1and, the majority 
of mines being located in this area. They therefore had easy access 
to the main white markets and the railway. Their population was small 
and scattered, hence there was no pressure on the land. Furthermore, 
they were aided by the opening-up of many small mines in Mashona1and, 
which resulted in an increased demand for both beer and foodstuffs 
for the mine workers. 56) The Shona were able to take advantage of 
these opportunities, whilst the Ndebe1e were forced onto the labour 
market at a much earlier date than were the former. 
In addition to supplying maize, which soon became the staple diet of 
the African mine employees, the Shona also responded by increasing the 
variety of foodstuffs offered for sale: market vegetables were grown 
as demand arose, especially after 1907 when the new dietary regulations 
for the mines were passed. 57) An increasing number of cattle became 
available for sale, their numbers having increased after the 1895 
rinderpest epidemic. According to L.H. Gann, the number of African 
owned cattle increased from 63,564 in 1902/3 to 204,000 in 1908. 58) 
Cattle sales serve as an important indicator of the receptiveness of 
Africans to the new economY: in the past Africans were seldom willing 
to part with their cattle, their symbolic and ritual value holding 
more importance than their potential economic value; yet ~n demand 
from the mining centres they were willing to sell their animals. 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, it ·came to be 
realised that the earlier hopes of finding a second Witwatersrand were 
merely an illusion; but such hopes lived on. R.H. Palmer has attributed 




Increased demand from the mines actually caused food prices to 
rise; much of this increased demand resulted from the employment 
of foreign migrants on Rhodesian mines owing to lack of employment 
opportuni ties in thei r home countries. 
loR. Phimister, 'Peasant Production and Underdevelopment in 
Southern Rhodes i i 1890-1914', p.222. 
L.H. Gann, op. oit ., p.149. 
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other events: the 1896/7 risings and th,e Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 
which cut Rhodesia's rail links with the ~outh.59) The end of the 
Anglo-Boer War was followed by a mining boom, but this collapsed 
during the financial crisis of 1903-4. As a direct consequence of 
this, thoughts turned to the potential wealth of land; and an awareness 
grew of the important role of the African agricultural sector had 
assumed in the economY and the threat it posed to the future labour 
supply of the Colony.60) 
The tuming point in this period of African prosperity came in 1905 
with the enquiries of the BSA Company into land settlement schemes, 
and the establishment of a Land Settlement Committee in the same 
year. By 1908, when the white agricultural system began to expand, 
African agricultural opportunities gradually 'began to be reduced. 
2.2 The Road to Power: The Foundation of Future Policy 1908-1923 
The growing awareness that the mineral wealth of the country was not 
as extensive as was originally anticipated, led administrators to 
e~amine alternative possibilities for an economic base for the Colony. 
The other great asset was the land, and it was to this that thoughts 
were tumed in the first decade of the twentieth century. The formation 
of the Land Settlement Company represented the real isati on of thi s 
aim, and for the next decade all energy was expended in promoting the 
deve lopment of whi te agri culture. 
In 1891 the BSA Company had stated that "splendid as are the agricultural 
prospects of the country, it is to the mineral wealth that the directors 
II 61) 
look for the most profitable retums; but by 1912 the directors 
were telling the shareholders that, 
59) Official Yearbook of the Colony of Sout hern RhodEsia Vol. 1 1924 
p.293. 
60) L.H. Gann, op. cit. pp.174/175. 
61) V. Machengadzi, Company Rule and Agricultural Development: The 
Case of the BSA Company in Southern Rhodesia, 1908-1923 
(Seminar No.43, 1978), p.2. ' 
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The recent and continuous rise in land values, both 
in Sou the rn and Northe rn Rhodesia, is, in the vi ew 
of the board, the most striking feature of the 
present situation. In the early years of the cen-
tury, the mining industry was the Company's chief 
care. While the industry continues to receive such 
assistance as its circumstances require land is 
today claiming a much greater share of the Company's 
attention, and the industries connected with it are 
rapidly gaining ground now that capital is available 
for thei r support. 62 ) 
Thus it was that land came to assume a position of new importance in 
the eyes of the BSA Company and encouragement of land settlement and 
interest in white farming were the outward manifestations of this 
awareness. 
It was essential that white agriculture be promoted. It was hoped 
that a prosperous white agricultural sector would create greater 
economic self-sufficie'ncy, cut the import bill, raise the value of land 
and provi de more traffi c for the railway. In order to achieve these 
aims, however, two thorny issues had to be resolved: firstly, land 
currently held by speculative companies had to be made available to 
potential farmers; and, secondly, African agricultural competition had 
to be eliminated. In the ensuing years the promotion of white agri-
culture was advanced on these two fronts. 
The BSA Company began to charge rents to Africans living on unalienated 
land, and a rent of £1 per annum was levied on all Africans living on 
such 1and.63 ) This policy also served to fulfill the BSA Company's 
second aim: that of creating a larger labour force to serve the need 
of the mines and farmers. In this connection, the CNC for Mashonaland 
stated, "A commercial agent of the BSA Company informed me that it was 
intended to charge all adult natives living on unalienated land a rent 
of £1 per annum from the 1st of January 1909. NCs were told to warn 
natives under their control that they must either move into reserves 





Unalienated land was that which had been appropriated but not yet 
sold or granted to individuals or companys by the BSA Company. 
NAR N9/1/11 NC Annual Reports: CNC Mashonaland, 1908. 
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If Africans chose to move into the reserves, many would be forced to 
relinquish the ability to sell surplus. .agricultural products because 
of the general remoteness from markets of these areas. Those who 
chose to remain on white owned land came to play an important role in 
the development of nascent whi te agri culture. On occupied whi te 
farms, the landowners could exact rents or labour servi ces from thei r 
tenants, and they could also charge grazing and dipping fees; thus 
they were not only contributing financially to white agricultural 
development, but forming an all-important labour force. Those living 
on unalienated land were also welcomed as a source of revenue to the 
BSA Company. The government at this stage made no effort to evict 
Africans from the land because the white sector was still heavily 
re1ient on African agricultural production.65 ) 
The other method which the BSA Company used to create a labour force 
took the form of an attack on the absentee landlords: The Private 
locations Ordinance of 1908 stipulated that all agreements with 
tenants should be written and no longer merely verbal. Mr. R. Dinnis, 
former Under Secretary for Native Co-operatives, stated that all 
labour agreements must be written and Signed in the presence of a NC; 
these were no longer undertaken in a haphazard manner and conditions 
of the agreement were laid down, the contract having to be renewed 
each year. He stated further that these agreements were sti 11 in 
existe.nce in 1952.66 ) (Mners occupying land were obliged to take out 
a licence of 1/- per annum for each adult male residing on their farms. 
Absentee landlords, however, were obliged to pay 5/- per annum. A 
maximum of forty males were allowed on each farm of up to 3,175 acres. 
Africans in excess of this number were to move into the reserves. 67 ) 
In this manner, it was hoped that African competition would be 
eliminated and an adequate labour force created. G. Arrighi saw these 




The relevan~e of this m~y be seen when with the passing of the 
land Apport10nment Act 1n 1931, all labour agreements were to 
be ,terminated wi thin sev~n years of its passage, thus bringing 
to .an end, the last vest1ges of supposed African competition. 
Vide Infra, pp.48/49. 
Mr. R. Dinnis, Interview, October, 1979. 
R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, pp.89/90. 
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agriculture:- because markets were small, uand prices, :- being mainly 
determined by African production of marketable surpluses, fluctuated 
wi de ly from season to season,- u take off of European agri cul ture 
h k h · u68) ucould only be brought about by other t an mar et mec an1 sms. 
Labour services were a solution to the predominant problem of labour 
shortages, and rents and fees represented a source of capital 
accumulation. 
The charging of rents to Africans residing on white land had the 
desired results, and from 1909 the rate of migration of Africans from 
white areas accelerated. The proportion living in reserves increased 
from 54 per cent in 1909 to 64 per cent in 1922;69) and at the same 
time the rate of African production began to decline as poorer and 
more densely populated land was brought under cultivation. Thus, of 
necessity, many Africans were forced to seek wage labour. 
The consequences of this policy were to have a greater impact on the 
Shona than on the Ndebe1e. The latter were used to paying rents and 
preferred to remain on their traditional lands in order to do so, rather 
than move into reserves. In Mashona1and, however, there were fewer 
Africans in alienated areas - furthermore, many reserves were in close 
proximity to both mines and white farms and Africans were still able 
to market agricultural surplus. As white farming developed and the 
marketing of African produce was discouraged, the Shona increasingly 
realised the necessity of seeking wage employment which, after many 
years of acquiring cash through sale of agricultural surpluses, they 
we re re 1 uctant to accept. 
The second platform of reform - that of promoting white agriculture -
began in earnest when, in 1908, an Estates Department was set up to 
promote white settlement and deal with applications for land. In 
the same year, the Department of Agriculture was re-organised and the 
first Director of Agriculture, E.A. Nobbs, a scientifically trained man 
68) 
69) 
G. Arri~hi, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of 
the Afr1can Peasantry in Rhodesia', in JournaZ of DeveZopment 
Studies, 6,1970, p.209. 
M. Loney, Rhodesia: White Raaism and Imperial Response, (1975), 
p.53. 
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was appointed. 70) Experimental farms were opened and extension 
facilities offered to white famers. In 1912, a Land Bank was set up 
making credit available to persons of European descent only. 
Availability of these credit facilities alleviated the position some-
what. The Bank gave loans of up to £2,000 for the purchase of farms, 
livestock and agricultural equipment. 71 ) It was obvious, even in the 
absence of restrictive land policy, that with such assistence the 
white farming sector would soon surpass that of the African sector. 
The need for more land demanded by the Estate Department, however, 
necessitated readjustment of the original land distribution. In a 
letter to Gladstone in 1913, the Resident Commissioner stated that 
II ••• the increase of European land settlement and the construction of 
rai lways has led the BSA Company recently to press for constant re-
adjus tments of the Nati ve Reserves. II 72) 
In the years immediately following 1908, debates ensued as to the 
desirability of undertaking re-adjustments to existing reserves. In 
May 1914, the British government set up the Southern Rhodesia Native 
Reserves Commission under the chairmanship of Robert Coryndon; and 
the High Commissioner was ordered to, 
Visit and examine the existing Native Reserves and 
to have sped a 1 regard to the suffi ciency therei n 
of land suitable for the agricultural requirements 
of the natives, including in all areas, a fair and 
equi tab 1e proporti on of spring or permanent water 
.... In so doing you shall have regard not only to 
the present requirements of the natives, but also 
to thei r probab 1e future necessities, consequent 
upon the spread of white settlement land now oc-
cupied by natives but not falling within the 
reserves, and to the probable extension of these 
requirements by reason of natural increase of 
popu1 ati on .73) 
Although the Commission was supposed to treat Africans fairly in 
allocating land for their occupation, it is doubtful whether this need 
was accorded the same treatment as that for additional land in areas 
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The final report of this Commission, only published in 1920, suggested 
alterations to existing African land ho1dings,74) the final area 
reserved for Africans amounting to 21,594,957 acres.
75
) II Certain 
defined lands", the Commission's report stated, "known as Native 
Reserves are vested in the High Commissioner and set apart for the sole 
and exclusive use and occupation of the Native inhabitants of 
Southern Rhodesia." 76 ) The demands of the Commission were met by the 
Estates Department which presided over the Commission, but much debate 
was to follow before the report was finally accepted by the Legislative 
Assembly. 
As early as 1903, one _NC was heard to have sai d, 
I am strongly in favour of abolishing the large 
Na ti ve Rese rves and in 1 ie u the reof gi vi ng 
them individual title on the quit rent system. 
If this were done it would facilitate the labour 
question to a certain degree; whereas at present 
the natives living in these reserves cultivate 
as much ground as they please, the products of 
which are in excess of their consumption and 
the large remaining surplus they sell to traders 
in order to meet thei r hut tax, and by thi s mode 
of living the average Mashona does not require 
to look for work. I f a nati ve owned ali mi ted 
piece of land which would only produce sufficient 
grain for his own consumption he would be bound 
to go out in search of emp 10yment in order to 
earn enough money to pay his tax. lin) 
That such consideration was not given heed to prior to the second 
decade of the twentiet.h century is indicative of the important role 
African agriculture played prior to this period. 
By 1914, however, this leniency regarding African landholdings had 
abated somewhat, and in that year Sir Percy Inskipp, the Commercial 
Representative of the BSA Company, brought attention to this subject. 
He wrote, 
74) See Appendix 4, Map 4, showing the reserves prior to 1920. 
75) OffiaiaZ Yearbook of the CoZony of Southern Rhodesia No.2 1930, 
p. 286. 
76) Ibid. 
77) NAR N3/6/3 NC Makoni, 1903. 
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In some cases it has been made easy for natives to 
obtain the use of additional land. If the native 
finds himself getting overstocked he only has to 
apply for additional land to get it. The Euro-
pean fanners say these nati ves are competing wi th 
them, they breed cattle, sell stock, grow grain 
and sell grain. If the white man overstocks his 
farm he has to do one of two things: either to 
b~ more land or sell cattle. Owing to the 
position in which the native is placed, he can go 
on increasing his herds, and when his lands are 
fully stocked he applies for more land and 
usually gets it and he need not sell his stock 
unless he wants to. 78) 
Thus it was that the Africans' treatment in the allocation of land 
only came to be questioned and examined at a time when white agriculture 
was struggling to assert itself and attain a position of predominance 
over Afri can farming. 
A further important consideration taken into account when deciding how 
to readjust the reserves, was the importance of the tobacco industry 
in which the white farming sector was becoming increasingly interested. 
In 1912 the Resident Commissioner wrote as follows, 
It has been customary in the past to regard certain 
soil s as sui tab 1e for European settlement and 
others for native occupation. A change in this 
respect is, however, observable. It has been 
found that light sandy soils are usually inhabited 
by natives, owing to the facility with which they 
can be culti vated, are eminently sui ted to the 
cultivation of tobacco, and in some instances, 
wheat. Such 1 and, therefore, is now being readi 1y 
taken up by Europeans. There is also a tendency 
among nati ves who have learnt the use of the 
plough to culti vate richer and heavier soils which 
are able to take crops of grain for a greater 
number of successi ve years than from the 1 i ght 
sandy soils which need scientific treatment after 
being cultivated successfully for two to three 
years. 79) 
the BSA Company was keen to promote the cultivation of these sandy 
soils, because it would entail the extension of white farming areas 
into land further removed from the main mining centres and railways, both 
of which were situated predominantly on the highveld, that is, on the 
dark, heavy soils. 
· 78) NAR ZAD 3/1/1 Bul~wayo 2!7/~91~, state",:nt by Sir Percy Inskipp. 
79) NAR ZAD 1/1/1 Resldent Commlssloner Sa11sbury to High Commissioner, 
8/9/1912. 
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That the Native Reserves Commission report was not implemented until 
1920, resulted partly from the interruption occasioned by the First 
World War, and partly from the continuously conflicting aims of the 
various parties interested in readjusting the reserves. When the 
report was finally published in 1920, 83 reserves of various sizes on 
a total acreage of 21,594,597 were assigned. 80) In addition to the 
675,499 Africans in the reserves, there were 375,000 living on 
unalienated and white-owned land. Of the entire country, 23 per cent 
was assigned to reserves, 32 per cent alienated to individuals and 
co~anies, and 45 per cent earmarked for future allocation. 81) In 
the reserves, terms of tenure were to follow those of the old tribal 
system: communal grazing rights, and individual arable holdings granted 
by the chiefs. 82 ) In unassigned and undeveloped areas, Africans 
continued to live as they had done in the past, no attelJl)t being made 
at that time to force them into thei r own areas. 
Although whites were anxious to prevent the acquisition of land by 
Africans which under the terms of the 1898 Order-in-Council, they were 
ab 1e to buy, concem was expressed by the Bri tish Govemment and the 
missionaries. The latter feared that by the time Africans had accumu-
lated sufficient capital to enable them to purchase land, all the best 
land would have been alienated to whites. 83) Thus by 1918, whites 
began to demand segregati on of 1 and ownership and other protecti ve 
devices to shield themselves against possible competition from African 
agriculturists. The " fears of the missionaries and the Native Affairs 
Department, however, were of a different nature - that the African 
was not yet equipped to cOlJl)ete wi th whites in an open 1 and market. 
These consi derati ons, however, only gathered momentum in the years 
immedi ate 1y after the grant of se If-govemment in 1923. At thi s stage, 
they were merely latent desires expressed by various parties; and most 
attention in the years prior to self govemment was focused on the 
development of the European agricultural sector, the search for a 
staple crop to stabilise this sector, and the elimination of African 
competition in this sphere. The Native Reserves Comrnission's report 
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these goal s . 
The role played by the BSA Company in furthering the aims of the white 
fanners was 1 i mi ted re 1ati ve to government i nterventi ons whi ch were 
to occur in ensuing years, particularly in the 1930s. The BSA Company 
itself had established several large estates and was engaged in the 
large scale production of tobacco and fruit, and cattle ranching. In 
1907, the Company's col1ulE rei a 1 and gove rnmen ta lope ra ti ons we re sp 1 it, 
and marketing organisations and precessing enterprises fell outside 
direct government control. Thereafter, the advancement of white farming 
was to occur through the operation of pri vate enterpri se and companies, 
of which the BSA Company was only one. 84) Direct government inter-
vention - in the fields of production and provision of price supports 
or assistance in marketing - was avoided. The only assistance offered 
by the government in those years was the taxation of Africans, which 
. in some cases forced them onto the labour market, and a law making 
the dipping of cattle compulsory which helped curtail the rampant 
spread of contagious diseases. All the efforts of the Department of 
Agriculture were focused on the conduct of research and the offer of 
extension services. 85 ) 
Despite lack of government intervention on behalf of white fanners, 
the whi te farming sector di d expand. It was to the advantage of the 
white farming sector that it was confined largely to mining centres and 
along the line of rail. By 1913, approximately 12,500,000 acres had 
been alienated by the BSA Company to individuals and small companies, 
and of this over 80 per cent was within 25 miles of the railwayline. 86 ) 
Further from the rail most of the land was held by companies or 
retained by the BSA Company, but most of it was not utilized. The 
nunber of white fanners occupying farms increased from 545 in 1904 to 
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white farmers, who concentrated primarily on maize and cattle pro-
duction to meet these demands. 88) Tobacco production wa~ gaining in 
importance and maize production was facilitated by the opening up of 
the gold-belt to farming - an area consisting largely of the heavy 
red soils which were ideal for the cultivation of maize. Production 
of this crop increased from 45,815 (2031b) bags in 1903/4 to 634,133 
(2031b) bags in 1913/14. By 1924, 78 per cent of the land cultivated 
by whites was devoted to maize production. 89 ) 
The cattle industry expanded from the base provided by African cattle. 
The Director of Agriculture, E.A. Nobbs, stated in this connection, 
that African cattle n ... have been found to make an excellent 
foundation, being extremely hardy amd immune, or nearly so to many 
diseases of the tropics, qualities which are transmitted to a con-
siderable extent to their graded descendents ... Matabe1e cattle have 
served as a valuable foundation on which the European farmers have, 
by the use of bulls of British breeds, built up their present 
excellent breeds. n90 ) It was believed that Southern Rhodesia was 
i deal cattle country, and thi s view was reinforced when in 1911 
Nobbs claimed that Southern Rhodesia was nessentia11y a stock country. 
The conditions of the country point strongly to meat as the principal 
ultimate product to be elaborated of (sic) · our ve1d ... Arab1e farming 
must rank below stock farming in importance, profitability and use-
fu1ness. n91 ) 
The BSA Company in 1919 claimed, n ... from a ranching point of view 
Rhodesia is exceptionally well favoured in three important respects. 
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herds there is a good foundation stock available at a low price. 1I92 ) 
The white cattle industry continued to expand on the base of African 
cattle, which were purchased at very low prices, particularly in times 
of drought and famine when a source of income was necessary to pur-
chase essential food requirements. In this connection, the Native 
Superintendent for Umtali stated that, llreserve natives are practically 
living on roots and wild yams. Some are dying of starvation. It is 
imperative that grain should be supplied for cash as well as grain in 
exchange for cattle and the price shouldnlt exceed 12.00 per bag or 4 
bags for a really good cow. 1193) The following statement indicates the 
importance of cattle to Africans; the alternatives to sale of cattle 
in poor years were starvation or the necessity to seek wage labour: 
IIIn the south-west ... all cattle were sold or killed in the famine of 
1912. The old men are paupers, while the younger men are away at 
work. 94) Once the he rds of wh i te farmers had reached a moderate size, 
the prices offered for African stock decreased markedly and the last 
source of income available to the Afri can, other than that of wage 
labour, dwindled. 
After 1916, Southern Rhodesia, which had until then been a net importer 
of cattle, began to export stock, and for a while cattle ranching became 
a profitable undertaking. This was particularly true during the First 
Worl d War when the meat. market expanded as demand increased. Thi s 
prosperity was short-lived, however, and when the post-war boom 
collapsed in 1921/22, cattle prices fell and the internal market was 
unable to absorb the surplus. As cattle numbers continued to increase, 
p ri ces fe 11 even furthe r. 
Other agricultural sectors felt the impact of war possibly more than 
those involved in the cattle industry which had managed to establish 
export markets by 1916. In all sectors of the economy :there was a 
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in the armed forces. This resulted in the abandonment of many fanns 
and reduction of activity on others. The Director of Agriculture said 
of white farmers in 1916 that, "a nunber are away on active service, 
and their fanns are occupied by substitutes or worked by neighbours, 
and in some cases have been temporarily abandoned."95 ) By this time 
the effects of the absence of manpower from the agricultural sector 
was al ready being felt and " ... by 1916 the full impact of the war 
was felt as extremely limited stocks of all materials in Southern 
Rhodesia for agricultural production were exhausted."96 ) 
The infant tobacco industry was one of the hardest hit. Production 
had reached a peak in 1914, whereafter prices slumped as the limited 
South Afri can market became overstocked. Unl ike other crops ', tobacco 
collapsed through overproduction, but little attempt was made during 
the war to recti fy thi s, and it was not until six years 1 ater that 
tobacco began to recover. Unsuccessful experiments in other crops 
we re unde rtaken, and wi th the fai 1 ure of those crops, tobacco and the 
cattle industry, more and more land came to be reverted to the culti-
vati on of mai ze for whi ch there was a continual i nterna 1 demand, 
particularly since maize came to be the staple diet for African mine 
employees. 
Nevertheless, maize was also to experience an overproduction crlS1S in 
the 1920s. At the end of the First World War, the position of the 
white fanning sector had imp,roved when increased mining activity 
created new internal demands for agricul tural produce, and external 
demand increased as "depleted national larders" required replenishment. 97) 
This period of prosperity was short1ived, however, and in 1921 a 
general recession set in as production fell to prewar levels: "markets 
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were reflected on internal prices which dropped correspondingly.1I98) 99) 
This general insecurity in the white agricultural sector was to lead to 
increased clamouring for govemnent intervention in production and 
marketing in the peri od invredi ate ly after se If-govemnent was granted 
in 1923. Despite the teething problems, experienced in this sector, it 
was still able to surpass and triumph over African agriculture in this 
peri od. 
When maize began to be grown in abundance in the gold belt area, it 
had the advantage 'of having both the best soil and easy access to 
markets in the mining centres. African markets in this . area were 
thus taken over by whi te farmers. In addi ti on, as the tobacco 
industry expanded with its preference for light sandy soils, many 
Africans in Mashonaland lost access to the land which they had 
traditionally cultivated. The expansion of the white cattle industry 
at the same tine as that of the African, resulted in increased compe-
tition for grazing lands. The whites began to challenge Africans for 
markets, cattle and land, beginning what Palner has termed lithe 
squeezing-out process ll • 100) I 
Prior to 1914, white farmers had not forced Africans off their land. 
If they chose to leave through pressure created by the il1J,)osition of 
taxes and other devices, they were free to do so, but whites were 
reluctant to force thei r eviction because at this stage they supplied 
crops, labour services and also revenue through fees and rents. By 
1914, however, competition for African labour between the mines and 
the fanners had increased. In 1905, Southern Rhodesi a needed a labour 
force of 25,000, but by 1920 the mines alone required 39,000 and the 
fanners 23,000. 101 ) To complicate matters, white farmers required 
seasonal labour at precisely the same time that Africans planted their 
own crops, and they were reluctant to work for whi te farmers during this 
98) Ibid. 
99) The above survey c1ained that this recession coincided with one of 
a similar nature in the mining industry which also reduced internal 
markets. This uncertainty was to continue for more than ten years. 
100) R.H Pa1ner, Land and RaciaZ Domination in Rhodesia, pp.80/81. 
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period. Thereafter, farmers became re1ient upon migratory labour from 
depressed African areas. 
To ~chieve the twin goals of both reducing African competition which 
had become a larger threat during the war years, and discontinuing the 
general refusal of Africans to work, white farmers began imposing 
higher rents, and grazing and dipping fees on their African tenants. 
Such action, it was hoped, would force more Africans into the reserves 
which were further away from the main markets. 102 ) In this manner, 
both goals were achieved: competition was of necessity reduced, and 
Africans were forced to seek wage labour because of their inability 
to realise a sufficient cash income through the sale of agricultural 
surp 1 us . 
The natural consequence of this movement of increasing numbers into 
the reserves during these years was the acceleration of congestion in 
these areas. Access to markets was denied them owing to the remoteness 
of many reserves from the main centres of economic activity. African 
crop production began to decline, partly as incentive waned with 
diminishing market potentials, and partly as the practise of extensive 
methods of agri culture became increasingly di ffi cult to execute under 
congested conditions. Furthermore, cattle numbers increased rapidly 
during this period, placing more pressure on the land, and incentives 
to dospose of this surplus through sale deteriorated with the collapse 
of the cattle market in the 1920s.103) 
The post-war slump from 1921 to 1923 worsened the already deteriorating . . 
situation. During the war-years, the Africans had been able to sell 
cattle and crops at inflated prices owing to the absence of many white 
farmers in the armed forces. In 1921, however, prices for agricultural 
products dec 1 i ned and Afri can earni ngs decreased correspondingly. In 
1920, African sales of grain to white traders was estimated at 198,000 
bags at 10/- a bag, but in 1921 this price had fallen to 5/- a bag. 104) 
102) Ibid., p.97. 
103) For additional information on the African Cattle Industry, Vide 
Infra, Ch.4, Part 1. 
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At this low price trade actually became uneconomic in many districts 
despite a good harvest and in 1921 only 43,600 bags were purchased from 
Africans. 105) In 1921, an estimated 20,000 head of cattle were sold 
by Africans at £7-£8 a head, but by 1922 this demand had practically 
ceased. 106) At the same time, the prices of consumer goods widely 
purchased by Africans increased by 165 per cent but African wages rose 
by a mere 13 per cent. 107) The increased numbers of Africans on the 
labour market owing to difficulties experienced in the agricultural 
sector explains this decline in wage levels: Arrighi maintained that 
in 1900 sale of produce contributed 70 per cent of total African cash 
earnings; by 1932, however, this contributed barely 20 per cent. 108) 
This would indicate that an increased number of Africans were procuring 
capital through alternative sources - in this case, urban employment. 
An additional consequence of the slump in the early 1920s was that 
many Africans moved into the reserves, having no incentive to remain 
near markets in areas in Vttlich they were obliged to pay rent when sale 
of produce was becoming uneconomic. Having made this decision to 
migrate to reserve areas, future possibilities of gaining financial 
requirements through sale of crops was negligible. Thus, whilst for 
whi te fanners the s lump was mere 1y a temporary downward trend in the 
business cycle, for the African this situation was, in many ways, 
irreversible. 
The migratory labour system itself led to deterioration of conditions 
in themselves: tasks aSSigned to males - such as herding, preparing 
new land, and making decisions relating to cropping times, harvesting, 
the opening of new land and abandoning of old - were impeded. This 
problem was accentuated when the use of the plough gained popularity, 
and cultivation of the land passed from being the task of the women, 
to that of the men. 
During the period of BSA Company rule, the future of Southern Rhodesian 
African policy was formulated and all developments in ensuing years 
105) Ibid. 
106) Ibid. 
107) R.H Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.148. 
108) G. Arrighi, op. cit., p.216. 
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were to revolve around the initial distribution of land and the motives 
behind it. The establishment of reserves with the reservation that 
they were to be a temporary expedient, led to lack of careful considera-
tion in their selection, and the large-scale movement of Africans 
into these areas as a result of white pressure in order to curb 
competition and procure a labour supply, was to have important 
repercussions on the African agricultural economY in future years. 
"Responsible Government is to be. The Trial is to be made. 
Some will go into it with confidence, some with forebodings, 
but it is up to all to try and make the best of it. To the 
confident I would say, take care there will be difficulties, 
there will be mistakes. Along the path you have to tread 
you need to be accompanied by all classes and conditions, 
do not needlessly alienate any of them. 
To the forebodi ng I ':Ioul d say, have courage, and remember :, 
there is little satisfaction in" prophesies of failure coming 
true where that failure be due to your own action or inaction. 
Yes! The Trial has to be made, and, if some elixir can be found 
to soften the pride of victory, to sweeten the bitterness of 
defeat, if all according to their natures, will work their 
hardest in the venture to which all are committed, I am confi- . 
dent the people of Rhodesia are capable of building up a state 
worthy of their character and hopes, and worthy of their founders 
name". 
R., Macquire, 'Rhodesia", P.95. 
T HE PARADOX I N WHITE POLICY : 
£EVELOPMENT rn DISCRIMINATI~, 1923 - 193) 
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3.1 Land Apportionment: The Birth of Future Policy 
With the transition from BSA Company rule to responsible government 
under Coghlan in 1923, African policy entered a new phase. The BSA 
Company's policy had been based on " ... care and maintenance ... 
conducted by a special department which had administered Native 
Affairs in an unruffled and thoroughly pragmatic manner."
1
) After 
1923, however, attempts were made to develop Africans in their own 
aneas. Although responsibility for African affairs was transferred 
from the BSA Company to the settler government, final authority in 
this sector nemained in the hands of the Crown. As H.M.G. Jackson 
pointed out, however, this factor held more weight on paper than in 
practi ce, 
There is a constitutional check upon legislation 
directly affecting natives. All such laws must 
receive the King's assent .... In practise it is 
difficult to conceive of a case where the king 
would be advised to withhold his assent. In 
practise the will of the local P2~r1iament may be 
said to be the dominant factor. ) 
This provision in the new constitution, Gann maintained, " ... protected 
Africans against possible abuses rather than promoting development. 113) 
In theory, this provision perpetuated the negative attitude of the 
BSA Company towards African administration. In practise, however, 
the Coghlan ministry did implement the move towards formal segregation, 
and initiated the policy of developing rather than augmenting the 
reserves, both of which were carried to their conclusion by the 
successive Moffat and Huggins administrations. 
In examining the first of Coghlan's aims - the move towards segregation -
light will be shed on the appanent paradox implicit in these two goals: 
the attempt to develop African agriculture while at the same time 
moving towards fuller segregation, one of the aims of which was to 
curtail the advancement of Africans in any area which might threaten 
white predominance. Coghlan's government continued to encourage land 
1) M.C. Steele, 'Foundations of a Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia' 
1923 - 1933', p.314. ' 
2) H.M.G. Jackson, 'The Natives of Southern Rhodesia: Their Position 
After Ten Years Under Responsible Government', in The Afrioan 
Observer, 1, 1934, p.19. 
3) L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, p.249. 
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settlement, and to this end the Land and .Agricu1tura1 Bank of Southern 
Rhodesia was set up in 1924, through which loans and credit facilities 
were made available to white farmers. As a result, the number of 
immigrants to Southern Rhodesia rose. 
During this period of increased inunigration and expansion of white 
farming, attitudes towards the rule of the 'Native Reserves' underwent 
a fundamental change: they came to be seen as areas where Africans 
could develop along their own lines, and tribal customs maintained in 
an unadulterated form, as opposed to previous attitudes which viewed 
reserves as a temporary expedient ceasing to be necessary as Africans 
were absorbed into the exchange economy. W.J. Barber maintai~d that 
this decision was largely adapted as a means of preventing the flow 
of substantial amounts of capital into African areas. And, in 
reality, the retention of tribal insitiutions as the means of admini-
stration and rule were illusory, for these were merely channels 
through which instructions were communicated. 4) In this connection, 
Barber has stated that, II ••• (the) tribal structure was rehabilitated 
and recast in such a fashion as to ensure its responsiveness to 
European di recti on. 115) 
The Legislative Assembly encouraged the establishment of Native 
Councils in furtherance of this end; and at one of the parliamentary 
sessi ons it was stated that, 
The tribal system had been evolved by time and 
circumstance and it was peculiarly suited to the 
needs of the natives .... the best features of that 
system ... cou1d be retained by the initiation of 
those native councils which had been provided for 
in their constitution. The effect of these 
councils would be to study the point of view of 
the natives at close quarters .... study the con-
dition of the natives' daily life, to get a correct 
focus of the capaci ty for deve 10pment of reserves 
and of the nati ves .... the present system of control 
was based on an almost uniform law for black and 
white, irrespective of colour, traditions or 
capaci ty ... the system was ineffi cient to meet the 
varying and divergent needs of black and white ... 




a modified system of local control under the 
supervision of nominees of the, government was the 
only practical way out of the difficulty. By 
these councils in his (Moffat's) opinion, the 
native would be assisted to build up a system of 
civilization of his own, a system built up with 
due regard to his peculiar and primitive needs 
and modified to meet the conditions, altered by 
his contact with the whites. 6) 
Thus it was that although ,l,ocal control was to be promoted in the 
tribal areas, those fi gures of local control were to be government-
appointed and not in the customary tribal manner. 
Nevertheless, the complete dislocation and breakdown of the tribal 
sys tern was to be reversed after nearly twenty years of attempts to 
foster its disintegration. It was decided that reserves must be 
developed at all cost, particularly those in the more remote areas, 
and Africans persuaded to settle on this land. Decisions pertaining 
to the advancements which were to be projected in African areas were 
much infl uenced by developments occuring in the whi te farming sector. 
During the 1920s white agriculture was gaining a f,oothold and assuming 
an important position in the econolllY; the settlers economic position 
was enhanced and their political power entrenched. The result of 
this was an increasingly successful attack on the African peasantry 
in order to safeguard their own position. The form which this attack 
assumed was a demand for the segregation of land ownership. 
A period of renewed expansion which followed in the wake of the 1921-23 
slump was largely responsible for this change in outlook. This 
expansion was facilitated by the new settler govemment which en-
couraged the development of white agriculture. How these developments 
were to be realised were discussed by the Legislative Assembly, and 
in 1924 it was stated that, 
The Govemment must adopt a more progressive 
development policy with a view to 1) bringing a 
greater mood of prosperi ty to the agri cu1 tura 1 
community and thereby the whole Colony 2) placing 
further settlers on the land under ci rcumstances 
6) NAR Debates of the LegisZative AssembZy, 1924, pp.1127/8. 
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in which they are likely to succeed 3) encou~ag~ng 
the production of exploitable crops by natives 1n 
Nati ve Reserves ... 7) 
It was further stated that, 
... schemes proposed which aimed at shortening that 
anxious time when they had too much for the home 
markets and too little for the European market, 
was based on three principles: 1) cheapen the 
cost of production 2) increase the acreage under 
cultivation 3) enlist the assistance of that 
very big asset belonging to us: the native. 8) 
Nevertheless, the assistance of the Africans was not encouraged in 
any way except that of providing a continuous supply of cheap labour, 
until the 1940s. 
In the 1920s, attempts made in the reas1isation of the above aims were 
to take the form of debates urging further segregation of land for 
Africans and whites, culminating in 1930 with the passage of the Land 
Apportionment Act.9) On a more practical and immediate level, the 
govemment set out to deve lop whi te agri culture by i mprovi ng facil i ties 
in the rural areas. This was to be accomplished "through an active 
programme of provision for communications, road, telephone, postal 
services .... markets were sought and established in neighbouring 
territories, mainly for livestock produce, and on the British market 
for tobacco, citrus and cotton." 10 ) The average annual expenditure 
of the Department of Agriculture rose from £33,468 in 1918/19 - 1922/23 
to £75,636 in 1923/24 - 1928/29. The number of white farmers increased 
from 1,324 in 1911 to 2,355 in 1921. During the years 1915 to 1925, 
8,000,000 acres were alienated to whites, bringing the total white 
area to over 31,000,000 acres. (Over one-third of Southem Rhodesia.) 11) 
Ini ti ally, only 1 and wi thi n 25 mi les of the railway had been con-
sidered economic from an agricultural point of view; with this expansion, 
however, land further removed from the line of rail came under cultivation. 
7) Ibid.,p. 1295. 
8) Ibid. ,po 1312. 
9) These debates will be discussed later in this chapter. 
10) R. And~rson and Department of Native Agriculture, Southem Rhodesia, 
An AgnculturoZ Survey of Southern Rhodesia, Part Two: The Agro-
Economic Survey, p.16. 
11) R.H. Palmer, Land and RaciaZ Domination, p.145. 
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In the Agro-Economi c Survey, it was stated that, ::by 1927 most Crown 
land within fifty miles of the rail had been alienated and there was a 
spreading of SOIre ranching activity into the lowve1d. 1I12 ) 
White agriculture continued to be dominated by maize and cattle in 
this period. Although maize continued to be the major crop produced, 
production fluctuated in this period: in 1914/15 916,926 (2031b) bags 
were produced; by 1922/23 this had increased to 1,505,580 (2031b) 
bags. This number fell in 1925/26 to 1,068,904 (2031b) bags. Maize 
exports rose from 346,855 (2001b) in 1915, to a peak of 774,449 
(2001b) b~gs in 1923, thereafter dropping to 383,338 (2001b) bags in 
1925. 13) Referring to this instability in the maize industry, 
F.H.G. Mundy, Chief Agriculturalist and Botanist, stated in 1921 that, 
" ... pennanent agricultural stability will never be maintained in this 
country by grain growing alone. At best it can be regarded as a lreans 
to an end .... 1114) Uncertainty in this sector led to the search for 
other more secure staples. 
There was a cotton boom in 1924/5, which had aroused farlrers interest 
owing to high prices and the removal of transport difficulties. 15) 
Furthermore, improved rural credit facilities stimulated the revival 
of the tobacco industry which had collapsed in 1914. The increase in 
rebate under the Imperial Preference Schelre, from one-sixth to one-
quarter of the full import duty, a preference of 2/- per 1b of tobacco, 
and an influx of new settlers, were further factors influencing this 
renewed interest in tobacco. 16 ) Output increased from 426,423 1bs in 






Agro-Economic Survey~ Ope cit.~ p.16. 
R.H. Pa1lrer, Land and Racial Domination, p.l46. 
F.G.H. Mundy, 'The Interdependence of Crop Rotation and Mixed 
Fa~ing', in Rhodesian A~ricultuPal Journal, Vo1.18, 1921, p.344. 
Abrldged Report of the D1 rector of Agriculture for the year 1923 
in ~h~de~ian Agricultural Journal, Vo1.21, 1924, p.399. ' 
Officn.al: Y~~rbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia Vol.:3 J930, 
p.343. 
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The cotton boom was short1ived, and collapsed in the late 1920s when 
demand on the cotton market lessened, and in conjunction with this, 
yields were low owing to poor seeds and insect pests. l 7) It was said 
that the cOnDination of these factors "gave farmers such a poor retum 
for their efforts that cotton growing fell into disfavour." 18) 
Shortly thereafter tobacco production collapsed through overproduction 
as the overseas market became saturated. It was stated in 1927 that 
"a decrease of 75 per cent is anticipated for 1928/9: this is due 
mainly to the present unsatisfactory state of the market. Climate 
conditions were also unfavourable and reduced yields considerab1y.1I19) 
In the 1920s, local markets became too small to absorb local produce, 
and overseas markets deteriorated: liThe period of expansion was short-
li ved ... (in) 1928 overseas markets deteriorated and internally there 
was a reduction in mining and industrial activity, and soon Southem 
Rhodesia was in the trough of depression. 1120) What was at first true 
of maize and cattle, came in the course of the 1920s to apply to other 
commodities as well: more was produced than could be consumed locally. 
Producers of each commodi ty in tum were faced wi th overproducti on 
and began to seek means to control this situation. This took the 
fonn of demands for govemment intervention in the fields of marketing 
and price control. Maize growers were the main body behind these 
demands because much of the land utilized in tobacco and cotton 
production had been reverted to the cultivation of maize when the boom 
in the fonner crops collapsed. D.J. Murray said of this situation, 
IIBy 1928 the development of altemative crops in the previous five 
years, instead of alleviating the position of the main maize growers, 
had made it more difficult. There was threatened for maize what had 
happened to tobacco wi th the addi tional problem, that fanners had no 






Ibid., p. 345 • 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p.344. 
R. Anderson and Department of Native Development, The Agro-Eaonomia 
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D.J. Murray, The GOvernmentaZ System, p.70. 
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mai ze growers was that mai ze could not be. grown profi tab ly even on 
good land, at over twenty miles from the railway, transport being 
costly owing to its bulk. All land over twenty-five miles from the 
railway was considered suitable only for ranching.
22
} 
Despite growing pressure for government intervention, Coghlan's 
ministry, as the BSA Company before it, avoided any direct committment 
in the field of production and marketing. These objectives were to 
be achieved th rough the operati on of pri vate enterpri se. 23) The 
Rhodesian Agricultural Union, established in 1904, came to assume an 
important role in the white agricultural sector: it served as a means 
of communication between farmers and the Department of Agriculture. 
Al though the whi te fanning sector in the 1920s assumed an important 
role in the econol1\Y, its menbers occupying strategic positions in 
both government and par1iament,24) it was not until the 1930s that 
they were ab le to achieve the government interventi on for whi ch they 
. 25) were presslng. 
The instability of white agriculture in the late 1920s and the 
simultaneous increase in their political power, gave rise to a great 
deal of aggression towards Africans living on white land. 26 ) The 
white farmers, if they could not achieve satisfaction through the 
framework of government aid, were more determined to achieve secur.i ty 
through other means. The form these desi res assumed were pressures 
for segregation. 
The 1920 Order-in-Council had defined the land already allocated to 
'Nati ve Reserves' and whi te settlement, but no attempt had been made 






This may ~e attr~buted to the fact that maize was the principal 
crop cultlvated ln these years, and the heavy red soils, mostly 
found on the highveld i.e. along the line of rail, were considered 
the only soils suitable for maize cultivation. 
D.J. Murray, The GoveY'YlTllental System, p.60. 
R.H: Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.146. 
Achlevements of the white farming sector in the 1930s will be 
discussed more fully in Ch.3. 
Although white farmers gained considerable profit from rents and 
fees, there was a growing concern as to the suffi ciency of the 
labour force, particularly as the post war slump passed and 
conmodi ty pri ces revi ved. 
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land. The question of how this land should be dealt with led to the 
debates in the 1920s which finally culminated in the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1930. 
The main pressure for segregation, then, came from whte farmers who 
sought to consolidate their position, for although they were the main 
pillar of economY in the 1920s, their position was by no means secure. 
The main reason for this was the lack of a viable sta~1e crop, hence 
they sti 11 had reason to fear competition from the Africans who were 
also cultivating maize, and who, if given an opportunity, could do so 
at far lower cost of producti on than cou1 d wh i tes. 
Article 83 of the Order-in-Council of 1898, which gave Africans the 
right lito acquire, hold, encumber and dispose of land on the same con-
diti ons as a person who is not a nati veil, 27) was the cornerstone of 
the segregation debate and the principal cause of white farmers' 
fears. 28} With continuing fears of African competition in the production 
of maize, the white famers saw the possibility of Africans becoming 
commercial farmers and buying lan.d in thei r midst as an · impending 
threat to the continuation of their economic security. They were 
violently opposed to the creation of a wealthy African landowning class. 
Furthennore, they feared the encroachment of the poor tillage methods 
of the Africans on their land. At first, farmers had wanted Africans 
on or near thei r fanns because they represented a ready supply of 
1 abour. As 1 and became settled, however, Afri can squatters or tenants 
became less attractive. The white famers did not approve of what they 
called lithe slash and burn" method of the Africans,29} and they resented 




Offiaial Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No.2 1930, 
p. 286. 
W. M. Le.ggate, in 1929, convnented on the real i ty of thi s fear. II In 
practise outside the Native Reserves, which comprise 21,549,000 
acres held in communal ownership, a native is unable to purchase 
land because of the injury which any seller of land to a native 
would inflict on his white neighbours and the strong public opinion 
that exists in this respect." 
W.M. Leggate, Southern Rhodesia - Some Problems of Native Develop-
ment and Trade, (1929), p.6. 
Furthennore they feared the encroachment of a class of African 
commercial famers in their midst. 
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were also alive to the fact that should Africans purchase land in their 
midst, with easy access to markets and the availability of good quality 
soil, their potential as competitors would be vastly increased. White 
farmers were also aware that the possibility of Africans purchasing land 
in their midst was becoming a more feasible proposition as their 
earning capacity increased. 
The resolution of this problem, in the eyes of white fartrers, revolved 
around the labour question; they did not encourage total segregation, 
for Africans residing solely in African areas would minimise the labour 
supply. White farmers consequently adopted the CNC's initial suggestion 
that certain areas be set aside for the purchase of land solely by 
Africans, in which communal ownership was to be forbidden. There was 
some divergance of opinion in deciding where these lands should be 
located - whether in areas adjoining white farms, or areas adjoining 
the reserves. 30) E. T. Jollie wrote at the titre, 
Native ownership in a district adjoining white tren's 
farms woul d probably cause them to deteri orate in 
value. The natives themselves do not like a 
neighbourhsip that brings them up against standards 
and regulations above their own level. This aspect 
of the case, however, was not the one that originally 
s ugges ted a change, as the wri ter has speci a 1 
interest to know, having been one of the first who 
urged individual ownership of land as the only 
incentive to the native to stay on the land and 
keep him from drifting into a detriba1ised 1ife. 31 ) 
This then would appear to be in line with the general policy adopted 
in the 1920s, aitred at preventing the dislocation and break-up of the 
tribal system. 
The white farmers were the largest sector demanding segregation; 
nevertheless, they were supported in this field by both missionaries 
and the Native Affairs Departtrent, who saw also in the creation of 
Native Purchase Areas, a means of preserving the tribal way of life. 
The missionaries were opposed to Africans coming under what they 
30) 
31 ) 
T~e sma1~er white farmers feared competition from both Africans 
Wl th thel r low overheads, and from bi gger white producers who 
produced maize using more efficient methods. 
Ethel Tawse Jollie, 'Native Land Tenure in Africa~, in Pioneer 
SettZement Co-operative Studies, 14, 1932, pp.185/6. 
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considered, in many cases, to be the corrupt influence of the white 
sector of the econol11Y. Initially, the missionaries were of the 
opinion that Africans were "uncivilised barbarians" who must be 
civilised at all costs. By the 1920s, however, they came to realise 
that there were many aspects of tribalism which were worth preserving. 
The missionaries were of the opinion that attempts to assimilate 
Africans into the white econol11Y before they were ready, would result 
in their adoption of many of the less desirable aspects of the white 
sector. 32) 
The Native Affairs Department was also a defender of retention of the 
tribal system. This Department had become increasingly paternalistic, 
and was the strongest advocate for the preservation of the "tradi-
tional" lifestyle of the Africans. 33) Both the Native Affairs Depart-
ment and the missionaries realised that the majority of Africans at 
that stage did not have sufficient capital to warrent the purchase of 
land a feasible proposition. It was believed that by the time Africans 
had been assimilated into the cash econol11Y, and were in a position to 
compete on equal terms with whites for the acquisition of land, most 
of the best land would have been sold to whites: 34 ) " ... the right of 
nati ves to purchase land anywhere means that they purchase land nowhere ... ·35 ) 
Thus they felt that it was to the advantage of Africans to have the 
c reati on of separate purchase areas where they a lone had the ri ght to 
acqui re land. Over and above this, the Native Affairs Department 
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Ibid., p.144. 
G. Kay stated in connection with sale of land to whites and Africans 
that by 1911 whites had acquired approximately 19,000,000 acres, 
and by 1925 the total area alienated to whites covered 31,000,000 
~cres (one and a half times the area of the reserves), which 
lnc1uded all land over 3,00 feet in altitude, within 25 miles of 
the railway. In contrast, by 1925 only 45,000 acres of land 
outside the reserves had been purchased by Africans. These 
figures serve to emphasise the incapacity of Africans to compete 
with whites in this field. 
G. Kay, Rhodesia, A Hwnan Geography, p. 50. 
R. H. P a.1 me r ', Land and Racia Z Domnati on , p. 141 . 
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and a means of advancing the more capable Africans from the primitive 
C0lTl11una1 system perpetrated in the reserves. It was realised that 
individual tenure was not possible in the reserves, where congestion 
was a1neady rampant and was likely to worsen as more Africans were 
evicted from white farms conseq'uent upon the expansion of white 
agri cu 1 tune. 
Thus although motives behind the desire for the creation of separate 
purchase aneas for Africans wene many and varied, all sectors, including 
for the most part the Africans themselves, were in agreement that this 
was the best policy to adopt. The Imperial government maintained a 
neutral position, but was not opposed to segregation providing 
Africans wene allocated land sufficient to their requirements, both 
pnesent and future. Discussions in the legislative Assembly as to the 
best solution to adopt wene ultimately neso1ved by placing it in the 
hands of a COlTl11ission. 
This Commission, under the chainnanship of Morris Carter,"was appointed", 
in C.L. Carbutt's words,"to enquine into and neport upon the 
expediency and practicability of setting aside defined areas outside 
the Native Reserves within which a) natives only would be permitted 
to acquine ownership or an interest in land, and b) Europeans only 
should be pennitted to acquine similar rights." 36 ) Upon the appoint-
ment of the Commission in January 1925, all Native COlTl11issioners were 
requested to suggest suitable aneas for purchase by whites and Africans. 
Soil surveys wene to be drawn up of aneas selected as Purchase Aneas, 
and consultations with chiefs arranged. Despite this, the NCs did not 
have much choice in the selection of appropriate land: they were for-
bidden to consider the 31,000,000 acnes a1neady alienated to whites; 
furthennore, the time allocated in which they wene to undertake their 
survey was not sufficient to conduct a thorough investigation of land 
categori es. 
36) C.L. Carbutt, 'The Racial Problem in Southern Rhodesia', in 
NADA , 12, 1934, p.? 
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It was decided .against dividi,ng the country equally in two as this 
would be detrimental to the labour situation: African areas would be 
too far removed from white centres; furthermore, this would militate 
against the flow of beneficial examples from white to African rural 
areas. Over and above this, the cost in both monetary and personal 
terms of wholesale movement of Africans made this solution unfeasible. 37) 
It was also concluded that the assignment of one or two large Native 
Purchase Areas would be impossible for similar reasons. Ultimately it 
was recommended that white areas be left as they were, and Native 
Purchase Areas be created in areas adjacent to existing reserves 
wherever possible, or near districts where Africans were residing at 
the ti me. 38) 
When the Commission's report was submitted in December 1925, it reported 
in favour of the creation of separate Purchase Areas, recommending that 
17,793 acres in remote tsetse fly ridden areas remained unassigned and 
for future consideration should this be deemed necessary. The report 
also recommended that 6,851,876 acres of unalienated land were to be 
assigned to Africans as Purchase Areas, and 17,423,815 acres reserved 
for future purchase by whites. This assignment would bring the total 
African area up to 28,933,362 acres, and that of whites to 48,605,898 
acres. 39) 
The report was then subject to the scrutiny of the British and Southern 
Rhodes i an governments and only after a protracted peri od of negoti ations 
was the Land Apportionment Act, embodying the greater part of the Land 
Commission's findings, passed in 1930 and came into effect in 1931. 40 ) 
The main reason behind this delay was Coghlan's belief that whites and 
Africans should be treated equally; hence he resisted segregation. It 
was only when Moffat, a firm believer in segregation, assumed the reins 
of power in 1927 that the recommendations of the Land Commission 
could be finalised. Under the Land Apportionment Act, Africans 
relinquished their former right to purchase land anywhere, but were 
37) R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination", p.165. 
38) Ibid. 
39) Ibid., p.166. 
40) W.M. Leggate, Southepn Rhodesia: Some P~blems Of Native 
Development and T~e, p.6. 
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allowed to purchase farms anywhere w.ithin the 81 Native Purchase Areas 
that were allocated. These were scattered all over the colony, in 
most cases adJoining existing reserves. 
TABLE 1 (41 ) 
Land Categories Under the Land Apportionment Act 
European Area 
Nati ve Reserves 
Native Purchase Areas 
Unassigned Area42 ) 
Forest Area 









In the Native Purchase Areas, Africans could acquire land at lower 
prices than if they were competing with whites on an open land market. 
The maximum size of a landholding was set at 1,000 acres - thus 
ensuring that Africans could not compete on a large scale with whites -
while the minimum was set at 8-10 acres. No communal holdings were 
permitted in the Purchase Areas, and a Land Board was established to 
supervise the purchase of land and general development in these areas. 44 ) 
The reserves were vested in the High Commissioner, and he had final 
authority to make decisions in these areas. On unalienated Crown land, 
where many Africans were residing, the rent of £1 per annum for each 
adult male continued. A system of private locations existed on 
alienated land: Africans became tenants, and either paid rent or gave 
labour services. Moffat decided to act on the Native Affairs Depart-
ment's advice and terminate the system of rent or labour agreements 
on alienated white land. The phasi.ng-out period was to last six years; 





M. · Yude1m~n, Africans on the Land , p.75. See map, Appendix 5. 
The unassigned area was that land reserved for future allocation. 
In the undetermined area blacks and whites could purchase land. 
This was also available for future allocation. 
NAR CNC report for the year 1931. 
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moved to reserves or Purchase Areas. 45 ) E.T. Jollie commented on the 
reasons behind this decision, 
It has been the practise on many European owned 
estates to demand rent, or labour in lieu of 
rent, from nati ve tenants, but the system has 
not proved satisfactory either for the European 
or the nati ve, as no contract en·tered into is 
readily enforcable and many natives go to mines 
for years at a ti tre, leavi ng thei r wi ves and 
families behind, whilst, on the other hand, 
they have no security of tenure. Nevertheless, 
the native living on European owned farms, 
many of which belong to absentees, has had a 
very easy titre in the past. In the future he 
will be rounded up, probably to his own great 
advantage and certainly to that of the land, of 
which he has been wasteful because it cost him 
nothing. 1146) 
Thus the Private Locations Ordinance of 1909 was to be gradually phased 
out and all Africans moved into their own areas. 47 ) 
In 1930, there were 919,000 Africans in Southern Rhodesia: 587,000 
lived in reserves, 300,000 on farms and Crown land, and 22,000 in 
urban areas. 48) This meant that a substantial portion of the African 
population would have to be moved into the reserves, many of which 
were already congested. 49 ) Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of many 
of the Purchase Areas was soon apparent. A mi ssi onary, who represented 







This land tended to be located in remote sections 
of the country, 'IAlere frequently soil was inferi or, 
and cost of purchasing the farm precluded capital 
investment in such improvements as fertilizers. 
These areas exhibited varying degrees of difficulty 
in obtaining ready markets, labour, transport and 
water. Moreover, large portions of the almost eight 
million acres were still being occupied communally. 
The conditi8ns of both purchase and ownership were 
stringent. 5 ) 
NAR 51542 A4 1933-1934, Address given by CNC to Native Demonstrators. 
E. Tawse Jollie, 'Native Land Tenure in Africa ' , pp.186/7. 
Vide Supra, p.2l. 
E. Tawse Jollie, op. cit. ,t p.188. 
The CNC Carbutt estimated this figure to be 100,000 
R.H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination, p.205. 
O.B. Pollack, 'Black Farmers and White Politics in Rhodesia ' in 
African Affairs, 74, 1975, p. 265. ' 
56. 
Therefore, although land had been, made available for purchase by 
Africans, most required development before it could be considered fit 
for occupation. 51 ) 
In part, Purchase Areas had been created to relieve the growi ng pressure 
in the reserves. This objective was not realised, however, because 
many Africans ·were already living on land selected for Purchase Areas, 
and sale of the land in question could only take place at the expense 
of evicting those already residing there, hence increasing pressure 
in the reserves. 
With the passage of the Land Apportionment Act, white farmers had 
achieved thei r objecti ves. Afri cans were prevented from purchasing 
land in potentially good fanning areas, and they were pushed into areas 
remote from markets. Furthermore, the clause giving Africans a six 
year period in which to move into their own areas ensured the accelera-
tion of congestion the·rein, the consequent cessation of agricultural 
competition and the concurrent necessity for Africans to seek an 
al ternati ve source of income through wage labour. 
In the final analysis, the Land Apportionment Act achieved the 
divergent aims of the farmers, missionaries and the Native Affairs 
Department. It prevented wealthy Afri cans from purchasing land in 
areas in close proximity to white fanns, and the Purchase Areas ensured 
that there would be no conflicting interests with whites: their access 
to both rai lways and markets was res tri cted. In addi tion, the progres-
sive Africans were aided in that they were now able to establish more 
viable economic units and could develop in isolation from the primitive 
I 
practises of reserve Africans. And finally, the fear of the missionaries 
and the Native Affairs Department that all land would be alienated to 
whi tes, was abated. 
51) R.H: Palmer, maintained that over half of the purchase areas 
ass.1 gned, 1 ay on the borders of the country, and approximately 
4,000,900 acre~ of the total assigned comprised five large, remote, 
10w-1Y1ng and 1n some cases tsetse ridden areas in Darwin 
Me1setter, Bubi, Bu1a1ima-Mangwe and Gwanda. ' 
R.H. Palmer, Land and RaciaZ Dominationpp.182/3. 
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D.J. Duignan has conmented on the segregatory aims which played so 
large a part in the passage of the land Apportionment Act, 
Segregation retarded the African's development 
but in some ways that was its purpose. Native 
Reserves were nei ther served by roads nor gi ven 
sufficient agricultural extension advice or access 
to technical services provided to Europeans. 
Through segregation Africans were entrenched in 
their primitiveness. 52) 
The govemment remained deaf to repeated pleas for the allocation of 
additional land, and maintained that existing holdings must be more 
economically utilized. The problems involved were pointed out by 
Carbutt, 
The native population is now confined in its use 
of land wi thin defined boundaries that a far 
reaching and radical change in their social 
organisation has taken place with the advent of 
the white man, and that an adjustment in the 
agricultural and pastoral systems hitherto 
practised by the natives is essential if the land 
assi gned for thei ruse is to prove adequate to 
their needs .... Already there are signs of con-
gestion and overstocking in certain areas where 
the Natives have been left to follow their own 
time-honoured agricultural and pastoral methods. 53) 
It was the growing awareness of the ineffi ciency of Afri can methods, 
given the new role that reserves were to play, which led to the 
implementation of progranmes aimed at rectifying this state of affairs. 
3.2 The Paradox Resolved: African Agricultural Development Schemes, 
1925-1930 
Disruption of the Africans' traditional agricultural system began with 
the arrival of whites, although the manifestations of this were not 
apparant for at least two decades. Population increased with the 
introduction of medical facilities and cessation of intertribal 
warfare. In 1902 the population was. es.timated at 530,000, which 




D.J. Duignan, Native Policy in Souther-n Rhodesia, (unpublished 
thesis,' 1961), p.307. 
C.L. Carbutt, 'The Racial Problem in Southern Rhodesia', p.7. 
Cattle numbers were estimated at this low figure owing to deci-
mation by rinderpest in 1895. 
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By 1926, the population was 936,000 and the estimated carrying 
capacity of the reserves was only 940,000 under pre-colonial systems 
of agriculture. 55) Cattle numbers increased as compulsory dipping 
lessened the occurrences of rinderpest and East Coast fever which, 
in earlier years, had decimated African cattle. Alvord estimated that 
while population doubled from 1902-1920, cattle numbers . had increased 
during this : period from 55,000 to 850,000 head. 56) "In several of 
the newly created reservesi," he commented, "it was found that it was 
no longer possible to practise shifting tillage and each native farmer 
had to stay put on a piece of land allotted to him by his chief or 
headman." 57 ) The creation of reserves was itself responsible for this 
cessation of the nomadic form of life, and the growing numbers on 
small areas of land. Under such conditions, the practise of shifting 
culti vation could no longer be effi ciently executed, resulting in 
continuous cultivation of the soil. By 1924, the evils of soil 
erosion were making themselves felt and no longer passed unnoticed. 
Increased use of the plough by African cultivators added to existing 
problems. African farmers saw the plough as a labour-saving device, 
and it was for this reason that many adopted it so readily. Use of 
the plough in the absence of improved methods of cultivation accelerated 
the already decreasing fertility of the soil. Africans were correct 
in assuming that a light scratching of the ground with a hoe was the 
most efficient method under Southem Rhodesian climatic conditions. 
Indeed, by 1905, white farmers were already questioning the wisdom of 




The best depth for ploughing is still a matter of 
considerable dispute. The difference of opinion 
may be due to the di fference of conditi ons. Deep 
ploughing gives a finer seed bed and creates better 
moisture retaining conditions, but the rawness of 
the soil should again enter into our calculations, 
for the deeper we plough, the less fitted the soil 
is to sustain plant life, for this reason, shallow 
ploughi.ng of virgin lands often produces the best 
results ... deep ploughing does not give equally 
D.A. Robinson, 'Soil Conservation and Implications of the Land 
Husbandry Act', in NADA, 37, 1960, p.27. 




. good results on sandy soils, for the texture is 
. suffi ciently open to permi t easy roo~ growth 
without artificial 's6jl loosening. 58) 
As early as 1905, then, many white settlers had seen the value of the 
reasoning behind African methods of hoe cult~vation. Deep ploughing 
without accompanying cultivation of the land, manuring and irrigation, 
would only result in soil erosion and decreasing yields. The most 
ferti 1e soi 1 was the top soi 1, and Afri cans therefore saw no reason 
to plant crops deep in the ground. They were shifting cultivators, 
and it was usually virgin soils which they cultivated, thus the necessity 
for deep ploughing was never experienced by them. Yude1man commented 
on the virtues of the methods of shifting cultivation, 
... (It) now appears that under a system of shift-
ing cultivation, a relatively sparse population 
was in ecological balance with the environment. 
The problem today is that the envi ronment was . 
changed. Population has increased. European 
occupation has limited the land supply available 
for shifting cultivation by African producers. 
Nevertheless, many traditional methods have 
persisted, taking a heavy toll on the soil.59) 
Thus, although shifting cultivation might have sufficed in the late 
nineteenth century, the conditions which brought it into existence 
no longer applied, and a new type of agriculture was required. 
As mentioned, the introduction of the plough increased the deterioration 
of the land. African fanmrs had realised that much time and effort 
could be saved by utilizing this implement: fields were not properly 
cleared before the plough was applied, trees were left standing and 
the ground was ploughed around them; the ground was not stumped or 
levelled, nor was manure applied or land irrigated. Several NCs 
comment on this misguided use of the plough and its effects, 
There is reckless p10ughing .... I know cases where 
single natives plough sufficient land to reap 
500 bags of grain (this is what a good white 
fanmr would reap) while he actually reaps 50 
bags only. The cause of bad ploughing is the want 
of proper clearing of the 1 and ... (they plough) at 
the beginning of the rains and again towards the 
end of the season. The consequences are shortage 
58) G.M. Odlum, 'Maize Culture', in Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 
Vol. 6 , 1905-6, p.l36. 
59) M. Yude1man, Africans on the Land, p.13. 
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of grazing grounds, and the destruction of roots 
and gras"s whi ch would retain the rainwater and 
moisture. There is much ploughing done along 
the ri vers wi th the res u1 t that "at every heavy 
shower the best soil is washed away.60} 
I cannot report any improvement in methods of 
agriculture amongst the natives. A"certain number 
of ploughs are in use ... but with few exceptions 
the ploughing is done very carelessly. The land 
is not properly harrowed "or drained with the 
resul t that "a
f
" 1 arge " part of it gets waterlogged 
and use1ess. 6 ) 
In 1929, the CNC compared the efficiency of African tillage 
methods, and the way cultivation was conducted using the plough, 
It wi 11 be several years before the use of the 
plough by the natives can be considered an 
improvement on thei r own method of preparati on 
of the soil for crops; the ploughing is in most 
cases badly done especially in the lands where 
stumps have been left and they very often select 
land to be turned over by the plough, just because 
there are no trees in it, that would have been a 
was te of ti me to turn over wi th the hoe. To 
see two 1 ands al on gs i de each 0 the r, on the same 
granite soil, dotted with tree stumps, land being 
put into cultivation for the first, time, the one 
turned up wi th the plough, and the other wi th the 
hoe, is an object lesson. In the one done wi th 
the hoe the contour of the ground has been studied, 
and ridges made with a view to draining the lands 
from the heavy floods, but still more to 
prevent erosion, the crops stand high and dry in 
the heaviest rains, and gets all the benefit of 
the humus turned under between the sods whi ch form 
the ridge. The other is a sacrificed piece of 
ground, the half turned drills running in circles 
or straight lines, depending on the stumps, no 
thought being given to flooding, wash or anything 
else, patches of grass left where they could not 
get the plough to work, the crop existing where 
it can .62) 
The above passage serves to explain how Africans were able to meet 
the demands of the mi nes and the settlers in the fi rst decades of whi te 
occupation and also explains the growing concern as to the ability of 
Africans to support themselves on reduced areas of land when the plough 




NAR ZAD 3/1/1 Memorandum by the Reverend Father Beihlers of the 
Jesuit Mission Matabe1e1and 1/7/1914. 
NAR N9/2/1-3 NC Half yearly reports. NC Mrewa 1923. 
NAR CNC Annual Report 1929. 
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Because land was not properly prepared before the p1~ugh was. applied, 
the crop yields tended to be low. and land was. abandoned more rapidly 
than in earlier years. Furthermore, i.n order to offs.et the disad-
vantages of low yields, larger areas were tilled. That the plough 
was regarded as a labour-s.aving device also served to encourage the 
tillage of larger acreages. Several NCs in their annual reports 
cOl1lJ1ented on these problems: II In the northern part (of the reserve) 
hoes have almost fallen into disuse, with the increased use of ploughs, 
old lands seem to be abandoned more rapidly than before, with a con-
sequent more rapid destruction of timber. 1I63 ) In the same year, 
, the NC for Umta1i stated that, lIat present the use of the plough in 
the reserves is of doubtful economic advantage. The owner is inclined 
to plough up more land than he can properly cultivate. 1I64 ) It was 
pointed out that even Africans admitted to better yields under hoe 
cultivated lands: IIA1though the plough connotes an advance in the 
econofI\Y of human 1 abour ... i f left unguarded it is so uninte 11 i gently 
applied that its result is of doubtful economic benefit ... we have the 
admission of natives that higher yields were obtained from hand hoed 
1ands. 1I65 ) 
With the increased use of the plough, the total area under cultivation 
rose faster than the number of cultivators. The task of cultivation 
was traditionally allocated to women, and although the widespread use 
of the plough relieved them of much of the drudgery of hoe cultivation, 
the area ploughed was too large to properly care for, and yields 
dropped further. Gradually men came to assume the role of cu1 ti vators. 
Although problems accruing from the increased use of the plough were 
noticed in the fi'rst decade of the twentieth century, African, and 
indeed white, agricultural methods were left to continue unhindered 
during the period of BSA Company rule. It was only when pressures for 
segregation increased after the grant of se1f-9,overnment in 1923, that 




LD. Alvord, 'The Agricultural Life of Rhodesian Natives' in 
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debates it was sai d that, 
For the last twenty years the native policy of 
this country has remained unchanged. It had been 
quiet and uneventful, it was. met wi th the 
blessing of the Colonial Office to whom it gave 
no trouble, it was one of stagnation, but it was 
not prejudiced by any vital errors ••• it was certain 
that present conditions could not remain as they 
were. Now, that time has come in this country, 
the gu~s ti on of segregati on was primari ly a land 
one. 66 ) 
Thi s atti tude would appear to be in.: sympathy wi th the BSA Company's 
intention, in the earlier part of their rule, of allowing Africans to 
supply its needs. With vast areas at their disposal, Africans were 
able to meet these needs. When, in the final decade of BSA Company 
rule, attention came to be focused on the promotion of white farming, 
Africans were forced into the reserves and no further consideration 
accorded them. It was only when Coghlan's ministry assumed control in 
1923 that a more concerned, if not paternalistic, attitude towards 
Africans came to prevail. 
There were indi cati ons, however, of an awareness of the needs for 
improvment prior to 1923, although in many cases these acknowledgements 
were advanced only in so far as they would benefit whites. For 
example, by inducing an increased supply of labour. In 1903 the NC for 
Charter comrented, 
This season, however, owing to the drought, will 
produce sufficient only for the maintenance 
of natives. Natives must be brought fully to 
realise the advantages of ploughing and irrigation. 
Then they wou1 d readily adopt more modem methods. 
It is the old and primitive and antiquated method 
which keeps a native so much at home and his con-
stant excuse for not going out to work. 67) 
A few years 1 ate r, in 1907, the CNC wrote, 
If the nati ve could be taught more practi ca 1 things 
soch as proper cul ti vati on of the soi 1, adequate 
housing of themselves and their families, wants 
would gradually arise which would necessitate 
working to earn the necessary purchasing power, and 
so th row into the 1 abour market a far greater nunber 
of keen and intelligent workers than any taxation 
or amplified legislation could produce.68) 
- -------------------------------------------
66} Debates of t he LegisZative AssembZy, March-October 1924, p.1123. 
67) NAR N9/1/8 NC Annual Reports, NC Charter, 1903. 
68) NAR N9 /1/10 Report of the CNC for the year ending 31/12/1907. 
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Finally, it was claimed by the NC for Charter th~t, "By abolishing 
the old system of spreadi,ng the tilli,ng, sowing and reaping over the 
whole year and conveniently accomplishing all that in half the time, 
would also abo1 ish the attraction of beer drinks. ,,69) Another 
important consequence of the achievement of this last aim would be the 
release of a large quantity of potential labour for part of each year. 
It was not until 1910, however, that steps were taken towards the 
realisation of these goals. In these years a Committee of Enquiry 
into African Affairs was appointed under J.H. Graham. Sections 105-6 
of the report stated, 
In the matter of agricu1 ture, however, proper 
knowledge of which is regarded as all important, 
the commission feels it may be necessary to provide 
for instruction other than that obtainable in mission 
schools. For this we recommend the establishment 
by government of central institutions in reserves, 
where teaching may be given by expert instructors, 
not only in regard to proper methods of tillage, 
but also to the treatment and rotation of crops 
and to all other branches of agriculture. 70) 
The Committee's report had also recommended that ocular demonstration 
be undertaken, "which should be furnished at the central stations ... 
also should be laid down as part of the educational policy, that 
members of staff should be able to travel around the districts and 
endeavour to get in touch with the more progressive natives and give 
them advice at their kraa1s.,,71) 
The proposals of the committee had been reaffirmed by a conference of 
senior officials of the Native Affairs Department in 1911, but these 
recommendations met with much opposition at this stage. It was this 
which, in part, prevented the implementation of development programmes 
until the mid-1920s. The negative attitude which the BSA Company 
exhibited towards African affairs was an important contributive factor. 
The demands for labour in these years were met largely by foreign 
Afri cans, and it was not until the whi te farming sector became fi rmly 
entrenched that the labour needs of this sector increased markedly. 
Finally, the recommendations of the Committee could not be realised 
69) NAR N9/l/8 NC Annual Reports NC Charter 1903. 
70) Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1923, p.583. 
71) Ibid. 
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unti l ' the reserves had been more clearly demarcated and approved of 
and, this was not completed until 1920. The onset of the First World 
War was partly responsible for this delay, owing to lack of both man-
power and capital. 
The Native Affairs Department was also largely responsible for the long 
delay in inaugurating developmental programmes. The Department was 
responsible for the administration of Africans; but until 1920 the 
missionaries monopolised African education and the government gave 
them grants for this purpose. Owing to lack of both capital and 
trained personnel, however, technical education was not a feasible 
possibility, and all education was of a literary nature. The missions 
were under the control of the Department of Education, whose primary 
concern was that of white education. The missions and the Native 
Affairs Department were, at the time of self-government, the principal 
admini strati ve bodies representi ng Afri can interests, and confl ict 
arose between these two bodies centred on the issue of education. 
Prior to 1920, then, when the Native Affairs Department's attentions 
were devoted to areas other than that of education, the missionari.es 
came to dominate in this field. During the 1920s, however, this situ-
ation was changing. With segregation becoming a more realistic 
possibility, an awareness grew of the necessity of developing African 
areas. 72) Furthermore, pressure from white farmers had lessened in 
certain areas: in 1919 a resolution was passed by the Congress of the 
Rhodesia Agricultural Union, suggesting that Africans be taught 
handicrafts with the object of making them into better citizens, but 
not so that they would compete with whites!3)Changes in policy for 
African education were discussed in the Legislative Assembly debates, 
and they compared the virtues of the old and new systems, 
The old was tryin9 to graft upon the native Euro-
pean civilization. In as far as its influence on 
the masses was concerned tbis had failed. 
Missionaries had produced fine individuals but the 
effect on the masses was small. Tbe new system was 
that of taking the native as they found him in his 
72) See Leg~sZative . A~~'embZy .Deb<1;tes 1922/3, May-October 1923, p.570. 
73) D.J. DUl gnan, Nat'we Fahey -z-n Southern Rhodesia 1890-1.923, pp.249/50. 
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kraal, with his. simple meth.ods of agriculture 
and stock raising, his simple industries and 
handicrafts, and building him up. This w.as 
the underly.ing principle and aspect of this 
scheme.7 4) . 
Thus it was that Africans w.ere now to be developed in their own areas 
and not along w.hite lines. This decision was embodied in the 
recommendations of the Southern Rhodesian Native Affairs Commission 
of 1910,75) which were implemented in 1920. 
In 1920 pressures for initiating development policies in African areas 
led the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council to authorise the estab-
lishment of two central institutes and a Native Development Department 
subordinate to the Nati ve Affai rs Department. The aim of these moves 
was to promote the growth of African industries, which the Native 
Affairs Department maintained the missionaries had neglected in their 
devotion to literary education. Many of the recommendations proposed 
by the Legislative Council were those which H.S. Keigwin had formulated 
in his report on the 'Industrial Training of Natives.' .76) 
Keigwin proposed that the purpose of the industrial schools should be 
the development of Africans in their own areas. In this regard, he 





First with the simplest and humblest vocation of the 
people, building up in them among the people in 
their own villages instead of taking individuals 
away from their home surroundings and collecting 
them in central insti tutes77) where they are pro-
bably trained on European lines and in European 
directions .... we are concerned primarily with the 
natives who live in a more or less communal way 
in the reserves ... they cannot be allowed to drift 
on as they are without any organised system of 
guidance and instruction. Use of ploughs is a· 
sign of progress : ..• it is evident that on the one 
hand native conservatism has to be broken down, 
and on the other it is desirable that some means 
Debates of the Legislative Assembly~ op. cit.~ p.588. 
Vide Supra, p. 57. 
Keigw.in became the first Director of the new Native Development 
Department in 1920. 
Keigwin's proposals for deve:loping Africans in their own areas 
was backed by the legislative assembly which stated that there' 
~as a "big distinction between th.e development of the natives 
~n Euro~ean and their development in Native Industries. Certain 
l~dustrles must b~ marked,out: cattle raising, agriculture, peasant 
llfe, baskect maklng, curlng of hides etc. which natives have so 
long followed. Debates of the Legislative Assembly 1922/3 p.385. 
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should be devi sed whereby the progressi ve nati ve 
may be instructed in the proper ·us.e of his new 
imp lements. 78) 
Keigwin also advocated the means by which. these agricultural improve-
ments could be realised, 
Better methods of tillage, improvement in seed 
selection, more constant cultivation, proper 
rotation of crops, and less wastage of corn in 
beermaking. One of the first needs is for an 
instructor, who shall go around the reserves and 
demonstrate with a plough. In America wonderful 
results have been achieved among negroes by 
instruction. 79) 
It was this last suggestion which was to form the basis of all African 
development policies in ensuing years. 
Keigwin's primary concern at this stage, however, was with the in-
adequacy of the missionary system of education, which concerned itself 
with reading, 'writing and arithmetic, but included no wider training. 
The financi a 1 assi stance gi ven by the government 'for the furtherance of 
the Kei gwin scheme was for more practi cal training. It was stated 
thus, liThe money voted to Keigwin's scheme was for a different purpose. 
They started on the hypothesis that the native wanted industrial 
rather than religious and literary education ... the missionaries 
trained a smaller number of pupils to a higher level. 1180) 
At Keigwin's suggestion, two Industrial Schools were opened: Dombashawa 
in the Chindamora reserve in Mashonaland in 192081 ), and Tjolotjo in 
Matabeleland in 1924. At these schools, demonstrators were to be 
trained "with the view of their going out into the . reserves to give 
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Mr. D. Hampton, ex-principal of Dombashawa School, stated that 
the reason Chindamora Reserve was selected as a site for the 
school was because Africans had said the soil was no good and 
had all been worked out. Nevertheless, demonstrators got 20 bags 
an acre from this land in ensuing years. 
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Although agricultural instruction was part of the schools curricu1um~ 
industrial training received the most attention until the appoint-
ment of an agricultural expert in 1926. 
Part of the reason for the delay in the effective launching of the 
Keigwin scheme was the continuing opposition between the Native 
Affairs Department and the miss"ions. Ke.igwin was allotted £7,500
83
) 
for the execution of his scheme, which the missionaries criticized as 
being extravagant. The isolation of Domboshawa from the remainder of 
the education system administered by the missions, enraged them further. 
When, in 1922~ a more practical emphasis was given to training but 
involving literary education, which Keigwin had realised was necessary, 
the Missionary Conference of that year attacked the government 
schools, maintaining that these schools were encroaching on an area 
which they considered their responsibility.84) In response to these 
conflicts, a Commission was set up under Hadfield in 1924, to enquire 
into the matter of African Education. 85 ) The extensive drought 
experienced in the 1921/2 season was also a contributive factor in the 
establishment of this commission: £50,000 was spent on famine relief 
following crop failures,86) and this made the necessity of developing 
African areas even more imperative. 
The missionaries pressed for the creation of a separate sub-department 
to take over the supervisory functions which were in the hands of 
inspectors of the Education Department, who were more concerned wi th 
white education. The Commission was divided as to which department 
this should fall under. 
83) Debates of the Legislative Assembly op. <:nt. ~ p.370. 
84) The missionary conference was established in 1906 and co-
ordinated the activities of all the missions. Its declared 
objective was to promote the work of the missions and encourage 
co-operati on between them. 
85) Report of the Corrmission appointed to enquire into the matter 
of Native Education in all its bearing in the Colony of 
Southe~ Rhodesia~ 1925. 
86) Glori a Passmore ~ The National PoZiay of Community Development 
in Rhodesia, (1972) ~ p.18. 
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The CNC, H. Jackson, recommended that the sub-department be placed 
under the wing of the Native Affairs Department, and not the Education 
Department. a7 ) It was not until H.U. Moffat became Premier in 1927, 
however, that these reconmendations were put into effect, and the 
Native Education Department was created, with H. Jowitt as its head 
and Domboshawa and Tjolotjo under his control. 88) The 1924 Hadfield 
Commission brought about Keigwin's downfall: not believing him 
suitable for the implementation and execution of the scheme, he 
resigned in 1926; and the Native Development Department, established 
only in 1920, did not long survive its founder. 
Like the Native Development Department, the new Native Education 
Department stressed the need for development within the bounds of 
the I traditional I tribal framework. In 1927 the CNC stated, 
The removal of the two native schools from direct 
connection with the Native Affairs Department 
serves to widen the already considerable gap be-
tween Native Administration and Native Education. 
But a closer connection between mission schools 
and government schools has been effected through 
the important establishment by the government of 
a Native Department of Education with a director 
and staff of Inspectors. 89 ) 
The Native Education Department, too, was not to survive very long. 
In 1929, as a result of the Hadfield COlTl1lission, the passage of the 
Nati ve Development Act subs ti tuted the Nati ve Education Department 
wi th a new Na ti ve De ve 1 opmen t Depa rtmen t of whi ch Jowi tt was made 
Di rector. 90) 
88) NAR CNC Annual Report, 1927. 
89) NAR CNC Annual Report, 1927. 
90) From 1928-1930 the rivalry between the Native Affairs Depart-
ment and chiefs on the one hand, and the missionaries on the 
other, was concealed. With the establishment of a new Native 
Development Department in 1929, an attempt was made to unify 
the varying aspects of educational policy. But this division 
rem~ined, l~ing dormant while Jackson was CNC: although in the 
Natlve Affalrs Department, he shared many ideals of the Native 
Development Department and the missionaries. It was only when 
a new CNC - Carbutt - was appointed in 1930 that the Native 
Aff~irs Departmen~ came to dominate in African development 
agaln. Carbutt belng a representative of the more conservative 
traditions of the Native Affairs Department. 
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When the first .Agriculturalist for Instruction of Natives, E.D. 
Alvord, was appointed in 1926, he was to work with the Department of ' 
Agriculture. In April 1927, however, he was transferred to the Native 
Education Department within the Native Affairs Department. The 1925 
Land Commission was partly responsible for his appointment, as it 
envisaged the migration of Africans into reserves on a more permanent 
basis. These areas had to be made to facilitate a much larger 
population, and their deterioration brought to a halt. Commenting 
on the possible repurcussions of the Land Apportionment Act, the 
CNC in 1933 stated, 
The Land Apportionment Act .... also requires that by 
1937 all natives who have not required farms of 
their own, or who are not living on European farms 
as workers, not as at present in some cases as 
rent payers, must reside in Native Reserves. 
That means there will be far more people in the 
reserves than there are now. You who have been in 
the reserves, know that, owing to the large areas 
which natives plant, since the white man brought 
them the plough, and owing to the large increase in 
cattle, since dipping was introduced, that many of 
the reserves appear to be overcrowded wi th human 
beings and cattle even now. Therefore it is 
necessary to organise the occupation of the natives 
in such a way that they will accommodate more 
people who will move into them in 1937. 91 ) 
An American missionary, Alvord, having already achieved successes on 
his mission station at Mount $i1inda was selected to instruct Africans. 
His primary aim was to introduce agricultural instruction to the 
school on his mission, and develop agricultural instruction and 
improved tillage methods amongst Africans residing on mission farms. 
Alvord was appalled by African cultivation techniques. Although he 
was hasty in condemning these methods without pausing to examine 
the~ 'r possible value under existing conditions, he had inadvertently 
struck at the core of the problem, one which no other white was to 
consider in ensuing years: that in attempting to induce Africans to 
adopt new methods the first platform of reform must be conducted at a 
social level, and it was at this level that Alvord initiated his 
schemes. 
91) NAR $1542 A4, 1933-1944. Address gi yen by the CNC to Nati ve 
Demons trators, 28/6/1933. 
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Writing of African methods of cultivation, Alvord maintained that, 
"once the seeds were planted ... they left it to nature, ancestral 
spi ri ts and wi tchcraft charms to bri.ng them a good crop. 1192) He was 
alive to the fact that before the introduction of new technology 
could achieve any noticab1e results, . these attitudes would have to 
be overcome; and the only way Alvord believed this would be success-
ful was by the demonstration of improved methods in the tribal 
areas. In this manner, Africans would see for themselves that these 
improvements could be achieved without resorting to supernatural 
means. 
Alvord then implemented the programme he had devised at Mount Silinda. 
He inaugurated a five year course in agricultural instruction at the 
mission school, and demonstrated the use of advanced methods on one-
acre plots of land. Prior to the harvest, Africans were assembled 
at the plots to witness the results achieved. At the before-harvest 
meeting at Mount Si linda in 1921, the general response was "mtakati 
ya rayungu" 93) (magi c of the whi te man). He grew even more 
despondent when the very pupils who had prepared the land and cultivated 
the crops, fi rmly asserted that the "mfwulsi" must have gone out at 
night to sprinkle magic medicine on the crops.94) It was at this 




... was to influence millions and affect the 
economic development of a whole nation. I 
discovered that in spite of high qualifica-
tions and experience, a white man could not 
teach agriculture to the superstition steeped 
native who attributed high crop yields to 
'muti', witchcraft and favour of the ancestral 
spirits. I concluded that it was impossible 
to Christianise the natives without first of 
all intellectualising their agricultural 
practi ses, so filled wi th supersti ti on, 
ignorance t witchcraft and worship of the 
E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow ' . 




unknown. 95 ) I must create in them wants and 
desires which would automatically lift them out 
of the sea of fear and superstition which en-
gulfed them. I macIE: the discovery96) tha~ the 
African must see thlngs demonstrated on hlS 
own land, within hiS: reach~ by demonstrators 
of his own black co10ur.97J 
This principle was to form the basis of development schemes in 
Southern Rhodesi a. 
Neither the settlers nor the government. considered the necessity of 
inducing receptive social responses from Africans towards agricultural 
change. This is indicative that the prime considerations behind the 
inauguration of development policies were not that these would 
benef; t the Afri can himself; but rather that they woul d prevent 
deterioration of the soil and allow an increased number of Africans 
to subsist in the reserves wi thout the support of government famine 
relief in times of drought and crop failure. In 1930 the following 
was written on the purpose of the demonstrators, 
The aim of farming demonstrators on Native 
Reserves is not to stimulate production of 
staple cash crops, but to teach the native 
farmer how to get good returns from his labour, 
and at the same time build up and maintain the 
soil fertility for himself and his children. 
It mus t be remembe red that 1 and on nati ve 
reserves is comnunal and it is limited. No 
individual can be permitted to go extensively 
into the production of money crops, wear out 
the land and crowd out other individuals who 
95) As most missionaries at this time, Alvord sought to release Africans 
from the vices of polygalTlY and collectivism.' Most missionaries, 
however, neglected industry and agriculture, believing that 
conversion and literary training would resolve this situation. 
Alvord believed that hard work in agricultural and industrial 
fields would gradually draw the Africans from their I heathen I 
states. They would realise that effort and industriousness had its 
own reward, entirely unconnected with any form of supernatural 
ri tes. 
96) Although Alvord attributed this idea to his own ingenuity, the use 
of African demonstrators as a means of improving African agricul-
tural methods, had been used on previous occasions. The CNC 
Taylor commented, lilt is certain that it is only by native agents 
that the masses can be reached. 1I He drew his conclusions from 
the precedent set in the Transkei, and (recommended the training 
of demonstrators at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, after which they 
were to be sent out into reserves to assist any interested Africans. 
These extension services had also been practised among negroes 
in the Southern States of America. NAR CNC Annual Report for the 
year 1924. 
97) E.D. Alvord, The Gospel of the Plow. 
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98) 
have an equal right to a share of the land. 
The whi te popu1 ati on and the. govemment were adamant that Afri cans 
should not compete with whites for limited markets. In considering 
the Africans' position in the econol11Y it was also said that "Africans 
should grow subsistance crops before cash crops. The native should 
always be in a position to obtain his own requirements by his own 
efforts from the land. There will be saleable surpluses in some 
areas, but the basis of native agriculture should be to get at least 
a subsistence from the land.,,99) 
When Alvord accepted the new post in 1926, his duties were to include 
the organisation of better agricultural training of Africans at both 
mission and govemment schools; and to organise agricultural instruction 
and development in reserves by means of African demonstrators and 
demonstration p10ts. 100) Alvord faced govemmental antagonism from the 
outset and he was offered little assistance in furtherence of his 
schemes. Mr R. Dinnis, retired NC, and later undersecretary for 
Native Co-operatives, commented on this antagonism displayed towards 
Alvord. He maintained that firstly, Alvord was a missionary, and, as 
already explained, the Native Department and missionaries were 
generally of divided opinion where African policy was concemed. 
Secondly, Alvord was an American, and was not too well received by a 
, ci vil se rvi ce 1 arge ly compri sed of men of B ri ti sh ori gi n. Fi na lly it 
was feared that shou1 d Afri can produced crops enter the market, the 
country would be flooded with an inferior quality product which would 
lower the standard which white farmers had struggled so hard to attain~Ol) 
D. Hampton, retired principal of Domboshawa school. suggested that 
Alvord infringed upon what the NCs had considered their domain. These 
men were, until this time, what Hampton termed the "Lord Gods of the 
districts", and Alvord, who on many occasions, was tactless, was not 
popu1 ar wi th NCs for many years. 1 02) . 
98) Offiaial Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia Vol.2 1930, 
p.745. 
99) NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission. 
100) E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow'. 
101) R. Dinnis, Interview, October 1979. 
102) D. Hampton, Interview, November 1979. 
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In addition to the difficulties outlined above,. when Alvord first 
assumed duty he discovered the .agricultura1 instruction was not 
. . 
included in the school curriculum at Domboshawa. The demonstrators 
were badly trained, and the course offered was vague and elementary. 
Industrial training was considered more important and accorded the 
greatest emphasis. Skills were encouraged which offered no possibility 
of competition with whites. It was feared that improvements in 
agricultural techniques would give rise to a class of independent 
black conmercial farmers, and threaten the perpetuation of white 
supremacy. While white farmers were still struggling to find their 
feet, they were loathe to co-operate with A1vord ' s far-reaching 
schemes. At Tjolotjo, too, Alvord encountered similar setbacks: the 
role of agricultural instruction was underplayed and taught to the 
lowest classes only, carpentry and building being taught at higher 
1eve 1s. 
The scheme Alvord drew up was finally enforced when the CNC ordered 
the principal of Domboshawa to adhere to all A1vord ' s reconmendations 
pertaining to agricultural instruction. 103) Thereafter, this field 
came under A1vord ' s control and in July 1927 a five year course in 
practi c'a 1 agri culture and all ied subjects was inserted into the school 
curricu1um,104) and organised courses in agriculture embarked upon in 
several important mission schools. Agricultural trainers were instructed 
in soil conservation methods, gardening, animal husbandry, fish farming, 
water conservation, crop cultivation, general farming practises and 
farm mechanics. 105) 
Efforts in agricultural instruction were focused on raising the stan-
dards of land use sufficiently to ensure that a subsistence livelihood 
could be eked from the land, and the demonstration schemes devised in 
the 1920s did not attempt to alter the existing structure of the 
I traditional I system. Communal holdings were to be maintained, and 
capi tal intensi ve , large-scale holdings were not encouraged. "Our 
purpose is to teach these reserve natives to make the most of their 
103) E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow ' . 
104) Ibid. 
105) D .. Ham~ton, ;:v. cit. "Once these schools got under way,"Hampton 
malnta1ne~, t~ey .were swamped with applicants". Although some 
enn;>l1ed 10 bUl1dlng and carpentry, there were twice as many in 
agrlcu1ture. Thus the emphasis in teaching came to be on agri-
cultural training. 
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arable an~ grazing lands. It is our aim to teach them how t~ grow on 
one acre the quantity of crops they now grow on ten acres. Thus we 
shall be able to set free more lands for grazing purposes and greatly 
add to the resources of the Nati ve Rese~ves. IIl06} Alvord was aware 
that vast improvements could be made wi thin the existing system; and 
his schemes aimed at increasing the productive and carrying capacity 
of the reserves without changin9. either the traditional system or 
capital expenditure in this sphere. 
In August 1927, after preliminary meetings on eleven different reserves, 
the first demonstrators assumed duty.107) The first task of the 
demonstrator was outlined as follows: the demonstrator was, 
to question a likely man in his area as to the 
acreage he has under culti vati on, what hi s returns 
have been ... then he will tell him that he should 
be able to get better results with better rrethods. 
He wi 11 then offer to take over one or two acres 
of this man's land, attend to the cultivation, 
and generally handle the crop until it is reaped. 
When it is done the results will speak for them-
se1ves. 108) 
The demonstrator was not to take over complete control of the owner's 
plots, but encourage the p1otholder to work under his direction. 
Demonstrations were to be attended on a voluntary basis and not 
forced upon those not wishing to receive instruction. Those who 
followed the demonstrator's advice on their own were to be classed 
as co-operators. 109 ) 'Before Harvest' rreetings were to be held before 
each harvest alongside demonstration plots, under the supervlslon of 
the NC and the demonstrator, in order to indicate the results of 
improved methods. 
During the first year of demonstration, single unit demonstrations 
were conducted, the purpose of which was to indicate the value of 
proper tillage methods and the use of kraal manure. P1otho1ders were 








Annual Report of ,Agriculturalist for Instruction of Natives 1929. 
E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow'. 
NAR S138/10 24/2/1927. 
E.D. Alvord, 'Agricultural Demonstration Work on Native Reserves' . , 
ln Department of Native Development, OooasionaZ Paper 3, 1930, p.19. 
NAR Sl044/7 Native Agriculture 1934-6, ANC Umvuma to SN Fort ' 
Victoria 11/1/1934. 
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During the second and successi ve y~ars., i.f the p10tho1der wished to 
continue, crop rotation demons.trations were to be undertaken to show 
the buildi.ng and maintenance .of soil ferti.1ity. 
The rotation system Alvord devised was designed to build up the soil 
to a high degree of fertility as rapidly as possible, and to allow 
continuous cropping of the soil. One acre was split into four plots, and 
these were rotated for a period of four years. In the first year, 
maize was planted and manure applied; this was followed by maize or 
kaffi r com, or any other interti lled farniceous crop. In the thi rd 
year, a legume was planted and this formed an important part of the 
rotation because these could be ploughed in at the end of the season, 
helping to correct the nitrogen deficiency in the soil. Only legumes 
known to Afri cans were cu1 ti vated: kaffi r beans or g·roundnuts. In 
the final year, rupoko or any other close-growing millet crop was 
p1anted. 111 ) In addition to crop rotation, proper stumping and clearing 
of the land was essential, and winter ploughing was encouraged in 
order to retai n moi sture during the dry season. Ploughing before 
planting was necessary to aerate the soil, and finally seed selection 
and row p 1anti ng were demonstrated. 112) 
These methods were to prove successful: the average yields on demon-
stration plots were thirteen-and-a-ha1f bags per acre, compared with 
one-and-a-ha1f bags on ordinary African lands. The number of crop 
rotation demonstrations increased each year, which indicated an in-
creasing interest in better methods of agriculture. At one of the 
Ibefore p1antingl inspections, it was stated that II ••• The introductory 
stage of the demonstration scheme where we emphaSise the use of kraal 
manure and better ti 11 age methods is already past in several reserves, 
and the second stage during which we teach the practise of crop rota-
tion to build up and maintain soil fertility is well under way. 11113) 
It was stressed that all improvements in crop yields were attained only 
with those imp.lements already: at the disposal of Africans and no com-
mercial fertilisers were ~sed.114) 
111) D. Hampton, Interview, November, 1979. 
112) NAR 51044/7 op. ait. 
113) NAR 5138/72 Report on Before Planting Inspection of Demonstration 
Plots on Nati ve Reserves 1932/3. 
114) NAR L6/3/l Natal Witness, February 9, 1939. 
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Nevertheless white farmer antagonism continued unabated, many still , . 
feared African competition, especially in the field of maize 
cultivation. Alvord commented on the o~igin and nature of these fears, 
These feelings were even fostered in SQme 
di s tri cts by the NCs, many of whom were also 
district magistrates for European settlers. 
Under improved ti 11 age methods, natives were 
producing more and more maize. There was a 
growing apprehension regarding native develop-
ment and its seeming conflict with European 
development. The logical conclusion was that the 
African should learn no skills which the Euro-
pean offers in the labour market, and his soi 1 
should yield no food which the European could 
sell him.115) 
These complaints formed the basis of what Alvord termed the 'maize 
complex', and he came under greater pressure to terminate what most 
whites considered to be development focused on one crop alone, that 
. . 116) 1 s, mal ze. 
In 1931, Alvord received a latter from the Superintendent of Natives 
criticising him for teaching Africans to grow maize, and recommending 
that its growing by Africans be prohibited as it was a white man's 
crop.117) The increased attention being focused on maize after the 
collapse of tobacco and cotton in the late 1920s, was partly respon-
sible for this antagonism, and Alvord was accused of creating a maize 
monocul ture in the reserves. 
E.G. Howman, chief spokesman of the Native Affairs Department's 
conservative faction on African development matters, also attacked 
A1vord ' s supposed 'maize complex ' . He declared that Africans should 
be taught to grow food crops like millet for which only a limited 
market existed outside the reserves.118) Alvord, however, retaliated 





It has been thought by some that our agricultural 
demonstration is limited largely to one crop, 
E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the P10w ' . 
NAR S138/72 Alvord to Director of -Native Development 8/6/1931: 
The Mai ze Complex. 
Herein lay the seeds of what was later to take the form of the 
Maize Control Act and the culmination of white fears of African 
compe ti ti on. 
These criticisms culminated in the passage of the Maize Control 
Act in 1931, for further details vide infra, Ch.3.1. 
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nane1y maize ... this is not the case. A si.ng1e unit 
plot planted to maize is only done for two years 
for the purpose of teaching manuring, winter 
ploughing, cross p10ughi.ng, proper seed bed pre-
paration and cultivation. At the end of two years 
demonstration the owner is either dropped or 
undertakes to have the demonstrator teach him 
proper rotation. The following chart gives an idea 
of the crops grown by demonstrators on Se1ukwe 
Reserve during the past season: 
TABLE lWO 119) 
o,ro~s grown acreage ~ie1d average .lie1d Eer acre 
mai ze 8 90 bags 11i bags 
peanuts 1i 46 bags 26,7 bags 
kaffi r-com 1i 4,4 bags 3 bags 
kaffi r-beans 1 i 4,6 bags 2,6 bags 
pumpkins i 1008 pumpkins 2016 pumpkins 
In this manner, Alvord attempted to indicate that maize was by no neans 
the only crop cultivated under demonstration schemes. 
In a letter to the Director of Native Development, Alvord pointed out 
why mos t Afri cans preferred cu1 ti vating mai ze to other crops, 
An important cause of the maize complex among 
the natives is the fact that the mines, missions, 
govemment departnents and employers generally 
throughout the country ration the natives em-
ployed by them with nealie neal. .. maize can be 
produced and purchased at a quarter to a half 
the cost of rupoko ... (the) natives themselves 
know that maize is much easier and cheaper to 
grow than rupoko and larger returns are to be 
had for their 1abour.120) 
In his annual report, Alvord stated that with regard to the 'maize 
complex', lilt is in my opinion that such farners who cannot stand 
possible competition, would do the most good for Rhodesia by moving 
out ... 121) 
In addition to the pre-occupation with maize cultivation on the part 
119) LD. Alvord, 'Agricultural Demonstration Work', pp.26/7. 
120) NAR S138/72 A1v?rd to ~irector of Native Development, 8/6/1931. 
121) NAR S138/72 Natlve Agrlcu1tura1ist: Draft Report 1928. 
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of white famers, there we.re further explanations for the accusations 
1evelled .against Alvord: Africans generally were pre-occupied with the 
cultivation of maize, and were reluctant to try other crops. Indeed, 
Alvord himself occasionally found difficulty in persuadi.ng p10tho1ders 
to adopt crop rotations in which maize did not feature prominently. 
Afri cans had every reason to prefer the cu1 ti vati on of mai ze to that 
of other crops: being the staple diet of Africans in urban employment, 
markets were more readily avail ab 1e than for other crops. Further-
more, the lower and less reliable returns for maize led to the 
planting of larger acrea;ges per head; 122) thus it might appear that 
more maize was cultivated than was in fact the case. This was 
sufficient, however, to convince white famers of the African pre-
occupation with maize cultivation. 
Shortage of staff and government reluctance to finance development 
programmes were to prove two of the primary obstacles to the success 
of A1vord's scheme. Furthermore, conditions in some reserves had 
deteriorated to such an extent that restoration of the natural resources 
was deemed necessary prior to any attempts at development itself. Thus 
limited staff had not only to restore the land, but communicate what 
were revolutionary concepts to a vast number of rural Africans, 
comprising 98 per cent of the entire African population and existing 
on 89 reserves scattered throughout the country. In 1933, Alvord was 
granted an Assistant Agriculturalist, his first request in 1931 
having been refused. In 1932, a CORJ11unity demonstrator was appointed, 
and in the following year, two Land Inspectors. 123) In that year, 
1937, the CNC commented, 
122) 
123) 
" ... (there is) doubt as to whether it is possible 
to accoRJ11odate the whole of the above population 
(1,050,512) in reserves and native areas as they 
exist today. With a view to determining the 
matter two surveyors were added to the staff and 
are n~ engaged in production of large scale maps 
of Nat1ve Reserves showing the distribution of 
existing popUlation, the amount of land suitable 
for cultivation and pasture, and the extent of 
T~i$ , . is a P?ssib1e ex~lanation as to why Alvord experienced such 
d1ff1cu1ty 1n persuad1ng Africans to cultivate smaller areas. 
E. D. Alvord, • The Gospe 1 of the Plow'. 
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water supplies. Therefore we can form some idea of 
what additional population the Native Reserves are 
capable of carrying .... It is not possible that this 
(development) wi n be complete by the time the 
land Apportionment Act stipu1ates.124) 
~spi te increased pressure for the deve lopment of reserves, the 
government at this stage was still reluctant to comply with this 
demand. 
That Alvord was initially refused an Assistant Agriculturalist vali-
dates the assertion that there was still fear of African competition, 
and the existence of too many qualified men in the training of 
Africans might translate this fear into reality. In 1932, however, 
agricu1tu~1 training at the two industrial schools was made com-
pu1sory, That there was no objecti on to thi s measure reflected the 
opinion that self-sufficiency in the reserves was favoured, but that 
a class of commercial farmers providing competition to whites should 
not be allowed to develop. 
A1 vord experienced great di ffi cu1 ty in introduci ng improved methods on 
scattered plots, and under communal systems of tenure. Of this practise 
Alvord stated that, "It was the custom of Africans everywhere to have 
sma 11 1 ands and gardens scattered throughout the reserves 1i ke sma 11 
islands in a sea of grass. They also had their huts scattered and 
"125) hidden away in the bush and rocks. In 1929, therefore, Alvord 
introduced the system of centralisation on the Se1ukwe Reserve. This 
entailed the consolidation of all arable holdings and grazing lands 
in block systems, separated by the village which was laid out in 
straight lines on the boundary lines between the two areas. Once 
the arable land had been protected, it was re-a110cated into family 
ho1dings. 126 ) In this manner, a permanent system of agriculture was 
i n~ugurated,. grazi.ng 1 ands en 1 a.rged and crops protected from damage 
by roaming cattle. This terminated the system whereby " ... the extensive 
patch.es of grassland which the owners of contiguous cultivated land 
124) NAR Report of the CNC for the year 1933 . 
. 125) E. D. A1 vOrd, • The Gospel of the Plow'. 
126) NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 1944 Native Production and Trade Commission. 
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leave between their gardens, which are entirely wasteland during half 
the year, for they are not of sl.,Ifficient size to be, grazed without 
. h d··· f· ld ,,127) damage to crops 1n tea J01n1ng 1e s. 
Africans generally were not opposed to the policy of centralisation, 
and in many cases actually requested assistance in this field.
128
) 
In pre-colonial communities, arable and pastoral land had been clearly 
demarcated. These divisions broke down in the 1890s, however, when 
grazing and arable lands became intermingled as the use of the plough 
became more widespread, and both cattle and the human population 
increased in number. 
After the Selukwe Reserve had been centralised, there was a two year 
interlude while the success of this pilot scheme was examined. This 
work proved to be a success, and many Africans, originally sceptical 
about the idea, became enthusiastic about the project.
129
) There-
after, work in this field accelerated: soil surveys were drawn up to 
determine suitable arable and grazing lands. This work was originally 
allocated to NCs, but the CNC, Carbutt, maintained that the NCs had 
neither the time nor the technical proficiency for such undertakings.
130
) 
When the land surveyors joined the department, they took over the 
execution of this work in conjunction with Alvord and Palmer, the 
Assi stant Ag'ri cultura 1i st. 
Enthusiasm for centralisation grew over the years as its benefits became 
more apparent: "Several old men, who on most reserves are opposed to 
progress, got up and spoke enthusiastically in favour of the work and 
urged all younger men to adopt our methods.,,131) In 1937 Alvord 
quoted the ,agricultural demonstrator on ' Mondoro Reserve as saying, 
:'(the) reserve people are thanki,ng very much for the centralisation 
done in this reserve for they have now seen the good results of 
127) C.L. Carbutt, 'Communal Land Tenure', in NADA, 5, 1927, p.43. 
128) NAR S138/72 Alvord to CNC 26/5/1987 Centralisation: Mondoro 
Reserve. 
129) E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow'. 
130) C.L. Carbutt, 'Communal Land Tenure', p.44. 
131) NAR S1534 Vol. 1 1934 Alvord to CNC Report on Before Harvest 
Meetings in Demonstration Centres, Mtoko Reserve. 
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centralisation. Its good result is plenty of grass. Cattle are also 
fat and strong ... A few years .ag.o before centralisation cattle were 
poor and th,i:n ... 1I132 ) Thus, on experienci.ng the results of centrali-
sation, much of the initial hostility exhibited against this policy 
abated. For example, the abovementioned reserve, so vocal in its 
appreCiation of centralisation, had, only a few months before, been 
suspicious and hostile to the movement. lilt appeared that there was 
a considerable amount of opposition by these natives to the movement 
of their villages into lines because they were finn1y convinced that 
they we re bei ng moved into 1 i nes for purposes of taxati on. 11133) 
Alvord was later to say of centralisation, lI(it) is the keystone on 
which community development, pennanency of agriculture and soil 
conservation are centred. 1I134) 
On reserves which had been centralised, community demonstrators con-
ducted development policies and aided in the resettlement of villages. 
Alvord outlined the tasks of community demonstrators in the following 
manner, 
Their job is to propagandise, guide, advise, 
assist and supervise reserve natives in com-
munity improving enterprises such as the 
establishment of community tree plantations, the 
planning and layout of rural villages, kraal and 
vi 11 age sani tati on, improvement of spri ng and 
village water supplies, construction of dams for 
watering livestock, construction and improvement 
of reserve roads, layout of buildings, locations 
and erection of cattle kraals ... 135) 
The first community demonstrator was located on Selukwe Reserve in 
1932, by 1937 these demonstrators were at work on twelve reserves. l36 ) 
Alvord also initiated the movement towards ir~igation schemes. These 
came to play an important role in the development of Southern 
Rhodesia, opening u'p previously uninhabitable regions in arid areas 
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the. government, and Afri cans buil t thei r own furrows, ai ded by 
missionaries whose example they followed. In 1928, the. government 
took a hand in the development of irrigation, and during the follow-
ing decades all the Sabi Valley projects came under government control 
with A1vord 1 s supervision and direction. 
The Mutema. furrow was the first to be surveyed by Alvord in 1928 
and thi s work was fi nanced by the Nati ve Reserves Trust Fund Commi ttee. 
This allowed the furrow to be constructed in 1930. 137 ) Between 
1930 and 1937, four more furrows were surveyed and constructed by 
Alvord, and all were financed by the Reserves Trust Fund. 138) At 
this point it was decided that all future irrigation projects were 
to be supervised by the Irrigation Department and financed from the 
Loan Vote Fund - lldevelopment of water supp1ies ll ; the actual con-
struction of the canal, however, was to be left to A1vord 1 s department. 139) 
Alvord promoted his schemes by emphasising their importance as a 
supplier of grain for the lowve1d in years of crop failure and food 
shortage. 140) Alvord did not initiate many changes in this area. In 
most cases he built where local Africans had already begun programmes, 
thus ensuring their co-operation. Most of these Africans actually 
assisted in the building of ' their furrows. 
By 1930, Alvord had achieved remarkable success in the implementation 
of his programmes. If one considers the various factors against him, 
then his accomplishments in these first few years were all the more 
notable. Dinnis, commenting on Alvord, stated that, IIA1vord woke 
the African agricultural side up," and further that there was 
probably African resistance to these progralTJl1es 141) in the early 
years. In addition to the above, Alvord also had limited finances 
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more di ffi cul t. 
It was know'ledge of this earlier success which probably made the 
government reluctant to provi de assi stance in furthering and expandi ng 
the ini ti al p~ogrammes. The, government was fully aware of, and 
utilized, its ability to promote African advancement in one area 
whilst curtailing it in another. In the field of agriculture, barely 
enough assistance was given to allow Africans to attain self-
sufficiency in their own areas. By keeping finance and staff members 
at a minimum, any advancement that might produce competition to whites 
was prevented. Population pressure and expectation of future mass 
movements into the reserves brought the reaslisation that although 
the carrying capacity of the reserves might be increased, pressure on 
the land ensured there would be no improvement in productive capacity. 
Poor communication and transport systems and lack of accessible 
markets also acted as a disincentive to adopt improved methods. 
Al vord wrote wi th regard to the above that, 
(the) greates t handi cap to our efforts to i ntro-
duce better methods of ti 11 age among reserve 
natives is the lack of marketing facilities. 
In many areas it is i mposs i b 1 e for nati ves to 
sell for cash and they're forced to take salt or 
cloth for their grain or they cannot sell at 
all .... The fact that most "kaffir-truck" stores 
cannot sell for cash imposes a hand to mouth 
existence upon hill) under which he cannot progress. 
With no income the natives are low consumers to 
the detriment of the \'ilole country.142) 
It is possible that these trading-stores were encouraged for this 
very reason - not being able to procure an income to meet financial 
obligations, many Africans were, therfore, forced on to the labour 
markets. 
Alvord attempted to convey to the Africans that adoption of improved 
methods was not primarily for the production of a marketable surplus. 
In connection with this, he stated, 
I have heard nati ves at kraal meetings say, "What 
is the use of teachi,ng us how to produce better 
142) NAR S1542 A4 Vol.1 1934 Annual Report of Agriculturalist. 
Nati ve Department 1934. 
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and larger crops, if we cannot sell the, grain?" 
I want you (the demons trators) to tell them 
that the object of teaching them better and 
more certain methods of producing grain, is 
firstly to ensure that they and their children 
have enough to eat, and it is only after a 
man has 'grown sufficient to support his family 
that he should begi n to think of sell ing any 
grain ... (they) cannot expect the government 
to feed them, when the failure of crops is due 
to their neglect to follow the advice which is 
given to them.143) 
In the early years of development programmes, however, some reserves 
were not excessively overcrowded, and grain sufficient to meet sub-
sistance requirements could still be obtained through "traditional" 
practises. 144) Hence, with no access to markets, Africans were 
justified in expressing reluctance to adopt new methods. 
It was a common belief that Africans were reluctant to adopt new 
methods owing to high leisure preference. In this regard, the NC for 
Belingwe commented, 
(It is) difficult to explain why meetings are not 
better attended, and I can only think that it is 
due solely to lack of interest. While the 
native can grow sufficient food by his own crude 
agricultural methods he seems disinclined to 
adopt methods which to him involve more labour 
and care. He does not realise that there is no 
more trouble in looking after three acres properly 
than there is in caring for ten acres by his 
traditional methods, and that he would reap 
more from the th ree acres. 145) 
Alvord himself did not realise that reluctance to adopt new methods 
could be explained in part at least, by the precarious nature of the 
African's existence; that in living so close to the poverty line, he 
was loathe to cast asi de "centuries old methods to experiment wi th 
the new and foreign when he is experimenting, literally with the food 
his family must have to survive." 146 ) E.M. Rogers commented further 
on this point, liThe peasant way of life has conditioned them to avoid 
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never win, but he can never lose either. This unfavourable 
. ..-
orientation to change is partly a result o~ generations of cultural 
dOt
O . ..147)" . con 1 10n1ng. . 
In addition to casting aside well-tried methods, Africans were in fact 
working with government employees, sometimes total strangers, which 
added to difficulties experienced in this sphere. The Africans had 
justifiable reasons for the hostility and suspicion they expressed 
towards these government agents: memories of previ ous government 
intervention still ranked high in trei r minds and they did not readily 
forget the expropriation of thei r land and cattle in 1893, nor the 
various Land COl111lissions and establishment of reserves. In this 
respect, A1 vord corrmented, 
They feel they have been badly treated in 
apportionment of land and say that if they have 
demonstration plots and get good yields off small 
1 ands the government wi 11 do nothing for them 
with regard to further lands. They are justified 
in feeling that they have not been given a proper 
proportion of land on which to live. Almost the 
whole of Umtasa Reserve is one large granite 
mountai.n ... the soi 1 ... is very shallow and low in 
fertil i ty. 148) 
These feelings of unjust treatment were heightened when Africans saw 
on land adjacent to crowded reserves, large white-owned ranches with 
masses of cattle, one head to twenty acres. That this land might 
have required development of water supplies and various other capital 
inputs to render it inhabitable was not understood. Many Africans 
merely saw large areas of uncrowded land, and this was sufficient to 
convince them of their own unfair treatment. 149 ) 
Not only was it thought that if smaller lands were cultivated, the 
allocation of more land would not be considered, but it was feared 
that more land would be withdrawn from their use should it be realised 
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stated, liMy fear is that if I were to go to a demonstrator and be 
taught, nw land would be cut up and I would, be. given a very small 
area to plough ... we feel that if we follow these people there is a 
da.nger that some of our land will be taken away from us.:
,150
) Alvord 
conmented on African attitudes in this sphere, "They all know that 
thi s so called teacher of farming had nat been sent to teach them 
about farming. The government wauld not spend money so fao1ish1y ... 
he was sent to test their land and if it was found to be good, it 
would be given to. the white man ... they all know that men's crops 
woul d be taken by the demons trator. 11151 ) 
Customary agricultural practises and peasant avaidance of the risky 
and nove 1 were furthe r endorsed by the role played in II tradi ti ona 111 
agriculture by superstition and witchcraft. Alvord maintained that 
in these early years they fai led to. see the relationship between work 
and the visible benefits accruing therefrom. With regard to this, 
Alvord gave an example of the detrimental effects resulting from these 
be 1iefs, 
Twenty-six days and not a drop of rain. Marudzi, 
after trying every charm he knew wi thout results, 
began to make excuses. Certain spirits were 
angry because no beer-drink had been made in 
their honaur ... graves of ... ancestors had not been 
properly cared for",Then at last Marudzi's 
fertile brain hit upon what was accepted by all 
as the real reason for the great drought. It 
was because of the coming af the native farming 
demons trators who had been sent by the govern-
ment to. teach them better farming. 152) 
Thi s type of response mi ght have been prevalent in the early years of 
Alvord's scheme when the needs far adoption af improved methods were 
nat as great as they were later to become. 
As the years passed, however, and reserves became more congested, the 
need for demons trators increased. Never having wi tnessed the effects 
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Afri cans saw no 1.ogi c or reason in adopting soil conservati on lrethods, 
nor the need for manure to retai n fertil i ty. As the effects of soil 
erosion becalre evident, however, Africans b.egan to see the wisdom 
behi nd these practi ces. Having once adopted them, they experienced 
the benefit of tilled smaller acreages under improved lrethods, and 
attaining higher yields through implementation of these. 
Consequently, more Africans who were initially opposed to the scheme 
and had objected wn~n demonstrators brought to a halt their migratory 
system of agriculture, settled down and adopted the proper rotation 
lrethod; advocated by demonstrators. 153) Be this as it may, Hampton 
maintained that there were still SOIre dissenters, those whom he 
stated, 1I100ked over the wa1l ll • These lren watched the p10tho1ders 
progress, ploughing when they ploughed, planting when they did and 
harvesting when they did. These lren then stated that demonstrators 
were of no use because they too could get high yields without their 
assistance. Hampton pointed out, however, that even here the 
demonstrators were achieving indirect benefits for these dissenters 
were indirectly influenced by the new lrethods. 154) 
Despi te all these setbacks, by 1930 the demonstrators had achieved 
some visible results. The CNC stated in 1930, "Native demonstrators 
have without exception won laudatory comment upon their work and it 
is significant that areas in which marked improvelrent has been 
observed are usually those in which the activities, of these demonstra-
tors have been centred." 155 ) Chief Umtasa of Umta'li district offered 
hi s thanks to the. government in the fo llowi ng words, 
I have to thank the government today for the success 
of this work. When the agricultural demonstrator 
came it surprised me very much that a native should 
be taught agriculture. I thought very sincerely 
that my people would be troubled by this agricultural 
demonstrator. My people for the most part used to 
have to buy food year by year but now thei r posi ti on 
is beginning to improve. They are getting enough 
food to eat and even a little to sell. What pleased 
lS3} R. Dinnis, Interview, October, 1979. 
154) D. Hampton, Interview, November, 1979. 
155) NAR Report of the CNC for the year 1930. 
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me especially about this work is that many people 
are improving in all their affairs, in all their 
doings and ·i n all thei r haDi ts. 156} 
By 1930, then, Alvord's efforts were beginning to bear fruit and many 
Africans were actually asking for demonstrators. 
In the final analysis of the success of demonstration schemes in the 
1920s, all factors must be taken into consideration: lack of staff 
relative to the vast rural population, I traditional I ties, and sus-
picion of government motives. Above all, it must be remerrbered, that 
these changes were revolutionary to the African, and not changes 
evolving from natural causes. Not only did Africans have to under-
stand the changes advocated, but had to overcome their inherent 
hostility towards the government before implementing them. 
Furthermore, the reserves themselves were in a position of upheaval 
and dislocation as a result of the Land Commission and Land Apportion-
ment Act. That Alvord was able to induce change in the face of such 
obstacles is a tribute to his determination, and an expression of his 
belief in the validity of the work he was conducting. In 1930, 
Jowitt, the Director of Native Agriculture, commented thus, 
It should be remerrbered, however, that experience 
is not static, and hence that with changing con-
ditions, ancestral methods may be inexorably 
doomed. With an increased density of population 
and of stock in Native Reserves, acutely inten-
sified by the powerful stimulus of rising needs, 
there would now appear to be ample justification 
by the giving of direction to native agriculture. 
Such direction is being increasingly provided 
by the work of agricultural demonstrators. The 
extraordinary response that they have already 
secured would seem to be illustrative of the fact 
that the new agricultural experience of the 
natives who have co-operated bears witness to 
the correctness of the practise which the demon-
strations now advocate. Certain it is that in 
reserve after reserve the contras t between the 
old and the new is dramatic. 157) 
This, too, serves to illustrate the general success of Alvord's work 
by 1930. 
156) NAR Sl~8/72,.Thanks to Government Chief Umtasa, Umta1i District. 
lSi) H. JOWltt, Dlrec~or of Native Development Department, Forward to 
LD. Alvord, AgnauZt;uruZ Work on Native Reserves, p.1. 
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The apparent paradox in govemnent pol icy in the 1920s may be reconciled 
when it becones clear that simultaneous pressure for s.egregation, and 
deve lopnent of the reserves, were contributory factors to the same 
final goal. If seg~gation were to be rendered a feasible proposition, 
it was necessary to develop the reserves to the extent that they ' w,ere 
capable of accommodating the vast numbers whose migration to these 
areas was envisaged. Simultaneously, while the white fanning sector 
was still unstable, it ensured that Africans were not given assistance 
which might render them a threat to continued white hegemony. 
"We cannot expect, however, to persuade a conservative 
and stubborn people to change over en masse to systematic 
crop rotation, we have been trying that for t he past twenty 
years and under our programme of propoganda and gentle 
persuasion, less than 10 percent have been persuaded to 
adopt better methods. It is time to change our policy. 
We need a land utilization Act and a good husbandry bill 
which must be enforced~. 
E.D.Alvord, The Progress of Native Agriculture in Rhodesia. 
--' 
THE DEPRESSON YEARS AND AFTER I 19]) - 191.5 
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4.1 Maize Control: Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1930-1935 
The whi te farming sector entered the 19305 in a posi ti on whi ch was 
already vulnerable. Their power in the political arena was firmly 
entrenched, and they had succeeded in limiting the possibility of 
African competition via the Land Apportionment Act which came into 
effect in 1931. Nonetheless, this did not detract from the fact 
that the white agricultural base was itself extremely fragile in these 
years. Consequent upon the general re~ersion to maize cultivation 
after the collapse of cotton and tobacco cultivation during the 
depression in the 1920s, demand for government intervention grew 
steadily more vocal, and determination to achieve government aid 
intensi fied as the early 1930s ushered in a more wi despread depressi on. 
In 1929 government policy towards white agriculture began to change 
from that of promoting research and providing advice, and came to 
incorporate acceptance of responsibility in the fields of marketing 
and production. The reasons for this change of policy may be attributed 
largely to the declining importance of African agricultural contribution 
at a time when white agriculture began to expand. In this event, the 
government was no longer so reluctant to discriminate against African 
marketed produce. 1) 
The posi ti on of hegemony whi ch whi te farmers assumed in the 1920s 
stemmed from domination of the maize market; maize becoming Southern 
Rhodesia's chief export in those years. When the world maize market 
co 11 apsed in the early 1930s, however, the re 1ati ve 1y superi or 
posi ti on of these farmers became threatened. 2) C. F. Keyter wrote of 
this situation that, "Concentration on maize growing merely served to 
exacerbate the already parlous posi ti on of whi te farmers when the 
export price of maize dropped from a plateau of 11/- a bag to 5/10 in 
1930 and to a low of 3/4 in April 1931, at the very time that the 
1) G. Arr:ighe, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective ' , p.220. 
2) Yudelman c1aime~ that the value of gross output of agriculture 
reached a peak 1n 1927. When commodity prices fell in the 19305 
however, it was not for another decade that the value of agri- ' 
cultural exports again exceeded that of 1927. 
M. Yude 1 man, AfPi'cans on the Land, p. 43. 
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amount of surplus maize available for export began to rise significant1y.1I3) 
As a result of this, many maize, growers faced bankruptcy. In order to 
offset falling prices, acre,ages under cultivation were increased; 
but this led to soil erosion owi,ng to continuous croppi,ng, and less 
care of the soil. At the same time, their economic plight was 
heightened as competition from African growers intensified. The CNC 
, 4) 
said in 1929 that this "threatens to become a serious problem. II 
In 1931 the world price of maize fell sharply and it was the white 
farmers alone who bore this burden. All Afri can-produced mai ze found 
its market in the home economy and competition to secure access to the 
now re 1 ati ve 1y hi gher-pri ced i ntema 1 markets reached unprecedented 
heights. 5) This problem was brought to light by the CNC as early as 
1929, when he said, liThe argument is that as the local price is 
stabilised by export, and that is, up to the present, local prices 
have been prevented, as a di rect result of export, from becoming unre-
muneratively low, means should be devised to save those who export 
from bearing the entire burden."6 ) In response to falling prices on 
the international maize markets, a Maize Control Bill was drafted. 
This did not materialise, however, and instead a Commission of Enquiry 
was appointed to investigate the production and marketing of maize. 
The Commission's report, published in 1931, favoured compulsory control 
of the sale of maize and a bill was drafted in furtherance of this aim. 
Nevertheless, there was conflict amongst white farmers in Southem 
Rhodesia over the Maize Control bill: the main maize-growers in 
Mashonaland were in favour of control, but in this regard they stood 
alone.?) Farmers in the Midlands, Eastern Districts and Matabe1e1and, 
3) C.F. Keyter, Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia 1931-1941, (1978), 
pp.3/4. 
4) NAR CNC Annual Report for the year 1929. 
5) In 1928/9 total white grown maize crop amounted to 1,826,000 bags 
and that of Africans, only 140,000. It was, therefore, purely , 
over access to the best markets that friction arose. 
L.H. Gann, A Histo~ of Southern Rhodesia, p.287. 
6) NAR CNC Annual Report op. ait. 
7) D.J Murray, The Governroontal System in Southern Rhodesia, p.73. 
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(parti cul arly ranchers and tobacco farmers) di d not approve of thi s 
move. Tbey believed it would operate to t~ir disadvan~age because 
they would tben have to pay more for tbeir maize requirements. Only 
when the bill was amended, and made to apply to Mashonaland and the 
Midlands alone, did it receive, general support. Thus the Maize 
Control Act, which came into effect in 1931, was designed to safeguard 
the Mashonaland maize-growers. This Act authorised the establishment 
of a Maize Control Board to operate a system of compulsory co-operation 
in marketing. 8) It controlled both domestic and export markets in 
those areas, and set a minimum price on all maize sold in the domestic 
market. 
The 1931 Maize Control Act did not meet with much success. It was 
intended as a temporary measure only, to last three years during which 
time white growers could find alternative crops.9) Although it 
applied only to Mashonaland and the Midlands, growers in other areas 
could sell to the Control Board in order to benefit from guaranteed 
pri ces. Furthermore, consumers in controlled ?reas sought means of 
avoiding the higher controlled prices, and purchased maize more 
cheaply from local Africans. 
Consequently, the Rhodesia Agricultural Union demanded an amendment to 
the original Act, making it applicable to the whole of Southern 
Rhodesia. Nevertheless, this did not come into effect until 1934, 
when Moffat's government was succeeded by a more conservati ve govern-
ment under the leadership of G. Huggins. The fall from power of 
Moffat's government was brought about primarily by farmer oPPosition;lO) 
when the Rhodesian Agricultural Union, on behalf of the Mashona1and 
niai ze farmers, succeeded in persuading the Rhodesian Party to pass 
the 1.931 Act, the opposition of other maize-growers to the Union 
(which, they believed, favoured Mashona1and farmers), was extended to 
include the, government. As a result, the Refonn Party was established, 
compri s i,ng Matabe le 1 and, Mi dl ands and Eas te rn Di s tri ct farmers, 
remnants of the old Progressive Party, and members of the Labour Party 
8) Ibid., p.l8. 
9) M.C ~ Steele, Foundations of a Native PoZiay in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1923-1933, p.383. 
10) D.J. Murray, op. cit., p.l8. 
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which had been established in 1920. The Moffat government, unable to 
withstand such opposition, gave way to the Refonn Party in 19·33 under 
the leadership of George Mitchell. This. governlrent lacked the 
support of the Rhodesian .Agricu1tura1 Union and the Mashonaland 
fanners; and in an attempt to overcome this schism, Huggins reconstituted 
the Refonn Party in an alliance with the old Rhodesia Party11) in a 
new party called the United Party. 
The United Party,12) when it came to power in 1934, succeeded in 
passing the Maize Control Amendment Act in that same year. This new 
Act sought to satisf!y the diverse aims of all the farJrers, and it was 
to continue in operation until mid-1936. To placate the farmers of 
Matabele1and, Midlands and the Eastern Districts, who were pre-
dominantly small producers, the Act gave them preference over the 
large-scale Mashona1and growers. Unlike the Act of 1931, the 
Amendlrent Act was extended to include African maize-growers who were 
also suffering the effects of the world slump in prices. With regard 
to this, the CNC cOmJrented that, "ONing to the drop in world prices, 
the pri ce of mai ze fell to such an extent that, in remote areas, 
maize was practically unsa1eable and in some areas traders declined 
to buy for anything but goOds. u13 ) 
The Maize Enquiry Committee believed the aims of the Act would be 
defeated were African maize-growers not incorporated into its context. 




If ... as the Committee recommends, any control 
measures are applied to European produced 
maize, and native maize ;s left free, then 
undoubtedly it will at once becolre the most 
prominent factor in the matter, and in the hands 
of anyone desi rous of defeating the aims of the 
co-operation, would be a powerful and most 
effective weapon, lending itself on the one 
The old Rhodesian Party was Moffat's party which fell from 
power in 1933. 
These movelrents indicate the growing strength of fanners in the 
Southern Rhodesian political arena. In fact, 13 of the 30 
members Of. the assembly were, or had been, farmers, and it was 
on.~e basls 0: such strength that Africans caire to be dis-
crlmlnated .agalnst for the duration of the 1930s. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1934. 
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hand to the exploitation of the native, and on the 
other to prejudi cing the interests of the European 
producer. 14) . 
The Committee stated further that, . . 
tn addition to European production, there is a 
surplus produced by the natives estimated at 
from 75,000 to 300,000 bags which comes into 
the market and thereby becomes , an important factor 
in determining prices for local sales. Native 
grown maize while in some. cases excellent is 
on the whole of very varying quality, and is, 
therefore, generally speaking, unfit for export 
as grain. As a result, while some may un-
doubtedly be included in the meal exported 
north, it mus t be accepted that to a 11 intents 
and purposes it is locally consumed . 
... Item 5. Native Production .... Native pro-
duced mai ze and its entry into the market .... 
a considerable quantity does come into trade 
channels - it is not possible to guage the 
measure of its effect on local prices, although 
it is without a doubt an important factor.15) 
It was obvious then, that much African-produced maize was entering the 
market, and being of inferior quality, was consumed locally. In order 
to prevent an African monopoly of the local maize market, the Act of 
1934 operated against these maize-growers. 
Under the 1934 Act, a two-pool system was established by the govern-
ment. All mai ze had to be deli vered to the Board from where it was 
assigned to either the export pool or the local pool. The amount of 
maize allocated to the local pool was determined by local consumption 
requirements, and the prices paid for this maize were 30 to 50 per cent 
above world pri ces. 16) Thus it was on the consumer that the burden of 
these increased prices fel1. The remaining maize received by the 
Board was allocated to the export pool, and sold at whatever price 
could be reached on the world market. 
In order to break up the African maize-producers. grip on local markets, 
the Board established a quota system by. which maize was allocated to 
the two pools. The smaller wnite farmers received l~rge quotas of up 
to 80 per cent of their deliveries in the nigh priced internal market. 
14) NAR S138/72 Maize Enquiry Committee. 
15) Ibid. 
16) M. Yude1man, Afrioans on the Land, p.179. 
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The large producers received a quota in the internal market of up to 
20 pe; cent of their delivery.17} 
The policy imposed upon African growers differed slightly from that 
of white producers: under the 0~igina1 Maize Control Act of 1931, 
Africans were accorded privileges not received by whites, and were 
permitted to sell maize to bodies other than the Maize Control Board. 
The new Act perpetuated this stipulation, but maintained that 
should African producers wish to share in the Board's local sales, 
they were to surrender their maize on the s'ame terms as did whites.
18
) 
Afri can growers were allotted the same quotas as 1 arge whi te pro-
ducers; and if their maize was surrendered to the Board by traders, it 
was to be submitted to the export pool on1y.19) Africans, however, 
suffered a further disadvantage in that whereas whi te farmers I mai ze 
was treated individually, that of African growers was treated col-
lectively. Furthermore, African-produced maize contributed only 25 
per cent of all maize de1ivered,20) and this made their treatment in 






Murray extends on these percentages: whites who delivered less 
than 100 bags per annum, sold 75 per cent on the domestic 
market, and the remainder went to export. Those with 200-300 
bags had a quota of 70 per cent to 30 per cent and so on, up 
to 600 bags where the quota was 25 per cent., to 75 per cent. 
D.J. Murray, The Govemroontal, System in Southern Rhodesia, p94. 
E.R. Jacklin, IThe Maize Control Amendment Act ' , in Rhodesia 
Agriaul,tural, Joumal" 31, 1934, pp.487-490. 
This policy in effect excluded the African producer almost 
totally from the local pool, because in most cases the trader 
was the only means Africans had of handling and transporting 
thei r crops. The NC Mrewa conunented on thi s fact: liThe trader 
is the only channel through which crops can be laboriously 
collected in small quantities ... then bagged and disposed of, 
and at this stage of development the trader is indispensable 
to natives in outlying districts. 1I 
NAR S1542 A4 NC Mrewa. 
M. Yude 1 man, Africans on the Land, p. 179. 
Jacklin, op. cit., maintained that the belief that the lower the 
sales, the larger the quantity of the quota, was an illusion; 
the small growe!' was gi ven a quota representing a higher 
percentage of hlS crop than was the large grower, but this was 
a percentage of a smaller quantity. M average of sales of 
500 bags woul d eam a quota of 70 per cent, whi le that of 750 
bags, 65 per cent. But 65 per cent of 750, was more than 70 per 
c:nt of 500. ~he~fore, those wi th 1 arger average sales got a 
hlgher proportlon lnto the local sales pool. 
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In the 1920s, then, white fanrers achieved a preferential position in 
Southern Rhodesia, especially the small fanrers. This situation, 
however, contained an inherent contradiction: the system of control, 
aimed at promoting an efficient agricultural system, actually mili-
tated against the achei vement of thi s goal by favouring the element 
amongst the white farming community which least displa~ed an interest 
. 22) 
in improvement - the small fanrers. The system of maize control 
produced an inbalance in the development of white agriculture since 
it invoked a strong incentive to maize production and militated 
against the expansion of other crops. 
The 1934 Maize Control Act was the first Act directly seeking to 
control African marketing and production: "When did they first begin 
to organise native production of crops? The first Act by parliament 
in these directions was the Maize Control Act." 23 ) As the following 
quotations reveal, African producers suffered a severe blow when the 
Act was implemented: "Chief Ngungubana stated that prior to the passing 
of the Maize Control Act, the natives of this di-strict had disposed of 
some 10,000 bags of grain, whereas now the traders did not want their 
grain. He also complained that there was no local market for rupoko 
or munga ll ;24) and, "further to IT\Y minute of January 25, on the ... 
matter ... add the following COJTJnents of NC Bu1a1ima Mangwe: lithe 
cultivation of maize has become negligible, the Maize Control Act 
may be regarded as the main factor for this, for under its operation 
the production of maize is not longer a remunerative one from the 
native point of view."25 ) Be this as it may, in the absence of maize 
control, Africans might have realised prices even lower than those 





The effi ci~nt producers were the 1 arge scale farmers: 70 per 
cent of malze growers planted under 100 acres, accounting for 
25 per cent of the area planted, but only 15 per cent of the 
crop, whi le 8 per cent of the growers were responsible for 
40 per cent of the area planted and 50 per cent of the crop. 
D. J. Murray, The GovemmentaZ System in Southern. RhodEsia, p.94. 
NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission 1944. 
NAR S1542/N2 B 1931-9 Meetings of Cbiefs and Headmen Belingwe 
13/5/1937. 
NAR S1542/M2 Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary Maize Control 
Board 27/1/36 Resolution by Maize Control Board. 
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With the construction of markets, attitudes ~~wards the adoption of 
improved methods of cultivation, and to ~he demonstra~ors. generally, 
experienced a heavy setback. This is evidenced in the various official 
reports, 
I have spoken to the natives to try and encourage 
them to continue with better methods of farming that 
they have been taught, but they simply refuse and 
say, "Why shou1 d we grow crops and sell them at less 
than we used to?" and another favouri te remark :i Sl: 
"Ves, we told you when you fi rst brought demonstrators 
onto other reserves that they had come to try out our 
land and that the govemnent would take either it or 
our crops. "26) 
Demonstration work has taken a setback because plot 
holders have not been able to sell the improved 
maize grown on plots, and are wondering if it is 
worth while giving up the old easy nethods and do 
the hard work requi red on p10ts.27) 
'The precepts of the demonstrators are not being 
taken to heart. Once the fi rst flush of enthu-
siasm is over, the painful fact that better 
farming methods nean more work is brought home, 
and interest quickly wanes.' No doubt the economic 
slump would encourage the tendencies described 
above. 28) 
... fa11 in number of African demonstration plots 
through the Maize Control Act is rather disappointing, 
as in thi s area and Zi mutu North there welre 141 plots 
and this year the total is only 67. I have done my 
best to talk the natives round to carryon with crop 
rotation but they say it neans too much hard work and 
they would rather carryon with their native nethods 
of farming, and further that the govemment wi 11 do 
the same with the price whatever they grow in excess 
of requirements for actual consumption as they did 
with maize prices.29) 
During the years of maize control, then, much of the success achieved 
by demonstrators in the 1920s was undone. 
The slump in .agricultura1 prices duri.ng the depression retarded the 
marketi.ng of surplus grain and altered attitudes towards demonstrators. 





NAR S1542/M2 Ass.Ag. SB7 to CNC 19/1/35 MCA. 
NAR S138/72 Report on Before Planting Inspection of Demonstration 
Plots on Rese rves, Mondoro Rese rve, 1932/3. 
NAR CNC Annual Report 1931, quoting .NC Goranonzi. 
NAR AL 6/1/1 Before Planting Inspection 1934 Zimutu. South. 
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they were bei .ng discriminated against by the. govemment and white 
fanners in whose favour the Act operated. Those Africans living in 
areas remote from the railway-line were more harmfully affected as 
transport costs alone rendered the marketing of maize an unviab1e 
proposition, the following excer·pt from the CNC's annual report 
shows that the problem had not escaped official attention, 
(The) present Maize Control System has had the effect 
of increasing native cultivation in central districts. 
NC Mazoe reports almost 100 per cent increase in the 
area under maize. ANC Victoria, the same. Reports of 
remote areas indicate the opposite effects i.e. it 
handicaps marketing. NC Nuanetsi: Transport renders 
the sale of maize to the Maize Control Board 
uneconomical and maize control makes it uneconomical 
for the trader to buy. 30) 
In controlled areas, this position was alleviated somewhat when the 
Board permi tted whi te fanners to purchase mai ze from Afri cans for thei r 
own requirements. 31 ) Thus these Africans were able to bypass the 
control system, and hence able to command higher prices for their 
. 32) graln. 
Africans in areas exempt from control, when they were able to sell at 
all, received better prices for their grain. In some districts, up 
to 10/- a bag was recei ved; the general average pri ce i n uncontrolled 
areas being 1/6 and that in controlled areas under 4/- a bag. The 
CNC m~int~ined that the main factor contributing to Afri can responses 
to Maize Control and possible decreases in maize production in some 
areas, was not a result of the existence of the Control Bo~r.d, which 




NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the ye.ar 1937. 
Thi s factor operated to the benefi t of whi te farmers who cou1 d 
purchase maize cheaply from Africans and then sell at enhanced 
prices to the Board. Profits they received in this manner were 
further increased because most white farmers in these areas were 
small farmers who were favoured under the 1934 Amendment Act. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1932. 
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were low. The main hindrance to African maize production was the 
existence of traders in many areas who refused to deal otherwise than 
by barter. 33) At one of the Native Board :;meetings it was 's·aid in 
regard to the above that, 
They could not get cash for their grain.and were only 
paid trade goods ... asked whether somethlng could be 
done to make storekeepers pay cash for grain. The 
NC said",the only place where they could get cash 
for thei r meal i es was in Fort Vi ctori a from the 
Maize Control Board and that the heavy cost of trans-
port made such a scheme a worthless proposition.34) 
In view of high transport costs, then, many Africans had no choice 
. . ' . . .. . 
but to deal wi th traders, thus gi vi ng the 1 atter the upperhand. 
There were numerous 'kaffir truck stores' scattered on reserves 
throughout Southem Rhodesia, and over and above refusing to deal in 
money wi th Afri can fanners, "even in the pri ce offered for the goods 
and the goods received there was a big discrepancy.1I35) Alvord 
maintained that the value of the goods Africans received in exchange 
for thei r grain was usually 50 per cent above the cost of the same 
article purchased in white centres. Furthermore, the 'price' 
offered for African maize was 50 per cent below the price of grain 
in white areas. 36) In this way, Africans were not only unable to 
secure a cash income for thei r mai ze, but the di screpancies between 
goods traded was so great as to make maize production for sale un-
economic. The following statement was made by an African when 





(Traders) - what do you think wrong with the system? 
They go to the store and although the law says the 
storekeepers must pay cash the storekeepers are not 
keen on it. If a man brings mealies, they say 'Your 
bag is worth 6/6 but I have got this shirt here.' And 
the Africans have the feeling ... that they are being 
done down ... maize ... price may be 1/- in that particular 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1932. It must be 
remembered, however, that in many areas, parti cul arly the 
more remote ones, it was also uneconomical for traders to pay 
cash for grain. Price differences and trade in goods allowed 
traders to make a profit. It is possible that the existence 
Of ~rader~, and trade by barter, was actually intended as a 
dlSlncentlve to the continuity of maize production by Africans. 
NAR S1542/N2 B-O 1931-1939 Bikita 7th Native Board Meeting 
13/5/39. 
Ibid. Minutes, Native Board Meeting 26/10/38. 
LO. Alvord, 'Development of Nathe Agriculture and Land Tenure', 
p. 36. 
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area and the man says 'Take this article' and the 
article is not worth l/~ but 6d.37) 
The above view, and many more in a similar vein, verify the contention 
that Africans were accorded unjust treatment by traders. 
Thelre were, however, some benefi ts to be had from dealing wi th traders 
which, to an extent, justified the treatment meeted out to their 
customers : 
If, however, the prices quoted relate to maize 
purchased by traders remote from the market in 
which it will be consumed, the native producer 
will naturally be at a disadvantage in exactly 
the same way as a European producer remote from 
markets or railway communication. The transport-
ation and intermediate charges must be met by 
someone. In the European producer's case, by 
himself, in the African's, by the trader.38) 
It was all very well to attempt to justify the existence of trader 
producers as stipulated above, but it would appear that traders' 
profits were well above the cost of transporting the grain to markets, 
whi ch is understandab le and necessary for thei r conti nued exis tence. 
Further benefi ts whi ch accrued from the exi stence of trader producers 
were that they produced incentive in some Africans to produce better 
grades of maize. Prior to the Maize Control Act, Africans were not 
taught how to grade their maize - all maize was put in one bag before 
it was taken to traders. The traders then paid out fanners the price 
of lowest grade maize; and after grading it themselves, usually sold 
to the . Board at a higher grade. Ultimately, then, the Maize Control 
Act provided the incentive for better grades of maize. 39 ) 
Nevertheless, the Maize Control Act succeeded in restricting the 
African's ability to market grain at a profit, the majority of which 
accrued to these traders acting in the capacity of middlemen. Alvord 




NAR ZBJ "l/l/l Native Production and Tnade Commission 1944. Native 
Muyanda. 
NAR S1542/M2 Maize Control: Secretary Maize Control Board and 
CNC 5/8/1935. 
R. Dinnis, Interview, October, 1979. 
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This imposed upon the natives a hand to mouth 
existence, under which they could scarcely 
progress. Allover the country natives were. 
as"king with wisdom,'What is the use of adoptlng 
better methods and producing more crops when 
there is not market?' Alvord emphasised ..• 
the need for a cash market_ for a cash market 
for surplus crops grown by Africans as an 
essential to thefr economic development. With 
no income they were low consumers to the 
detriment of the whole country. They would not 
prosper and become self-supporting rural commu-
ni ties un less a market for thei r surplus crops 
could be developed.40) 
Unfortunate ly, the wi sdom of thi s was not appreci ated until the years 
. 41) 
immediately subsequent to the Second World War. 
When Maize Control was first implemented, the majority of African 
maize marketed fell into the lower grading classifications, but there 
was a marked improvement in quality in ensuing years. Thus although 
the quantity of maize marketed in the 1930s did not increase greatly, 
the quality did, The CNC claimed that the influence of demonstrators 
was largely responsible for this improvement. 42 ) The NC for Wedza 
reported that Africans under the influence of demonstrators were able 
to sell maize direct to the Board, and that this was classified as 
Grade A maize for which they -received 5/- a bag. The NC stated that 
as a direct result of this, the demand for demonstration plots 
increased markedly. In the same year, the Superintendent for Nati ves, 
Victoria maintained that of 1,282 bags sold in Zimutu Reserve, only 
24 were not classified as Grade A. 43 ) 
The Board encouraged the cultivation of Grade A maize by all Africans 
who had access to railway transportation, and this indicates the 
importance of African contribution to the export pool. From 1937 to 
1938, there was an increase of 203,158 bags of maize delivered to the 
Board, and the percentage of Grade B maize increased from nil to 18 
per cent (46,695 bags).44) 
40) E.D. Alvord, 'Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure', 
p. 36. -
41) For further -information on this point vide infra, Ch.3.2. 
42) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1932. 
43) Ibid. 
44) Yearbook and Guide to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland 1938-9, p.119. 
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The depression and accompanying concern:with marketing possibilities 
led white farm:!rs to go beyond rrerely pus~j.ng for marketing and price 
control: they demanded statutory discrimination against the marketing 
of African crops. Moffat's. government, however, considered total 
segregation both impractical and unjust. It was not until the 
depression caused urban white unemployment and many hardships for 
whi te farrrers, that these moverrents gathered morrentum and di recti on, 
facilitating changes in the administrative sectors of Southern 
Rhodesia which led to the realisation of these aims. 
By 1930 the missions and the Native Development Department had gained 
control of African social and economic development. Open conflict 
between these bodies and the Native Affairs Department had remained 
dormant during the latter part of the 1920s,45) primarily through the 
influence of Moffat and the CNC, Jackson, who were sympathetic to 
missionary interests. Two factors conbined to bring about a change in 
the 1930s: firstly, the resignation of Jackson as CNC and the 
succession of C. L. Carbutt, who was a representati ve of the conserva-
ti ve facti on of the Nati ve Affai rs Departnent and secondly, increased 
hostility from the white community towards the type of education 
offered to Africans by the missions and the Native Development 
Departnents. The white farming sector was of the opinion that the 
Native Affairs Department would not attempt to develop Africans along 
white lines and in competition with whites as they believed the 
missionaries and the Native Deve10pnent Departnent were doing. 46 ) 
With the resignation of Moffat as Premier in July 1933, the Native 
Affai rs Department regai ned its forne r predomi nant posi ti on when 
Carbutt forced Jowitt, the Di rector of Nati ve Deve 10pment, to 
resign. When Huggins came to power in 1934, the title of Director 
of Nati ve Deve 1 opmmt was combined wi th that of Secretary of Nati ve 
Affairs and CNC. Alvord and his staff were removed from the Native 
Deve 1 opment Department and re-o.rgani sed as 'a sub-department of Nati ve 
Education within the Native Affairs Department. The missions too, 
were subjected to the control of this branch of the Native Affairs 
Department. 
45) Vide supra, pp 
46) Fo~ ~x~mp1e: the maize complex which developed when white farmers 
crltlclsed Alvord for teaching Africans to cultivate maize which 
they had regarded as a white man's crop. ' 
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Alvord, at this s~age, believed this transition to be a beneficial 
move, bri.nging to an end the previ ous conf1 i ct between the vari ous 
bodies involved in African administration. He saw this conflict as 
the causal factor behind the constant an~agonism displayed towards 
hi s efforts at promoting Afri can deve 1 opmen t. In hi swords, 
(In) April 1933, Alvord and his staff were trans-
ferred back to the Native Affairs Department, 
good relations with administrative officers were 
restored and a sub-department was fonned, designated 
as vote 4/111 - development of native areas and 
reserves. At the same tirre the title of Director 
of Native Development was transferred to the CNC 
who was also secretary for Native Affairs .... the 
fonner di rector of Nati ve Development was offered 
a new appointment as Director of Native Education, 
but declined .... Thus Native Administration, 
Native Education and Native Developrrent were 
placed under one Cabinet.47) 
Carbutt himself was probably responsible for instilling this belief 
in Alvord when he stated, "This will reduce to a considerable 
extent the impractical policy whereby a system of dual control was 
gradually being built up in the Native reserves~8)What Alvord did 
not forsee, however, was that the conservative nature of the new 
Prime Minister, HUggins, combined with white pressure during the 
depression, might convert that which he had considered a beneficial 
move to one suited to their own ends. 
Thus, by 1934, the progressi ve Nati ve Deve lopment Department had 
been virtually annihilated, and had corre under the control of the 
conservative Native Affairs Departrrent. This move was backed by white 
fanners who wished to restore the power of the chiefs and a more 
'traditional' form of education, as opposed to its predecessor which 
appoi n ted its own Afri can offi ci a 1 s from amongs t the ranks of the 
educated and encouraged progressi ve development. Huggins' be liefs 
a 11 owed the Nati ve Affai rs Department to further thei r objecti-ves for 
he encou~aged a policy of total segregation, a policy that had not 
taken many steps during the previous Premier's leadership. Africans 
47) E.D. Alvord, 'Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure', 
p.32. . 
48) NAR Annual Report of the CNC 1933. 
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were to develop within their own areas. In Huggins' , words, :'In the 
native areas the black man must be allowed to rise to any position to 
which he is capable of climbing. Every step in the individual and 
social pyramid must be open to him, excepting always, and only, the 
very top.1I49) The African presence, however, was, still required in 
the white sector as a labour force, and of this Huggins commented; 
IIIn the European area the African will be welcomed, when, tempted by 
wages, he offers his services as a labourer, but it will be on the 
understanding that he shall !rerely assist, and not compete with, the 
white man ... the interest of each race shall be paramount in its own 
sphere. 1150) 
During the 1930s, fear of African competition continued unabated, and 
the combined forces of white opposition and the depression itself 
caused development programmes to lose momentum. In this regard Alvord 
has stated, 
In 1934, the CNC influenced by these feelings took 
a very retrogressi ve step, and ru led that the 
saturation point had been reached with regard to 
the number of agricultural demonstrators and ordered 
that demonstrator training at Domboshawa should be 
discontinued. At that stage, with the exception 
of the demonstrators in training, there were only 
60 demonstrators. The CNC ruled that only six men 
could be enrolled each year for training - 60 
demonstrators for 750,000 living on 21,000,000 
acres. The effect of this ... tota1 staff of 
demonstrators was increased by only six over a 
period of five years.51) 
The CNC himself, when speaking of the necessity for demonstrators, 
justified his decision that saturation point had been reached, and 
that additional demonstrators would only encourage African competition, 
II ... in IT\Y opinion, demonstrators should only be stationed at places 
where thei r servi ces are really requi red ... the appoi ntment of demon-
strators should be confined solely to those areas which are a) exhausted 
and b) where lack of rain causes constant shortages of food ... 52 ) 
4~ ) M. Yude 1 man, Africans on tlw Land, p. 50. 
50) Ibid. 
51) E.D. Alvord, 'Deve10pment of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure 1 , 
pp.38/39. 
52) NAR S1542 A4 Vo1.1 1934 Superintendent of Natives to CNC 7/6/34. 
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Furthermore, when the Native Affairs Department regained control over 
the Native Development Department, the money allotted to the latter 
for purchase of equipnent was decreased from £200 to £215 per annum. 
This occurred despite the fact that the number of demonstrators had 
increased from 26 to 46 between 1931 and 1933.53 ) With reference to 
this, Alvord stated, II ... our estimates for 1933/34 for this item 
(equipment, spare parts and repairs) were drawn up to meet the needs 
of a 28 per cent increase in the number of demonstrators. The lowest 
estimate was £146. Mr. Leggate (Minister of the Interior) refused to 
accept this estimate and allowed for £125. 1154 ) 
Not only were the number of African staff in Alvord ' s Department in-
sufficient to cope with expanding needs in African areas, but so was 
the white staff. At the end of 1937, Alvord, believing his staff of 
five whites to be incapable of coping with the expanding work, 
reques ted of the Mini s ter of Nati ve Affai rs that he appoint an 
additional agriculturalist. 55) This request was vehemently refused, 
however, and Alvord quoted the Minister as saying that, IIhe would 
have no hope of getting parliament to agree,because it was a European 
parl i amen t wi th nembe rs from the European cons ti tuencies and no 
member would be allowed to hold his seat if he allowed the appointment 
of an additional agriculturalist to serve the natives. 1I56 ) Alvord 
was, however, permitted to appoint a Land Development Officer and two 
more Land Inspectors. 57) That these requests were approved by 
parliament, while that for an agriculturalist refused, would indicate 
that hostility towards the potential threat of advanced African 
famers continued. The appointment of men capable of conserving the 
natural resources of the reserves, yet not concerned wi th i~roving 
African producti vi ty, suggests that awareness of deteriorating 







NAR S1542 A4 1933/4 10th October 1933 CNC to Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
Ibid., Alvord to CNC 9/10/1933. 
E.D. Alvord, 'Developnent of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure I , 
p.43. 
Ibid. 
The Land Developnent Officer actually had the same duties as an 
agriculturalist, but Alvord actually said that if this officer 
was appointed on the. grounds of aiding in the regeneration of 
reserves, and not developing them, whites would be less reluctant 
to comply. 
(For further details), vide infra, p.115/6. 
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There was also a growing need for additional demonstrators, whose 
nunbers had increased by only three during the years 1934 to 1937 to 
a total of 63, and an additional .153 had been requested by NCs. 
After Carbutt's retirement, the new CNC, Bullock, less conservative 
than Carbutt, cancelled his predecessor's decision to limit the 
nunber of demonstrators in training. And as a result, by 1938 the 
staff consisted of 8 whites and 93 Africans: 9 supervisors, 64 
demonstrators and 12 community demonstrators. 59) 
This slight lessening of hostility towards A1vord ' s department in the 
mid-1930s may be explained partly by corresponding developments in the 
whi te agricultural sector. In these years this sector began to expand 
and diversify, particularly as the depression began to recede. 60) 
The growing importance of tobacco as an export crop, and a staple more 
secure than was maize, played a paramount role in invoking this 
change of attitude. 
After the collapse of the tobacco market in 1928, South Africa had 
imposed a quota on imports of duty-free Southern Rhodesian tobacco 
in order to prevent further detrimental effects on South African 
markets. 61 ) This, in addition to the depression, had resulted in 
tobacco production in Southern Rhodesia dropping to 8,644,3901bs in 
1930/1 before picking up to 22,401,7071bs in 1935/6. 62 ) 
Control boards were also set up for the tobacco and cattle industries 





LD. Alvord, I Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure I , 
p.44. 
1926-1936 white agriculture was static. The nunbers of whites 
employed in agriculture was 3,995 in 1926, this rose to 4,172 in 
1932, then dropped to 4,009 in 1976. This was in spite of an 
increase in the annual expenditure of the department of 
agriculture from £91,874 in 1928/9, to £262,957 in 1936/7. 
R.H. Palmer, '.Agricu1tura1 History of Rhodesia ' , p.239. 
By 1946, tobacco had overtaken gold as the most valuable single 
item of export and by 1948 the value of tobacco production 
exceeded that of all minerals. 
D.J. Murray, Xhe GbvernmentaZ system, p.105. 
R.H. Palmer, Ope cit., p.239. 
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set up in order that the benefits of the quota system imposed by 
South Africa might be distributed evenly amongst all producers. In 
the cattle industry, the linki.ng of marketi.ng with South Africa and 
prob lems of over-producti on led to the control of dai ryi ng in 
Southern Rhodesi a. 
4.2 The Government Changes Roads: African Development Policy, 
1935 - 1945 
Having built up a cumbersome system of protection and assistance to 
protect farmers who, in the 1930s, were over-producing for the domestic 
market and exporting to a depressed international market, the govern-
ment came to face new di ffi cul ties during the war years when farmers 
were unable to supply the needs of the domestic market. As a result, 
they were unable to take advantage of high world prices, or contribute 
to the war requirements of the Allied forces. In these circumstances, 
the role of the Control Boards changed to one operating an efficient 
marketing servi ce ensuring that consumers recei ved adequate grain 
supplies. Accordingly, these Boards were renamed Marketing Boards. 
Under conditions of shortage, the fear and opposition displayed by 
white farmers to African competition for limited markets subsided, and 
as tobacco gained more importance in the late 1930s, offering an 
alternative staple to maize, this, too, played a role in alleviating 
the fears of whi te farmers. 
The average export price of tobacco had been increasing since 1934. 
This may be attributed partly to improvements in quality, and partly 
to increased acreages and yie 1ds. Barber has attributed expansi on 
in tobacco output to two factors: the substitution of tobacco for 
maize on established farms, and the expansion of acreage under cul-
tivation owing to an increasing number of farmers. Tobacco acreage 
under summer crops in 1934 was nearly double that of 1929, and nearly 
55 per cent greater than 1945. The number of producers was 1,000 in 
1945 and 2,669 in 1954. The aggregate value of white production 
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increased sixteen-fold from 1939 to 1957 and tobacco was responsible 
for the · bulk of this expansion. Prior to 1938, however, output 
changed very 1i tt1e. 63) 
The shift from maize production was encouraged by the collapse of maize 
pri ces before the Second Wor1 d War and shri nkage of the export market. 
Simultaneously Southern Rhodesian tobacco came to the fore again 
when, in 1933, the United Kingdom decided to guarantee the existing 
25 per cent Imperi a1 Preference for ten years. 64) The promulgation 
of the Tobacco Act in 1936 witnessed the beginning of expanding 
production in a more stable environment. This Act, and amendments 
passed in subsequent years, provided a legal framework controlling 
the marketing of tobacco. With the shift to tobacco, emphasis 
shi fted from the external to the internal market. 
Agricultural exports assumed added importance in the 1940s.65 ) Tobacco 
comprised the bulk of this expansion, hence the problem remained of 
the inability of production to meet local food requirements. 66 ) Food 
imports rose in relation to local sales of white agriculture, par-
ticularly in post-war years. In the 1930s, the value of retained 
imports was, on average, just over one-third of the value of retained 
output of white agriculture. From 1947 to 1953, this rate was three-
quarters or more, and from 1940 Southern Rhodesia became a net 
importer of maize. 67 ) In these circumstances, African agricultural 






W.J. Barker, Econorrric Development in British Central Africa, p.131. 
From 1938 to 1950 the total volume of agricultural production kept 
pace with white population growth, that of mineral production 
failed to keep pace, and that of manufacturing outstripped 
population growth. H. Weinmann, Agricultural Research and 
Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1924-1950, Occasional Paper 4, 
1972, pp. 196/7. 
The contribution of mining declined from 25 per cent in 1958 to 
5 pe r cent in the early 1960s. Opposi te trends occurred in 
agriculture (white) where the volume of output in 1958 was ten 
times that of 1937. 
G. Arr~ghi, The ~olitical Economy of Rhodesia, (1967), pp.46147. 
The maJor expans10n came after the war; prior to the war it had 
never exc~ed 50,000~0001bs (in the mid-1930s it was only 25,0001bs) 
acreages 1 ncreased 1n 1957/8 to over 190,000 acres, whereas in 
the 19305 they had never exceeded 70,000 acres. 
W.J. Barbe:, The Economy of.Briti~h Central Africa, (1961), p.130. 
See Append1x 10, Table show1ng Wh1te agricultural output. 
Ibid., p.133. 
109. 
Thus, in the war-years, African agricultural production, particularly 
that of maize, was called upon to increase its output in order to 
supply both local and export markets. Domboshawa school was 
requested to increase food production. The principal stated, II ••• (the 
school) was called upon to produce more crops, especially maize and 
soya beans, the acreage in 1941 has been doubled. At least 40 acres 
of this is new land ... the school timetable has been reshuffled so 
that every school boy could do some 'war-crops' work. 1I68 ) 
These demands for expansion account for changes in government policy 
towards African farmers in the 1940s, and in the late 1930s measures 
were taken to alter the existing maize Control Act in order to en-
courage African production, 
We are carrying control too far. When the control 
of maize was first introduced it was said that this 
would be a temporary measure to gi ve the growers 
other means of disposing of their grain. These 
means are now becoming available in the shape of 
feeding animals, not only for the export market, 
but for our own consumption as we11.69) 
It was hoped that sales of African maize would increase when the re-
strictions characterising marketing policies of the depression years 
were removed. In 1940 a new Maize Control Act was passed regulating 
the marketing of African maize. In terms of this act a cash price 
was fixed for African growers on all maize delivered to the Board; 
and the trader-producer was paid directly instead of having to par-
ticipate in the distribution account, which only paid producers when 
all maize had been disposed of. It was stated in 1940 that, 
The provisions of the 1940 Maize Control Act 
governi ng the purchase of nati ve mai ze only came 
into force on 1/6/1940. In previous years the 
sale of European mai ze was governed by the market 
for the sale of African maize. Prices for both 
European and Afri can mai ze fl uctuated between 
6/- and 8/- per bag when native maize sold 
freely. This year the position was reversed 
under provision of this Act. The selling of 
native maize was fixed at 6/6 per bag to trader 
producers. In consequence European growers were 
68) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1942, quoting principal 
for Domboshawa School. 
69) NAR ZAY 2/2/2, Suggestions to the Southern Rhodesian Economic 
COlllJ1ittee, R. A. 'Ballantyne 12/10/38. 
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selling their maize freely between 10/1 and 11/-
per bag and closed the market for African grown 
maize' to all but farmer consumers until all 
European maize had been disposed of.70) 
Thus, a1th~ugh Africans were now paid a fixed price for their maize, 
they were still in a less favourable position relative to white 
growers. 
Alvord, however, believed that Africans were now bei.ng treated more 
fairly, and were getting a more favourable share of available markets. 
Alvord stated, "For the first time, maize grown by natives was admitted 
into European farmers (markets) and became saleable through the Maize 
Control Board at prices comparable to prices paid to European farmers." 71 ) 
The fi xed pri ce Afri cans were to recei ve under the new Act may have 
been more favourable than the pri ces they had recei ved previ ous ly 
when they were only allotted 20 per cent in the export pool; nevertheless, 
many NCs believed the new Act wou1 d operate to the detriment of Afri can 
growers. The NC for Bu1awayo stated, II Be fore the new Act came into 
force, a large number surrendered thei r mai ze to the Board and obtained 
prices far in excess of those paid now. It is believed that the new 
regulations will discourage maize growing. II72 ) 
Under this a price equalisation fund was established for the benefit 
of Afri can growers, pri ces being guaranteed by the govemment at a 
certain level for a number of years. This, in addition to the safe-
guard of the accumulated surplus held in the equalisation fund, 
enabled the govemment to fi x one flat rate for maize throughout the 
country. This scheme actually discouraged the growing of maize by 
Africans in the more remote areas because it did not take the cost of 
transport into consideration, which in these areas often made disposal 
of mai ze to the Board uneconomi c. 73) In thi s regard, the NC for Bubi 
stated, lithe effect of the Maize Control Act has upset traders con-
si derab 1y and they refuse to buy any mai ze whatsoever. Pri ce to pro-
ducer was fixed at 4/- per bag and the natives refuse to sell at this 
70) NAR S1563 NC Annual Reports 1940 Mutumbara. 
71) E.O. Alvord, 'Development of Native Agriculture and L d T I 47 
72) NAR S1563 NC An 1 
an enure, p. 
nua Reports 1940 Bulawayo. 
73) NAR Annual Report of the CNC 1940. 
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price and deal amongst themselves at 8/- to 10/- a bag-:: 74 ) The 
CNC, when speaking of the case of the Sha.ngani Reserve, conunented 
thus, "(This reserve is) 120 miles from Bu1awayo and an uneconomical 
centre for the producti on of rna; ze (for sale) ., and it follows that 
even if the price were fixed at 8/- a bag, transport charges to 
various centres are prohibitive. 1I75 ) 
Indeed, i't was the exorbi tant cost of transport which prevented both 
growers and traders from ·taking advarlt~ge of the price equalisation 
scheme. In the words of the NC for Bu1a1ima Mangwe, "Traders are 
unab 1e to buy from nati Yes at the pri ces fi xed, on the other hand, the 
return to the trader (the only present avail ab 1e channel through 
which such trade can be carried on) is so unremunerative that he 
declines to purchase maize." 76 ) Many Africans, especially those in 
Purchase Areas, experienced the difficulties involved of being treated 
as whi tes were under the new Act. The NC for Mrewa commented on this 
prob 1em, 
The nati ves on the Nati ve Purchase Areas, who are 
by the Maize Act, in exactly the same position as 
Europeans, soon discovered that their privilege 
included finding transport and good bags and also 
getting an unascertained amount of thei r mai ze by 
instalments, and were only too glad to sell their 
maize to the missions (who supplied bags and 
transport) at the uncontrolled pri ce permi tted to 
these institutions.77) 
From the implementation of the new Act until the mid 1940s, then, many 
Africans, particularly those in the Purchase Areas and remoter districts, 
experienced extreme difficulty in marketing their maize under the 
price equalisation scheme. 
Under the zoning system which was dominant for maize marketing prior 
to 1946, the pri ces recei ved were reduced by 3d. for every 5 mi les 
from rail head. 78) In 1946, however, a flat price was introduced 
74) Ibid. 
75) Ibid 
76) NAR S1563 NC Annual Reports 1940 Bu1a1ima Mangwe. 
77) Ibid., NC Mrewa 1941. . 
78) NAR, Report of the Native Production and Marketing Branch, 1948. 
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throughout Southern Rhodesia, and under this transport equalisation 
scheme African producers in remote areas paid the same transport costs 
as those nearer railheads. All African producers were formed into what 
amounted to 'compulsory co-operatives,79) as far as transport charges 
were concerned. Under this scheme, all producers had 3/- deducted 
from the basic price received for their maize; this contributed to 
transport costs. In other words, producers near Y\ailheads contributed 
to the transport costs of those in the more remote areas. 
This system was not without its advantages, for it allowed those living 
in remote areas to contribute agricultural production to a cash 
market. It had the added advantage of spreading production more evenly, 
thus minimising the risks of soil erosion. The latter had resulted 
from overcrowding in those areas nearest to markets to which farmers 
migrated in order to receive higher prices. This had been prohibited 
to them under the old system since high transport costs prevented 
thei r taking advan tage of market opportuni ties. 
With transport equalisation, there was less necessity to live in areas 
closer in proximity to markets, hence production would be distributed 
evenly throughout Southern Rhodesia. Because much of the maize 
rna rketed was done through the agency of the trader producers, they too 
were permitted certain advantages under the transport equalisation 
scheme. It allowed them to market maize under more favourable con-
ditions than those existing during the first half of the 1940s under 
price equalisation alone: "From the pool of 3/- deduction, each trader 
was paid id. per bag mile on this distance from his place of regis-
tration. The transport allowance was raised from 3/5d. to id. on 
June 1 because of greatly increased costs of transport .... The number of 
trader producers rose from 606 on May 31 1947 to 1,024 at the end of 
1947 ... (we) can relate the 66 per cent increase in registration to this 
improved margin and transport allowance. "80) 
79) Ibid. This explains why those in areas remote from urban centres 
suffered under the Mai ze Control Act. 
80) NAR Report of the Native Production and Marketing Branch for the 
year 1948: Marketing Offi cer - Pendered. 
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In 1946 the CNC stated: liThe new schene and increased pri ce was 
advised to the Africans in good time before the 1946 planting season 
comnenced." 81 ) Thus it w~s hoped that the schene would give Africans 
the incentive to produce a larger ma,ize crop, for which there was an 
ever increasing demand in Southern Rhodesia. The price and transport 
equal isation schenes together had the desi red effect, and by 1948 
Africans were contributing 625,331 (2031b) bags of maize to the country's 
food supplies. This represented 35 per cent of all maize marketed in 
the country.82) The Board paid 30/- per bag for Grade A maize 
surrendered at the railhead for the pool year 1948 to 31 Mqy 1949. 83) 
The Minister of Native Affairs, however, had fixed the price of maize 
at 22/- per bag under Section 23 of the Maize Control Act, and this 
price was to be paid to buyers of African maize anywhere in ,Southern 
Rhodesia during this sane period . The reason for this difference was 
that well over 50 per cent of African maize was surrendered to the 
Board th rough the agency of trader-producers who operated on fi xed 
margins declared by the Minister. 
follows: 
Trader handling margin 
Flat transport deduction 
Levy 
The difference was made up as 
2/- per bag 
3/- per bag 
3/- per bag84 ) 
In the wake of the price and transport equalisation schenes, there 
followed a tendency to switch to the cultivation of maize. This was 
because small grains were not included under marketing control and 
thei r pri ces were not guaranteed. In thi s regard the CNC comnented, 
Natives are dissatisfied with fluctuations in 
prices of small grains and of encouragenent 
given to maize produced by a fair guaranteed 
price. This has led to the growing of maize 
as a gamble in areas climatically unsuited 
for it, where the hardier mi 11ets would have 
given better returns in normal seasons.85) 
81) NAR Annual Report of the CNC 1946. 
82) NAR Report.of the Native Production and Marketing Branch, Ope ait. 
83) Grade A malZe was fi rs t qual i ty mai ze ina new 'Bag. 
84) NAR Report of the Native Production and Marketin'g Branch, ope oit. 
85) CN~ Report.194? ~e may compare the encouragenent of African 
ma1ze cultlvatlon 1n the 40s with the maize complex evident in 
the 20s and 3Os. This is an indication of the growing stability 
of the whi te farming sector. 
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In many ways, then, the new Act encou~aged the overproduction of 
maize which the. govemment had tried so hard to avoid in the 1920s. 
TAl3LE 3 86) 
Small Grains 1948 
Grain Total Estimated Tota 1 Es ti mated Pe rcen tage Sales 
Production in Bags Sales ' in 'Bags of Total Production 
Kaffi r com 888,960 32,555 3,7 
Munga 682,065 52,133 7,6 
Rupoko 679,846 59,005 8,7 
CF % of sales of total production in these grains to maize, which was 32%. 
It can thus be seen that within the African sector itself there were 
some advantages to be had from maize control. As maize control policies 
changed in the 1940s, from imposing restrictions in the fields of 
production and marketing to that of relative freedom and actual en-
couragement of production and sales, the amount of maize marketed 
increased. This would appear to be in line with the general attempts 
in these years on the part of the white sector to increase African 
agricultural contribution to the National Economy, particularly to 
the internal market as white farming became increaSingly export 
oriented on the base of tobacco. 
The lessening of white hostility to rural Africans was evident in 
fields other than maize control: The scope of govemment intervention 
in African affairs was widened during the war-years. Prior to the 
194~s, the role of the rese rves was that they provi de a reservoi r of 
labour, an outlet for products from the urban areas, a source of 
taxes and a means of maintaining control over Africans and preserving 
their I traditional I way of life. In the 1940s, however, particularly 
during the war-years when agricultural output could no longer meet 
growing demands, the role of Africans in the economic system of 
Southem Rhodesi a was extended. 87) 
86) Ibid. 
87) D.J. Murray, The Governmental System, p.300. 
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The open hostility - a policy of minimal concessions to Alvord1s 
departrrent, predominant in the 1~20s and 1930s -. gave way to an 
attitude encour:aging African .agricu1tural developrrent through the 
rredium of demonstrators. In furtherence of this aim, in 1944 the 
Department of Native Agriculture was forred of which Alvord was 
appoi nted Di rector. Furthermore, the scope of the work was extended 
and more white staff were appointed. The post of Land Development 
Officer was expanded and many more of these men were appointed to 
supervise soil conservation work in reserves. In addition, two more 
agricultural instructors were appointed to assist in agricultural 
extension work among the increasing number of farm o~ners in Purchase 
Areas. In the final analysis, this new organisation allowed all 
demonstrati on work to be accelerated and improved. 88) 
The lessening of white hostility towards African cultivators and 
demonstration scherres in the 1940s may be attributed to more than the 
importance of tobacco as a staple crop. In addition the Industrial 
Conciliation Act was passed in 1934 wh i ch reserved preferential pay 
and seniori ty for whi te union labour, and denying bargaining power to 
Afri cans. 89) 
This legislation proved vital in war and post-war years when Africans 
were required as both producers and consumers. It kept progressive 
Africans in rural areas where they were encouraged to become commercial 
farmers, and prevented them from becoming potenti a 1 competi tors in the 
industrial sphere where they were only required as cheap unskilled 
labour. This became more important as Southern Rhodesia began to 
industrialise and particularly so in the years after the Second World 
War. In those years, an increase in agricultural production was 
required, and the African contribution to the national economy became 
88) E.D. Alvord, IThe Gospel of the Plow l • 
89) G. Arrighi, The PoZitiaaZ Eaon~my of ·Rhodesia , p.34. 
This is in line with other similar moverrents in these years. For 
example, the transference of the progressive Development Depart-
ment to the control of the conservative Native Affairs Department· 
but Africans were already becoming educated and therefore a ' 
possible threat in urban areas. The Industrial Conciliation Act 
prevented further possible competi tion to whites from more 
educated Africans. 
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all-important. 90 ) 
In the "1940s, more attention came to be devoted to developing the 
country's industrial base, and for this a l~rge consumer power was 
requi red. It was s"~ggested that, 
One of Rhodesia's most vital needs is a larger 
consuming power. This can mainly be brought 
about in two ways: firstly, by increasing the 
spending power of the indigenous natives and 
secondly, by providing openings for a larger 
nunber of Europeans than we have at present. 
Most of the food we eat is imported. The 
country is capable of p"rovi di ng most of these 
supplies.91 ) 
More important, as the pillar of the economY came to be based on 
secondary industry, the dominant position of the farmers gave way to 
that of the industrial element. Thus farmers lost their position of 
hegemony in the government, those who usurped their position desired 
the expansion of industry at all costs. And although industrialists 
urged the expansion of agriculture in support of this growing 
secondary sector, they insisted that both African and white agriculture 
were to be encouraged. 
As a result, from the onset of war in 1939, efforts were made to 
increase and improve Al vord' s staff so that Afri can farmers mi ght more 
readi ly meet the increasing demands for thei r products. And, indeed, 
responses to these demands were favourable. Alvord conunented on these 
satisfactory trends as follows, 
90) 
91} 
More and more nati ve farmers were becoming p 10t-
holders and followers of the demonstrators. 
The only deterrent was the lack of a proper 
ready cash market for thei r surplus mai ze and 
other crops. Then without much warning an event 
occurred which changed the status of these native 
farmers almost overnight. In September 1939 
war was declared ... able-bodied men allover the 
Towards the end of the 1940s the " requirements of the industrial 
sector were for a more skilled stab"le labour force and not 
cheap migratory labour. The Native Land Husbandry'Act of 1951, 
was passed partly in furtherence of this aim. This period, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this work. 
NAR ZAY 2/2/2 Suggestions to Southern Rhodesian Economic Conunittee 
by R.A. Ballantyne 12/10/38. 
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country were joining the service, including all 
the younger men on A1vord ' s staff. Early in 1939 
his staff had been increased to ten by the 
appointment of two land inspectors. Nine months 
later the assistant agriculturalist and three 
1 and inspectors ente"red war servi ce. To the end 
of the war work was done by a skeleton European 
staff .... Meanwhi1e the African staff of agricul-
tural demonstrators increased from 65 to 99 and 
communi ty demonstrators from 19 to 6·3. Mean-
whi 1e nati ve farmers were being urged to increase 
production of crops and cattle. The attitude 
of the merrbers of parliament and their European 
constituencies changed almost overnight.92) 
The onset of war and expandi ng demand were to have advantageous effects 
" " 93} 
on demonstration schemes. 
Alvord attributed these more favourable trends to the onset of war alone, 
As Southern Rhodesi a became one of the most 
important Royal Air Force training centres, it 
became il1l>ossib1e for the European farmers to 
meet the increasing need for food. The Depart-
ment of Native Agriculture was instructed to 
intensi fy its propaganda to encourage nati ve 
farmers everywhere to produce not only more 
food crops and beef, but also peanuts for oil 
and cotton for texti1es.94) 
During the war-years, agricultural demonstrators made a concerted 
effort to induce African farmers to increase crop production. The 
positive responses in this direction came more as a result of increasing 
prices that the increasing number of demonstrators: liThe price paid for 
native crops was almost doubled over the previous year and native 
farmers everywhere were begging to be taken as p10tho1ders. 1I95 ) , 
Many unforseen difficulties came in the wake of these riSing prices: 
demonstrators were soon unable to cope with increasing demands from 
African farmers to become p10tho1ders, and the number of plots increased 





LD. Alvord, I Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure I 
pp.46/47. " , 
By 1944 white staff numbers had increased from 10 to 30; and 
African, from 151 to 219. Ibid.p.52. 
Ibid., pp.46/7. After the war when conditions returned to normal 
continued encouragement of African agriculture may be attributed' 
to the development of secondary industry. 
E.D. Alvord, 'Development of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure I 
p.47. This would indicate that contrary to current beliefs, Africans 
did respond to market incentives. 
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wi th some demons trators having as many as 300 plots. 96) These 
nunbers proved to be more than demonstrators could adequately 
supervise, and as a result yields from these plots fell to about 
half of those on properly supervised plots. Consequently, Alvord 
limited the nunber of plotholders per demonstrator to sixteen. This, 
in effect, meant that each demonstrator had a total of 64 to 80 plots, 
because each plotho1der had 4 to 5 plots in systematic crop rotation. 
All other interested farmers were classed as co-operators. In 
1941/2, the number of official demonstration plots decreased from 
6,929 to 1,898. 97) Thi s move also gave demons trators more ti me to 
pay attenti on to advi sory work, and to the di recti on of cropping 
sys terns in the increasing acreage protected by soil conservati on work. 
Rapid soil erosion was occuring in the reserves, particularly as the 
use of the plough became more widespread and ploughing up and down 
hills was popularised. Alvord considered this method of ploughing to 
be the root of the problem, and urged contour ridging to be undertaken 
on all centralised lands. With reference to this problem Alvord 
commented, "Soil erosion is showing a decided effect on our demonstration 
plots and a change in demonstration methods must be made. The usual 
square or rectangular plot must be changed to plots laid out on 
contours with terracing, strip cropping and vegetative contro1."98) 
Instructional contour ridging thereafter became part of the demon-
strator's task. To this end, all demonstrators were given intensive 
courses in soil erosion control methods. 99 ) Erosion control was not 
left to individual enterprise. In addition to all demonstrators being 
given general courses in soil conservation, a Soil Conservation Officer 
and three Erosion Control Demonstrators were appointed in 1936, and 
three more were appointed the following year. 100) 
Labour gangs were appointed in order to accelerate the work of soil 
96) E.D. Alvord, op. cit., p.49. 
97) Ibid. 
98) NAR Report of Agriculturalist for Ins.truction of Natives, 1935. 
99) NAR Annual Report of the CNC 1932, Acting CNC, C. Bullock. 
100) NAR S1542 A4 Vo1.II 1935/6 Alvord to CNC 8/12/1936. 
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conservation; these gangs were allocated to reserves on which 
centralisation surveys had been conducted. By the end of 1938, these 
gii:ngs were at work on ten different reserves: a total of 1,140,729 yards 
of contour ridges had been constructed, 34,004 yards of storm drains 
. 101) 
dug and 16,087 acres of arable 1 ands protected. By 1941/2, 23 
gangs were at work on 22 reserves under the direction of a soil 
conservation officer. 102 ) IIAgricu1tura1 demonstrators,1I wrote Alvord 
in 1941, IIhave flOW been limited for demonstration plot work so as to 
give them more time for supervision of maintenance and erosion control 
works, and di rect ti 11age methods and crop rotation in protected 
a re as . II 1 0 3 ) 
More and more Afri cans were encouraged to adopt improved methods of 
tillage in order to prevent the rampant spread of soil erosion. 
Indeed, prior to the mid-1930s this was the sole reason for advocating 
these techniques, as verified by a statement made by the CNC in 
1933, 1I ... adoption by natives of better agricultural methods can have 
far reaching effects in conservation of soil productivi ty, a matter 
ulti mate 1y more important than presen t i n~reased producti on. 11104) 
Concerted efforts in promoting these methods ultimately bore fruit, 
and the NC for Chi1imanji conmented, "Bad methods of ploughing up and 
down the slope is gradually being corrected by means of soil conservation 
and contour ridging has or is taking place. Propaganda in the form of 
lectures is gradually having effect towards improved agriculture." 105 ) 
Growing concern with soil conservation explains in part A1vord ' s 
introduction of the Master Farmer Training Scheme in 1934. This scheme 
was concei ved on the Se 1 ukwe Reserve in 1928 where one of the 
CUltivators, Vambe, tilled 32 acres of worn-out, sandy soil using 
pre-colonial .agricu1tura1 techniques, but 1I ... his cattle kraal was 







NAR AL6/2/1 E.D. A1vord,.RuraZ ~veZopment Work for Natives, 1938. 
NAR Annual Report of Agrlculturalist for Natives, 1941, See 
Appendix 11, Table sh'owing soil conservation work in n'ative areas. 
Ibid. 
NAR STS 138/72 CNC to NC Sinoia 27/6/1933. 
NAR S1563 NC Annual Reports 1940 NC Chi1imanzi. 
LD. Alvord, 'Deve10pment of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure I , 
p.35. 
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the fi rs t demonstrator was appointed, Vanbe became one of hi s fi rst 
plotholders, and in 1929 he harvested more maize from his one-acre 
demonstration plot than the remaining 31 acres conbined. By 1932, 
he had abandoned all pre-colonial techniques, and it was owing to 
this success that Alvord decided to award Master Farming certificates. 
In his own words: "Alvord took the CNC out to the reserve to show him 
just what Vambe was doing and together they decided that Vanbe should 
be honoured as a Master Farmer. So in 1934 at the Before Harvest 
meeting alongside his lands, Vanbe was presented with a certificate as 
a Master Farmer. Thus began the scheme for Master Farmer awards .... 11107) 
On the whole, Master Farmer awards became increasingly important as 
an incentive to adopt progressive cultivation techniques. The NC 
for Marandellas quoted the demonstrator of South Shiota reserve as 
saying, 
In passing I want to state that these Master Farmer 
badges are inducing nati ves to adopt better methods 
of cultivation. First they impart a sense of dignity 
to the wearer who feels he must keep his methods 
up to date or else he loses his well des-erved sign 
of honour. Secondly, the mere fact of having a Master 
Farmer among them, induces other farmers to better 108) 
their methods of tillage so as to win a badge also. 
Despite the increasing number of Master Farmers, the majority of the 
African population were not affected by demonstrators, and as the 
effects of soil erosion spread, more and more land came under cultivation 
in an attempt to offset decreasing yields. 
Duri.ng the inter-war years, Afri can agri cultura 1 producti on expanded 
107) 
108) 
Ibid. This scheme became important in the 1950s when prospective 
Purchase Areas farmers were obliged to obtain a Master Farmer 
certificate before qualifying to purchase a farm, vide infra, p.152. 
NAR S1563 NC Annual Reports 1948. NC Marandellas quoting 
Demons trator of South Sh iota Rese rve . 
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't b . 109) in absolute terms and remained constant on a per capl a aSls. 
When seeking to explain these trends - that is, the lack of significant 
per capita expansion despite the presence of the demonstrators -
several factors must be taken into consideration. The effect of 
maize control acted as a disincentive to improved techniques producing 
bigger yields. Furthermore, the depression years contributed to these 
adverse tren.ds: urban employment opportunities were limited, and even 
when obtainable, were at reduced rates of pay. The CNC commented on 
the effects of the above: II ••• the number of nati ves 1 i ving on crown 
land is likely to still further decrease, as many are experiencing 
the greatest difficulty in paying the rent of £1 per annum and are 
moving into the native reserves. lIlll ) During the 1930s, approximately 
50,00 people moved into the reserves. 112 ) This resulted in overcrowding 
and overstocking, which explain decreasing crop yields in these and 
later years. 
The effect of the above was destined to become a vicious circle, for 
participation in the money economy through sale of agricultural 
produce was also uneconomi ca 1 duri ng the de press ion. 113) In the event 
of this, Africans were forced, once again, onto the labour market to 
supplement their incomes from agriculture. 114) This, too, added to 
deteriorating conditions in the reserves, for the majority of able 








G. Arrighi maintained that falling yields were not due to 
increased population which in these years remained more or less 
cons tant at 1,6 per cent per annum from 1906 to 1936, 2,7 per 
cent from 1936 to 1946 and 3,4 per cent from 1946 to 1956. He 
was of the opinion that falling yields were to be attributed 
to the fact that Africans were forced to cultivate increasingly 
inferior land. nO) This point, however, remains open to debate. 
Falling yields could be attributed not to the cultivation of 
inferior land, but rather to increased population pressure on 
land on which continuous cropping was, of necessity, practised, 
and which, owing to lack of soil conservation works, was 
becoming depleted of fertility. In other words, redistribution 
of population and lack of conservation resulted in declining yields. 
G. Arrighi, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective', pp.212/3. 
NAR CNC Annual Report for the year 1931. 
R.H. P~lm:r, 'The Agricultural History of Rhodesia', p.242. 
G. Arrlghl, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective', p.2l9. 
Pa1m:r estimated that by 1932 over 80 per cent of African cash 
eamlngs were from wage labour. 
R.H. Palmer, 'The Agricultural History of Rhodesia', p.243. 
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With increasing pressure in the reserves, it was gradually realised 
that the six-year clause in the Land Apportionment Act, stipulating 
that by 1936 all Africans residing on white land were to have moved 
into reserves, could not be implemented. In 1936 Huggins amended 
the Land Apportionment Act, allowing an additional five years in which 
to effect the transfer. 115 ) ThiS,' too, proved to be unsatisfactory, 
and in 1941 the new Consolidated Land Apportionment Act was passed. 
This Act retained the principal features of its predecessor, but 
tightened conditions under which Africans could occupy land in white 
areas. It aimed partially at preventing white farmers from leasing 
land to Africans in retum for labour services or rent. It also 
tightened provisions whereby non Africans could occupy land in African 
areas. This was to curb the practise whereby whites rented Purchase 
Area land for the grazing of stock. 116 ) 
Thus, under the new Act, Africans on white land were permitted to 
remain there under certain conditions. The CNC stated, 
In terms of section 55 of the Land Apportionment Act, 
the Private Locations Act was repealed with effect 
31/12/42. Natives in occupation of land in Euro-
pean areas in consideration of payment of rent, and 
whose agreements were entered into prior to August 
1941, were authorised to remain in occupation undef17) 
payment granted by the Minister of Native Affairs. 
These developments were encouraged by a growing awareness that African 
areas were becoming dangerously overcrowded, and the possibilities of 
large-scale improvements in output were negligible. Perpetuation of 
the system of tenancy and the eviction of whites from African land 
alleviated this position somewhat. This solution, however, aimed 
at prevention rather than cure; and, during the course of the 1940s, 
more drastic measures aimed at both improving the conditions on 




L.H. Gann and M. Gelfand, BUggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His 
Country, (1964), p. 127. 
M. Yude lman, Africans on the Land, p. 73. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1942. 
"During the last twenty-five years I have been bu"ild-ing 
a bridge, a bridge to the future, and, there is still 
a wide river to cross. It will be up to the Europea~ 
and African members of my staff to complete the bridge 
I have started. The river we are crossing is the fluid, 
flowing life of the African people, we are bridging the _ 
stream from their past to their future". 
E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the Plow'. 
SOUTHERN RHODESIA FffiGES AHEAD : 
NEW AREAS OF CEVELCPMENT, 1913 -1950_ 
r 
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5.1 The African Cattle Industry: A Bone of Contention 
During the fi rs t few decades " of." whi te sett1e.rent, 1 i ttle effort was. 
expended on improving the pastoral pursuits of Africans. Indeed, 
prior to the mid-1920s, little assistance was given in any spheres of 
agricu1ture. l ) The passage of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, 
with its clause stipulating that all Africans on Crown lands move 
into reserves within six years of its passage, altered the situation 
so.rewhat. Gradually it was realised that not only was this clause 
unlikely to be rea.lised, but that even with adherence to strict con-
servation .rethods, the problems of soil erosion and congestion were 
not abating. In this event, the govem.rent in the 1940s decided that 
the ti.re had co.re to use force instead of persuasion in implementing 
these anti ~erosion methods. 
A few attempts had been made to improve the quality of Afri can cattle 
pri or to se 1 f-govern.rent. Indeed, possi b ly more effort had been 
expended in this area than in that of crop production. The motives 
behind this, however, were largely selfish. The white settlers having 
realised early in the period of white rule that the small African 
cattle were best suited to the harsh climatic conditions of Southern 
Rhodesia, built their own cattle herds up from a foundation of African 
stock. Dipping was made compulsory in 1922. This was done in an 
attel1l>t to alleviate the ravages of Rinderpest and East Coast fever. 
In addition, the government purchased grade bulls from dip-tank 
surpluses in the hope of improving the quality of African cattle. 
This policy was doomed to failure, and was finally abandoned in 1934. 
Government officials tended to lay the blame on the Africans themselves, 
who had resisted improvements for fear that whites would seize their 
cattle as they had done in the 1890s. Furthermore; the Ndebele in 
particular encouraged a hardiness in their stock which was best 
achieved by a process of natural selection - survival and propagation 
1) ~ack of press~re on existing land resources prior to this date, 
1n part ~xpla1~s lack of gov~rnment response to imminent problems 
?f overpopulatlon, overstock1ng and poor agricultural techniques 
1 n rese rves . 
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of the fittest. The CNC commented on Ndeb£le reluctance to co-operate 
with the. govemment in conducti.ng this scheme, 
... But the Matab.e 1e are too se If sati sfied on thi s 
score and not as open to suggestion for improve-
ment as are the Mashona. ·the rigid conservatism 
in regard of cattle is not unsupported by 
reason. They aim at hardiness and they get it. 
But in market value, the despised Mashona stock 
are a1 ready through better bull s, approaching the 
Matabe1e cattle, and threaten to surpass them at 
a distant date. In addition to those acquired by 
individuals there are now 3,151 grade bulls serving 
native catt1e ... (the) Matabele are less content 
than are the Mashona to leave the se 1ecti on of 
bulls to officials. Their acquisitions therefore 
are mos t1y th rough pri vate purchase. 2) 
It was also suggested that, lithe animals are neglected because they are 
regarded as govemment property.1I3) The Africans, then, saw no reason 
to give these animals any special treatment since they were not even 
the i r own p rope rty . 
The main reasons behind the fail ure of this scheme, however, may be 
attributed to a lack of foresight. Vast sums of money were expended 
on the purchase of grade bulls in order to improve African stock, but 
these bulls were unable to withstand the harsh climatic conditions 
preva lent in Southem Rhodesi a. The physi ca 1 condi tion of these animals 
weakened, and in most cases they did not have an opportunity to mate 
with African cattle, offering no competition to the physically superior 
African bulls. Those that were able to mate with African stock passed 
on to thei r offspring not thei r good features, but thei r 1 ack of 
stamina and inability to adjust to harsh conditions. "While overstocking 
continues," the CNC stated, "introduction of better bulls has opposite 
effects to the one anti cipated. Wi th the introducti on of better 
blood, the resistance to the hard conditions, which are characteristic 
of native stock, is reduced. The solution may be to improve native 
stock by selection rather than continuing the policy of cross breeding." 4) 
2) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1929. 
3) NAR S1542/N2 8-D, 1931-1939, Annual Native Board Meeting Be1ingwe 
29/6/38. . ' 
4) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1933. It was not until 
1942 that this policy was followed up. Vide infpa, p. 138. 
125. 
Had the experitrent been controlled by resorting to stall feeding and 
paddocking, then the outcotre wou1 d possi b 1y have been more favourable. 
Lack of capital in these years, h.owever, prevented the realisation of 
this 'Possibility. In this regard, the CNC stated, liThe result of 
overstocking was to dwarf the cattle, and while the policy of 
introducing better grade bulls is not yet abandoned, the benefit of 
the better strain is negated by insufficient nutriment. 115) The 
depression of the 1930s had a nullifying effect on what little 
progress had been made: Africans found it necessary to sell cattle in 
order to meet tax obligations since existing controls inhibited the 
sale of crops, and the grade bulls commanded the most favourable 
prices. 
Othe r than thi s aborti ve attempt at upgradi ng Afri can cattle, all 
other efforts in the 1920s and early 1930s were cen tred on improvi ng 
and increasing crop production; and this became Alvord's principal 
concem throughout the period. It was essential to improve agricultural 
production in reserves, at least to the extent that they we~ able to 
cater to the subsistence requirements of Africans. The Africans had 
never considered their cattle to be commercial commodities, either 
for sale or consumption. They placed more value on their ritual 
and syrrbo1ic significance, hence their value as a possible source of 
food was negligible. Meat did not constitute a major item of consump-
tion in the African's diet, being eaten only on rare occasions, such 
as upon the death of an animal or in cases of absolute necessity 
during famines or drought. For this reason, Alvord believed he would 
achieve greater success through concentrating his efforts on crop 
p roduc ti on . 
Alvord's concern with the condition of communal grazing lands stemmed 
primari 1y from the detrimental effects that continuous grazing was 
having on the soil. Deterioration of grazing lands originated with 
increased usage of the plough W1ich enabled larger acreages to be 
tilled, and indeed often necessitated them owing to lower yields 
from ploughed lands relative to those from hoe-cultivated lands. In 
5) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1932. 
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order to inc rease cu1 ti vated acre.ages,. grazing 1 ands we re cut back. 
The effects of this were not very pronounced in the early part of 
the twentieth century, when cattle numbers were still relatively low 
as they recovered slowly from the 1896 rinderpest epidemic. By the 
1920s, however, cattle numbers had increased from 55,000 in 1902 to 
1,495,803 in 19296) - a number which existing grazing lands, already 
diminished in acreage, could not accommodate. 
When Alvord instituted his centralisation schemes in 1929, cattle 
numbers were estimated at 1,495,803. 7) Under this scheme, much arable 
land was re-allocated as pasturage; and this checked erosion while 
grazing lands improved. The primary aim behind centralisation, 
however, was not the improvement of grazing lands, but that of 
arable farming; the tillage of immense acreages of land militated 
against efficient crop producti .on, as these could not be adequately 
cared for. Through centralisation, Alvord encouraged the tillage of 
smaller acreages, and yields therefrom were actually larger than those 
obtai ned on larger acreages, provi ded proper care and management 
techniques accompanied cultivation. 
Centralisation did assist in slowing down the rate of deterioration of 
grazing lands, but aimed at prevention rather than cure - that is, it 
did not tackle the root of the problem: that of overstocking itself. 
In 1932, the CNC commented on the effects of overstocking on the 
land, 
... So many many parts (of reserves) where the 
pastures are continuously fed down without the 
break necessary for recuperation. Then cattle 
travel each week to dipping tanks in their thou-
sands, and each day, in many parts, to water 
holes. Centralisation is a start to combating 
this .... But we shall also have to go to the 
root of the matter which is overstocking 
itself.8) 
Pre-colonial systems of agriculture in the reserves militated against 
6) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1929. 
7) Ibid. 
8) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1932. 
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attempts to improve African cattle. In the first s~ages of Alvord's 
extension services, no attempts were made to alter the structural base 
of the pre-colonial system. There was scope for vast imp,rovements 
within the existi,ng structure, through the utilisation of facilities 
and forces already available to Africans. In the field of arable 
farming, this did not pose an insurmountable obstacle, for under the 
pre-colonial system, cropping of land ~'d occur on an individual basis; 
hence individual instruction could be forwarded and adopted without 
altering the entire system of agriculture. 
Grazing lands, however, were held on a communal basis, and this posed 
seri ous di ffi culties to any attempts at recti fying problems relating 
to the care of cattle. COlllTluna1 herds acted as a disincentive to 
improve stock; forward-thinking individuals were hindered by the retro-
gressive attitudes of remaining communal grazers. Grazings were scarce, 
and with all cattle owners competing for these, the more progressive 
individuals could not rely on others to co-operate by culling excess 
stock to reduce numbers to optimum carrying capacity. The only 
, avenue open to these individuals then, was to follow the lead of the 
majority and increase their herds as much as possible. furthermore, 
communal grazings encouraged the deterioration of grazing land itself: 
whe.re no-one was responsible for its protection and individual action 
to alleviate the situation was impractical. 9) 
A further disincentive to efforts made at improving African stock was 
the vast difference in productivity between arable and grazing lands. 
Floyd pointed out that the average value of crop production was placed 
at about £4 per arable acre, and that of livestock output at about 
3/- per acre of cOlllTlunal grazing. Thus, although arable land was 
poorly farmed, it yielded about twenty-seven times as much per acre as 
that of grazing 1and. 10) Africans, therefore, had no incentive to 
improve either cattle or grazing land as returns expected therefrom 
were so unfavourable. In addition, the traditional role of cattle in 
ZoboZa (bri de pri ce) made them ch~nge hands so frequently that any 
9) £OM. Makings, AgriouZturaZ ProbZems in Developing Countries, 
( 1967), p. 1 48. 
10) B.N. F~Ord,. 'Ch~nging Patterns of African land Use in Southern 
Rhodes1a , 1n Rhodes-Livingstone JournaZ, 25, 1959, p.36. 
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beneficial results from improvements wou l d not accrue to the original 
owner. Thus numerical superiority continued to predominate .over 
quality-. Furthermore, in arable farmi.ng, returns from improvements 
were more rapidly forthcoming than similar efforts at a pastoral 
1eve 1. 11) 
In view of thi s, there was not much scope for extensi on servi ces in 
livestock during the first few decades of the twentieth century. In 
addition, A1vord ' s department was short-staffed in these years, and 
consequently attention was focussed on the improvement of arable 
farming. Recogni ti on by the government of a measure of responsibil i ty 
towards land usage was restricted to the prevention of the misuse of 
natural resources through soil and water conservation. Alvord, However, 
recognised that there was a lack of balance between arable and pastoral 
farming, and centralisation was the first method employed which sought 
to rectify this. Alvord constantly emphasised the importance of the 
use of kraal manure in crop production, and attempted to limit the 
nunber of cattle per capi ta to the amount of manure requi red to 
fertilise one acre of arable land. 
As human and cattle population in the reserves inc.reased, and conditions 
of erosion became more pronounced, it was decided that attempts must 
be made to offset the destruction of natural resrouces. Consequently 
a Soil Conservation Officer was appointed in 1936 when it was dis-
covered that problems of sheet and gully erosion were affecting 500,000 
acres (16 per cent) of arable land in Southern Rhodesia. 12 ) This 
ll) ONing to the importance of arable farming compared with that of 
pastoral farming the cattle industry suffered - many cases suited 
to cattle were used for crop cultivation - great areas devoted 
to maize cultivation could have been more profitably used for 
beef pr?ductiory. E.M. Makings, AgricuZturaZ Problems, op. cit.p.149. 
Jb~ P011CY, prlor to 1940, of keeping Africans at subsistence 
level, would not have allowed this to materialise. Food was of 
prime ~l11>ortance, lack of markets rendering commercial agriculture 
unfeaslb1e. In this event maize,being a staple food c·rop, 
could be consumed. Cattle ,. hO\rever, ·were not staple item in 
Afri cans I diet. 
12) E.D. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the P10w ' . 
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remedy, however, once .again aimed at prevention rather than cure. The 
CNC, Taylor, and his successor, Carbutt, were reluctant to advocate 
compulsory destocking thro.ugh fear that Africans would see this as a 
direct affront on them, and react in a similar way to their previous 
response to white seizure of cattle in 1896 . . Tentative suggestions 
were made to this end, but throughout the 1930s, no efforts were made 
towards enforcing these. 
Centralisation, although separating arable and grazing lands and 
improving the latter to the extent that the numerous cattle tracks 
causing erosion were eliminated, did little to tackle the root of 
the problem: vast nurrbers of poor quality cattle, increasing rapidly 
and for whi ch there were few markets. Wi th the ravages of soil erosi on 
becoming more evident, and both human and cattle nurrbers multiplying, 
Carbutt decided that the time had come to eliminate poor quality cattle. 
When, in 1933, Liebigs opened a meat extraction factory, the Native 
Affairs Department embarked upon a campaign designed to induce Africans 
to sell inferior cattle to Liebig's agents. This propaganda met with 
resentment: Africans were reluctant to sell their cattle at the low 
prices which had resulted from the post-war depression and collapse of 
the cattle market in the years 1921 to 1923. lilt would be beneficial 
to the country," wrote Carbutt, "if the nurrbers of native cattle were 
reduced legitimately by sales ... and in this connection Liebig's factory 
took 34,000 head of cattle in the ten months during whi ch operations were 
carried on. NCs also arranged sales of cattle." 13) 
These acti vi ties, however, we re conducted ina haphazard way, and there 
was no direction or control of these operations during the 1930s. 
With the failure of these propagandist methods, the emphasis was 
reverted to improvement of stock and pasture land, and to increaSing 
th~ carrying capacity of reserves by the encouragement of intensive 
farming systems. The main emphasis, as in the past, was directed to-
wards improvements of arable farming. Concerning this, the CNC 
stated, lilt is intended to develop the reserves so as to enable them 
to carry a larger population, and so avoid, as far as possible, the 
13) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1934. 
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necessity for organisation of more land for native occupation. This 
w'i 11 be done b.y re-organising the system of occupation and a portion 
of the reserves. pre~iOuslY ·uninhabitab1e due to lack of water .... 1114) 
Despite these attempts to alleviate reserve conditions, it was becoming 
increasingly evident that the problem of overstocking would have to 
be faced and some means devised for its solution. In 1938 the CNC 
commented on this problem, 
Propaganda and more direct measures to prevent overstocking 
have taken place in eight Native Reserves. Technical 
advice is given and administrative persuasion using 
pressure of native public opinion to induce selling of 
surplus stock of no breeding value is successful in its 
objective. Alternatives to this remedy e.g. adhoc 
legislation by the central authority is not without 
weakness but the situation needs a remedy.15) 
This was the beginning of the movement which culminated in the com-
pulsory destocking scheme of the 1940s. 
During the Second World War, advisory services and extension work was 
intensified, but they were unable to remedy the extent of deterioration: 
liThe natural increase in cattle exceeded reduction per head through 
sale and consumption. 1I16 ) This increase may be attributed to several 
factors, the most important being the resettlement of many Africans 
in the reserves when they were evicted from Crown lands in the 1930s. 
The CNC quoted the NC for Umta 1 i as saying that II ... congesti on of 
population on reserves in his district. The corollary to these con-
ditions is overcu1tivation and overstocking, followed by dangers of 
soil erosion and general deterioration. II17 ) 
The necessity for additional food requirements for the increased 
population in the reserves required the continual extension of 
cultivated acreages at the expense of grazing lands. Furthermore, 
Africans . had suffered from th~ closure of cattle markets in the 1920s 
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Africans moving into reseryes during the depression years also lost 
access to markets owing to the remoteness of many reserves. 
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In this respect, the CNC stated in 1931 that Africans suffered a, 
... severe financial blow from the closure of cattle 
markets. The accumulat·on of cattle thus forced on 
them by conditions beyond their control will un-
fortunately accelerate the overstocking from which the 
Native Reserves already suffer. Natives sold 41,156 
head of cattle in 1931, as against 79,248 in 1930 
(difference of 38,092). Natives themselves consumed 
approximately 80,000 head. Thus some 121,090 head 
of nati ve cattle were disposed of during the year. 
Notwi thstanding thi s there was a net increase of 
70,000 - this demonstrates the vital importance of 
finding markets for surplus cattle. 19) 
In regard to sale of African cattle it was stated, 
I wou1 d not say that today's prices are unusually 
high. He has had higher prices before and he has 
also had the disappointment of seeing these prices 
drop by several hundred per cent. That happened 
in 1920 and the resu1 t of that is of course, that 
he holds back hoping to see the good old days 
restored .... When he sells something it is generally 
for a purpose, but he has little incentive to sell 
today. 20) 
The above passage indicates that Africans had no incentive to dispose of 
their cattle on a voluntary basis. 
Furthermore, the cattle marketed were usually of inferior quality 
when compared with white owned cattle. The animal husbandry instructor 
at Domboshawa school attributed this to lack of knowledge in pastoral 
pursuits. Quoting a student at the school, he stated, "Before the 
Great War European cattle could be sold for £15 or more than that, 
while black man's cattle could be bought for £7, £6, £5, lesser, 
Why .... Nati ve cattle were sent out lately in the mornings about 10 
o'clock or 11 o'clock a.m. and brought in early in the afternoons." 21 ) 




NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1931. 
NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission 1944. 
E.W. Bevan, 'The Education of Natives in Pastoral Pursuits', in 
NADA, 2, 1924, p.15. . , 
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overaged. Makings attributed this to low calving rates amongst African 
cattle and high mortality rates among yo~ng calves, which resulted in 
the majorit; of cattle in herds being older anima1s. 22 ) Furthermore, 
growth rates were slow,owing to feeding problems during the dry 
seasons when many cattle suffered severe we,i ght loss. For these 
reasons, both breeding cattle and oxen were retained until they were 
too old to fulfil these functions. 23 ) 
Compulsory destocking would increase cattle offtake from these herds 
and allow for improvetrent in quality among the remainder; and, under 
these circumstances, was the oh1y solution. Improvetrent of grazing 
land was not possible: rotational grazing schemes could not be con-
ducted on land already insufficient to cater for both arable and 
grazing requirements. And supplementary feeding required cultivation 
of fodder crops which was not feasible in those years when all 
available arable land was required for cultivation of food crops. 
As it was, cattle numbers were inadequate to produce manure suffi cient 
for the fncreased arable acreage. Alvord stated in 1934 that, 
More cattle are requi red to create suffi cient manure 
for the increasing arable acreages - however, all 
available manure is used on arable lands and 
grazing lands deteriorated; "al1 available kraal 
manure has been put on the 1 ands and crops are 
better than in previous years. All grass on 
grazing lands, however, has been grazed off down 
to the ground and there are many nati ves who have 
very poor land. Again, the question of not enough 
land has been raised.24) 
Over and above theSe factors, Afri cans owned more cattle than they had 





This was because bulls had access to young heifers in communal 
herds before the 1 atter were suffi ciently mature to breed 
success fully. 
S . M.. Mak in gs, Agriou Z tura Z Prob Zems in De ve Zoping Colin trie s in 
Afnoa, p.153. ' 
NAR S1542 A4 Vol. 1 ~934 .. Alvord to CNC 18/4/34. Report on 
Before Harvest Meetlngs 1n Demonstration Centres, Mondoro Reserve. 
NAR ZAX 1/1/2 See Appendix 12 , Table 1 . African Cattle 
NUrrDers in Native Reserves. 
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African cattle owners also increased. 26 ) The purchase of more cattle 
was, in many cases, imperative, as they were required to draw plo.U9hs.
2
7) 
Furthermore, as famine relief, and in some instances, the adoption 
of improved farming techniques, allevi ated the dangers of famine, 
so the role of cattle for ritual purposes decreased thereby lessening 
the number of cattle slaughtered for this purpose. 
Many Africans were reluctant to sell cattle because maize markets 
expanded in the late 1930s, commanding better prices than did cattle. 
A Cattle Inspector stated, 
As markets for maize expanded in the late 1930s this 
affected the atti tude to cattle: the area under cul-
tivation has increased due to ploughing. They have 
native stores ... They get a good price for their grain. 
The cattle are of a minor interest compared with their 
crops, .. profided they have sufficient oxen to plough 
they make profit from crops but erosion is curbing 
that.28) 
Simultaneous with this reluctance to part with cattle, there was a 
growing .need in the white sector for the contribution of African 
cattle ~~ markets. 29 ) This factor pl ayed a role in the movement 
towards implementing the compulsory destocking scheme. 
At this stage only 10 per cent of the population in the reserves had 
been persuaded to adopt better methods, and it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that in order to accelerate thi s movement both 1 and culti-
vation and livestock management would have to be enforced. 30) During 







If we are to prov; de for future popul ati ons, the present 
Ar~ighi stated that cattle were prominent forms of productive in-
vestment. From 1905 to 1921 they increased from 114,560 to 
854,000 - an average of 12,5 per cent per annum. This fell to 
6 per cent in the years 1921 to 1931, and 1 per cent from 1931 
to 1945. Rapid accumulation, he claimed, was traceable to the 
existence of traditional mechanisms of transformation of 
current su'rp1us into cattle. They were also seen as possible 
means of increasing future income. 
G. Arrighi, 'labour Supplies in Historical Perspective', p.214. 
NA~ ZAX 1/1/2 Alfred John Gifford, Cattle Inspector, 1938. 
Ib~d,. , 
NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission 1944 
See Appendix 12, Table 2 . Numbers of Cattle Sold to Europ~ans. 
By 1~41 the population was estimated at 1,500,000 and cattle numbers 
had lncre?se~ from 330,000 in 1911, to 1,555,000 in 1935. 
A. K. H • We 1 n rl ch, AfnaCfJ1, Farmers in Rhodesia, p. 24. 
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wide scale depletion and destruction of the land must 
be curtailed. It is the government's duty to see that 
they do not destroy it, by legislation if necessary. 
And it is our duty as govern"ment servants to teach them 
how to use it properly. 31) 
The CNC too, stated that owing to condi ti ons in the reserves, the 
number of African owned cattle should be reduced legitimately by 
sa1es. 32 ) 
Interest in African contribution to the national economy exhibited in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s coincided with this growing concern 
with the evils of soil erosion and the necessity of devising some 
means of remedying the situation. The government was forced,in the 
late 1930s~by Rhodesian Agricultural Union representatives to devote 
more attention to both African and white areas of Southern Rhodesia, 
and recognition of this problem culminated in the appointment of the 
Natural Resources Commission in 1938, of which R. McI1waine was 
chai rman. 33) The Conmi ssi on was II charged wi th an i nqui ry into the extent 
to which the natural resources of the colony were deteriorating/being 
wasted. 1134) 
In Apri 1 1939 the Commission submi tted its report to the government, 
which in 1941 was made law with the passage of the Natural Resources 
Act. This Act made provision for lithe conservation and improvement 
of the Native Reserves of the Colony and for other matters incidental 






... areas may be temporarily reserved against human 
occupation or cultivation, depasturing of stock or 
cutti ng of vegetati on ... des tocki ng may be ordered 
by the gove rnor of areas whe re the natural re-
sources are being injured by overstocking, and orders 
relating to the depasturing of stock, cultivation 
of 1 and, and con t ro 1 of wate r may be gi ven to use rs 
of land by Native Commissioners for the adoption of 
E.D. Alvord, 'The Progress of Native Agriculture in Southern 
Rhodes i a', in The New Rhodesian, AugUst 6, Z948. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1934. 




such measures as are necessary for the conservation of 
the natural resources.36) 
The change in policy of the. govemment to a more authoritarian control 
of African areas gathered momentum with the passing of the Natural 
Resources Act. 
Following the passage of this Act, the Natural Resources Board was 
appointed with McI1waine as chairman. This Board was empowered to 
"place orders on owners, occupiers or users of any land restricting 
or prohibiting its use, or requiring the construction of protection 
works, where such are necessary for conservation or preven~ion of 
injury to the natural resources. ,,37) 
The govemment was also exhibi ti ng an increasing concern wi th the 
extent to which overstocking was accelerating. 38) It was found that 
of 14 reserves in the Bu1awayo circle, 11 were overstocked according to 
standards laid down by the Department of Native Agriculture, and under 
these circumstances, compulsory destocking under the Natural Resources 
Act commenced. 39) Although the Act was passed in 1941, no adequate 
machinery existed at this time with which to carry out the provisions 
of the Act. 
In 1943 the procedure for destocking was decided by assessing the 
carrying capacity of the reserves and their current stocking rates. 
Govemment Noti ce No.612 of 1944 dec1 ared 49 reserves to be overstocked, 
and allowed Govemment Notice No.271 of 1943 on destocking of reserves 
to be put into effect. 40 ) By 1945, destocking plans for each of these 
reserves were drawn up and applied. All senior staff in the Department 
of Native Agriculture were appointed culling officers" and were 






OfficiaL Yearbook for the CoLony of ~odesia, voL.4, L952, p.112. 
Annual Report of the Natural Resources Board, op. cit. 
Thus concem with the promotion of African agriculture coincided 
with, and was partly responsible for,ensuring that land usage and 
farming methods improved. 
The destocking programme was to be accompanied by pasture manage-
ment and imp·roved methods: Two systems were reconuoonded - both of 
them rot ation systems - with a fallow period in which pasture 
lands could regenerate themselves. 
NAR Annual Re·port of Director of Native Agriculture for the year 
1945. 
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necessary to bring herds down to carryi.ng capaci ty. 41) Genera 1 
propaganda programmes were entered upon by these officers in co-operation 
. . ~) 
with the NCs in order to conduct the above regulations. 
The number of years over which the plan was to be spread was determined 
by the extent of overstocking and overpopulation, the degree to which 
natural resources had deteriorated, and the extent to 'which it was 
possible to redistribute stock by development within the reserve. 
Reduction of individual herds was determined on a percentage basis 
according to the size of the herd. This was to ensure that smaller 
stockowners were not placed at a disadvantage relative to large 
owners . . The majority of plans were to be conducted on a five year 
basis. 
The marketing of African cattle remained mainly in the hands of agents 
and specu1 ators unti 1 1945, when an agreement was reached between the 
Native Department and the Cold Storage Commission to organise marketing 
for the producers I benefi t. 
The price of cattle was fi xed on a weight and grade basis and it was 
made mandatory that Africans sell cattle to the Cold Storage Commission 
at these prices. Prices received were fixed by the government, and 
those offered for the three most important grades of cattle were 19 
per cent, 16 per cent and 10 per cent respectively below prices in 
the open white market. 43) There were no proper auction sales: a 
price was merely offered which was either accepted or rejected. Al-
though individual b~ers were encouraged to attend dip tank sales, 
Liebigs and the Cold Storage Commission were the largest buyers, and 




Ibid. Destocking had begun in the Victoria Circle in 193U as a 
result of a foot and mouth epidemic. Destocking i,n other areas 
~.egan in an adhoc fashion in 1938 prior to the passing of the Act 
ltse1f. NAR ZAX 1/1/1 Native cattle. . 
In 1943 European livestock officers were appointed, and in 1944 
two livestock supervisors. These officers made livestock and 
gr~zing surveys of 12 reserves, that is, they initiated the surveys 
WhlCh were to become compulsory when destocking commenced. 
LD. Alvord, 'The Gospel of the P1ow ' . . 
NAR Annual RepQrt of Director of Native Agriculture for the year 1945 
M. Yude1man, Afrioans on the Land, p.190. . 
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African quality of cattle: "l think that the cattle that were sold 
were not of much use to anybody but Lieb.igs. 1I44) This caused much resent-
ment from African sellers ... being the b.i.ggest buyers, L iebi gs and the 
Cold Storage Commission managed to ach.ieve a monopoly of this market, 
and profits therefore accrued to middlemen instead of to African 
se llers. 45) 
The official attitude was stated as follows, "There is to be no com-
pulsion. There is to be persuasion, and let it be, as far as possible, 
the persuasion of native public opinion. II46 ) To achieve this, it 
was hoped that small cattle owners would exert pressure on those 
owning large herds, because it was the latter's cattle which were 
largely responsible for the destruction of natural resources , and 
small owners suffered at thei r expense. None the less, there were 
still complaints about the execution of cattle sales. Africans had 
no valuators to determine which grade their cattle belonged to, and 
no-one to protect them in assessing the true weight of their cattle. 
The procedure usually followed was that of se 1ecting the most inferior 
cattle and leaving the better stock. 47) One of the chiefs stated, 
"Cattle inspectors went into our herds and picked out the worst 
catt 1e and 1e ft the bes t. 1148) Furthe rmore, II Afri cans di d not recei ve 
pri ces comparable to those whi ch whi tes achieved in the open market: 
liThe price available to me was 8/4 per 100lbs. The price available 
to the native was 4/7 per 1001bs. 1I49 ) 
44} NAR ZAX 1/1/1 Native Cattle. Bullock CNC. 
45) Ibid., Abe Geoman: General Manager, Cold Storage Commission. 
46) NAR ZAX 1/1/1 ope cit. 
47) Ibid., Robert Dunipace Gilchrist. Ranch Owner. 
48) NAR ZAX 1/1/2 Native Munyaradze. 
49) NAR ZAX 1/1/1 Robert Dunipace Gilchrist, Ranch Owner. One 
explanation as to the low prices realised at Weight and Grade 
Sales, was that at these sales only inferior stock were selected. 
In comparison, in non-destocking areas sales were voluntary, 
and therefore cattle offered inc1 uded very few culled or scrub 
stock. The average prices in these areas were .£5.0.10 
compared with .£4.4.0 in destocking areas. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1947. 
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The marketing system for Afri can cattle benefi tted whi te cattle owners. 
In controlling the flow of lives~ock, the Cold Storage Conmission operated 
a "grazier scherre" whereby surplus stock were leased to white fanners 
until required at-' a later date. 50) Ownership of these cattle remained 
in the hands of the Cold Storage Commission and the scherre was financed 
by them. 51 ) White fanners, therefore, were not obliged to make large 
capital outlays to purchase livestock, nor run mortality risks. They 
were given the added value upon returning cattle to the Conmission, 
and this was usually high because the grading and price system was 
such that there were wide price differences between high and low 
grades. Whites purchased or leased low grade, cheap livestock, 
fattened them and returned them to the Cold Storage Conmission. The 
animals were then reclassified and profits accrued to white fanners. 
As cattle nunbers decreased under the destocking scheme, attempts were 
made to improve the quality of African cattle; not, as in the 1920s and 
1930s, by the introduction of grade bulls, but using the Africans' own 
cattle. To this end, a cattle breeding station was opened in 1942. 
Alvord s ta ted wi th regard to thi s , 
After many years of trial and error in attempts 
to cross exoti c breeds of European cattle wi th 
indigenous native cattle, it was finally decided that 
the best cattle for the Africans was their own sanga 
cattle ... an intensi ve programme was started to induce 
nati ves to ilTl>rov.e thei r herds so that they could 
rreet the requi rerrents of an expanding trade in beef 
cattle. 52) 
In this way it was hoped that when destocking had reduced reserves to 
their optimum carrying capacity, Africans would be induced to improve 
the quality of their remaining cattle. And as it was now necessary 
for Africans to make a larger contribution to the national economY, 




~AR ZAX,l/l/l Native Cattle, . . Leo A)exander Levy; Cattle . Buyer . 
... 3 dlfferent classes of cattle . . There is bone. cattle, which 
can be used, on ly for frozen beef ~ and then there i-s the' animal 
wh.ich has"got a certain weigh.t which can be used only for 
frozen ~ef,- and. then there is the animal which is bought from 
the natl ve, fud up ·, and sol d as chi llers. Then there is another 
animal which the European buys from the native and keeps it for a 
few years and wo:ks it and ~i ther se 11 sit in the market or exports it. II 
T~e above elTl>haS1Ses the pOlnt that Africans were not competing on 
open terms with those dealing on the open market. 
Agro Economic Survey Part Two, op. cit., p.20. 
E.D. Alvord, 'Developrrent of Native Agriculture and Land Tenure', pp.49/50. 
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It was believed that African antagonism to the destocking scheme 
would not be too. great. By 194·2 many Africans were comi.ng to view 
demonstrators as genuinely operating for their benefit, and no 10.nger 
looked on them with suspicion. In the words of the CNC, lilt is the 
belief at this stage of the development of Africans, that practical 
demonstration is worth more than any theory .... suspicion with which 
thei r (demonstrators I) efforts were viewed by the more conservati ve 
elements has now largely disappeared. 1153) It was thus hoped that 
Africans, trusting the demonstrators, would reas1ise that the de-
stocking policy was undertaken out of genuine concern for their 
we 11-be i n g . 
Furthermore, cattle prices during and after the war-years were inflated, 
and it was hoped that higher prices fetched at weight and grade sales 
would offset any suspicion Africans might feel towards government 
motives. 54 ) There was still distrust of the government, however, and 
many Africans were reluctant to improve thei r cattle for fear that 
they would become desirable to the white man. Even many whites were 
of the opinion that the government had introduced destocking to 
eliminate African competition. One of the cattle buyers stated, 
liThe government may have come to the conclusion that the native of 
Southern Rhodesia is competing with the European, and that may be 
the policy, to eliminate the competition by reducing. II This statement, 
however, was vehemently denied: "No ... because the CNC and the Nati ve 
Department ... they would not have been party to such a development. 1155) 
Other' unforeseen disadvantages came in the wake of destocking schemes. 
Acreages planted to crops were already increasing and cutting into 
grazing areas, destroying the balance between arable and pastoral 
farming. The destocking scheme destroyed this even further and as a 
result there was no longer sufficient manure to adequately fertilise 
the increased arable acreage. Compulsory destocking, by cutting back 
on cattle numbers, made this position worse. Hence crop yields 
53). NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1942. 
54) Ibid. 
55) NAR ZAX 1/1/1 Native Cattle. L.A. Levy, Cattle Buyer. 
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dropped and more land was required for arable pursuits in order to 
maintain output. 56) In addition, destocki,ng cut off a convenient 
source of income and method of savi,ng amo,ngst Africans. 
Pri or to 1940, the I correct I number of popul ation on reserves was 
estimated by the carrying capacity of cattle. Each family required 
six cattle to accumulate sufficient manure to maintain the humus 
content and soil productivity on 6 to 10 acres of arable land. Six 
head of cattle required 6, 10 and 16 acres of grazing land each in 
high, medium and low rainfall areas respectively. (That is, 60, 
80 and 100 acres per family.) 
The larger nunbers sold under the destocking scheme is not indicative 
of the overall success of the policy. That is, that Africans were 
aware that when cattle nunbers were lower, and grazing not so scarce, 
they would then be able to strive for improvements in quality in 
thei r remaining cattle. On the contrary, many co-operated with the 
scheme and sold their excess stock through age-old fears of government 
intervention. "They are selling their cattle much more freely," 
said a Chibi storekeeper, "and they say that the reason is that they 
are frightened that the government is going to take away their cattle. 1157) 
Opposition to destocking grew, and progress in advanced agriculture 
and animal husbandry was too slow to keep pace with proper conserva-
tion of the soil. The population was increasing too rapidly to 
prevent arable holdings from becoming uneconomic units. Not only was 
progress in advanced agriculture unable to keep pace with deteriorating 
conditions, but the demonstration scheme also experienced a setback 
OWing to the destocking scheme. The primary explanation behind this 
56) It had been hoped that destocking would yield to increased crop 
yields. This, in many instance's, did not materialise: planting 
occurred immedi ate ly after the fi rst rains, but cattle were 
usually in poor condition at this time after long winter months, 
hence more oxen were needed to draw the plough. This necessitated 
the pooling of draught animals, and those who lent animals, 
usually did so only when they had ploughed their own lands. Thus 
borrowers were forced to plough 1 ate'- whi ch meant yields were 
lower. After destocking the position worsened for more people 
had lost their access 'to cattle. 
57) NAR ZAX 1/1/1 Thomas Little, Storekeeper, Chibi district. 
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occurrence was that all senior officials of the Department of Native 
.Agricul ture were appointed culli.ng officers, instead of employing a 
separate staff for this purpose, and as a result they immediately lost 
African backi .ng . arid trust. Africans believed that instead of 
representing them to the. government, the Department of Nati ve Agri-
culture were carrying out the harsh features of a scheme which would 
operate to thei r de·triment. 58) Furthermore, those newly appointed 
culling officers operated from blueprints on destocking, the surveys 
of which were done by African agricultural officers. These culling 
officers were aware that in some cases they were destocking areas on 
the blueprints below their carrying capacity. This resulted in much 
bad feeling from Africans on the affected reserves.
59
) Hostility 
also arose towards white farmers living on land adjacent to reserves 
who acquired cattle cheaply from Africans, thereby leaving them little 
opportunity to sell cattle at reasonable prices. 
Following the report of the Turner Commission in 1956, however, a con-
siderable degree of freedom was restored in cattle marketing: marketing 
policies were changed and white and African markets integrated. 60 ) 
Auction sales in reserves replaced weight and grade sales, grades 
were reclassified and prices raised for lower grades. All sales 
were conducted on a competitive basis, and the Cold Storage Commission 
became a residual buyer, thus providing a floor price for cattle. 61 ) 
Price and slaughter controls were abolished, and minimum prices were 
taken from a table listing the current grade/price structure. Cattle 
were graded according to their quality and then weighed. 
To keep sales constant throughout the year, the government ordered 
that higher prices be paid at the end of the dry season when quality 
was poor, and lower prices at the end of the rainy season when quality 
was better. That cattle were needed during the first rains for 
58) R. Dinnis, Interview, October 19.79. 
59) Ibid. 
60) Agro Economic Survey Par>t 2., Ope cit., p.20. 
61) Graziers wis.hing to purchase cattle now had to do so on a 
competitive basis. 
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draught purposes often prevented Africans availi.ng themselves of 
these higher prices. 
Results accruing from this change in policy were on the whole 
favourable. Prices for African cattle increased: in 1955/6, the 
average price rose by 25 per cent and there was a 10 per cent increase 
in the nunber offered for sale. 62 ) At the end of 1956, African 
producers received an average of £2.19.3 more per beast than they did 
under weight and grade sa1es. 63) 
The fact that the goals set under the compulsory destocking scheme had 
been accomplished was a possible additional explanation for the 
abandonment of the scheme. In this regard the CNC stated, 
At the end of this period (April 1947 to June 1948) the 
excess in the 52 overstocked reserves was reduced by 
70,4 per cent or 10,4 per cent more than the target 
set at the commencement of destocking to be achieved 
by the end of the thi rd year. In achieving the 
object of reducing total holdings we are at the same 
time in some cases reducing individual holdings to 
an uneconomical figure due to the fact that we have 
no means of limiting or stabiliSing the number of 
stock owners, so that as these increase the per-
missible maximum of each individual holding must 
diminish.64) 
At this stage, then, there was no longer reason to continue the 
destocking scheme. 
Al thou,gh the scheme had been successful, admini strators were aware 
that it was not an ideal solution to the problem. The CNC commented 




Although destocking measures result in reducing stock 
in overstocked Native Reserves to carrying capacity, 
they can only operate as a short term measure ... 
(we) must find another solution. The problem, as it 
stands at the moment relates baSically to the human 
population, therefore the problem of overstocking 
lies in solving the problem of rapid increase in 
African population and its relation to occupation rights 
M. YU.de 1 man, Africans on the Land, p. 191 . 
R.W.M .. Johnson, 'Afri~an . .Agricu1tura1 Development in Southem 
Rhodes1a, 1945 - 1960 , 1n Food Research Institute Studies, 4, 
1963-4, No.2, p.206. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year, 1948. 
143. 
in Native Reserves. 65 ) 
It was thus apparent that a more authoritarian control of .agricultural 
pursuits on reserves was imminent, for not only were natural resources 
to be protected, but African production expanded. 
In the final analysis, it would appear that the compulsory destocking 
scheme represented not a deviation from, but a continuation of, the 
policy of African development which, in the late 1930s, had undergone 
radical deviations from former practises. Compulsory destocking was 
part and parcel of the whole movement towards increasing African 
agricultural production, by restoring some balance between arable and 
pastoral farming, and by upgrading the quality of African cattle. 
This policy also aided total agricultural contribution to the economy 
through the operation of grazier schemes. Furthermore, the latter 
seemed to curtail possib1e white hostility towards attempts at 
upgrading African cattle. In 1924 the following comment was made, 
It has been agreed that if the nati ves are taught . 
to breed a better class of cattle, they wi 11 enter 
into competition with the white man, or they WIll 
become more independent and less inclined to work 
than at present. Thi s would appear to be a short 
sighted view. If Rhodesian cattle are to find a 
place on the world's markets, there must be a 
constant and available supply of animals of uniform 
weight, age and quality. We cannot capture and 
hold a market with samples. A plentiful supply 
of native cattle up to standard will assist.66) 
It was not unti 1 1940·, however, when atti tudes to African contribution 
changed, that these recommendations bore fruit. 
5.2 The Move Towards Authoritarian Control of African Agriculture 
The growing need for a revision of African agricultural policy was making 
itself felt, particularly in post-war years when African areas came to 
be seen as more than labour reservoirs and areas of subsistence 
65) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for -the year 1946. 
66) E.W. Bevan, 'The Education of Natives in Pastoral P "t I 16 urSUl s ,p. . 
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farmi.ng. During these years, the reserves assumed an added importance, 
and were viewed as potential centres of cash crop and cattle production. 
It was only in the 1950s, however, that positive steps were taken in 
thi s di recti on. 
Until the late 1940s, .agricu1tura1 development policies followed much 
the same lines as those in the early part of the century. These 
policies operated within the framework already p'rovided in African areas, 
and no effort was made to alter the basic structure of land use 
patterns. While population in the reserves was still reasonably small, 
it was possible to extend arable acreages through development of 
water supplies and soi 1 conservation in otherwise uninhabitable areas. 
Later, when the population became too large for continued application 
of this method of extension, there arose a need for a structural 
change in the Africans' agricultural base. This was impeded, however, 
by traditional tenurial patterns. Pressures in the 1940s of rapidly 
growi ng nunt>ers, and increased mi grati ons into reserves from whi te 
areas resulted in the abandonment of all previous policy and the pur-
suance of a more authoritarian method of developing African agriculture 
in the 1950s. During this period, methods used in pursuance of this 
aim rested not, as in the past, on persuasion through education and 
in troducti on of i fllIroved fanni ng methods, but by compu1 s i on and 
enforced adoption of new methods. In 19.48 LD. Alvord wrote that, 
... In 1936 we here in Rhodesia started our prograJl11le of 
soil conservation work in the reserves. But man is 
now discovering that conservation is not enough. If 
he is to prosper where he now lives, his ploughs must 
tum out more and ever more from his arable land and 
his pastures must be made to support more and ever 
more livestock. In addition to soil conservation we 
must have soi 1 bui 1ding and maintenance under con-
ditions of more and heavier occupation and production.67) 
Here Alvord realised the necessity of introducing compulsion to extension 
prograJl11les. He admitted finally, after twenty years of hard work, 
that paternalistic endeavours to persuade the Africans to improve their 
techniques, would only reach a handful of them. 
67) E.D. Alvord, 'The Progress of Native .Agricu1ture in Rhodesia', in 
The New Rhodesian., Augus t 6, 1948. 
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In the same speech, he commented on the need for a ch~nge in policy, 
This year was the start of the second 20 year cycle of 
agricultural development ~n ,native areas and re~erves. 
Heretofore we have been al mlng to teach the natl ve 
people to feed themselves. 'Hereafter our policy must 
change .... It cannot be said that we have achieved 
any spectacular success even in the feeding of our 
people today, or at any time up to t he present, as 
witnessed by the periodical shortages in different 
areas ...• astronomical figures are quoted of soil 
losses each year, and 1 i vestock losses through 
starvation every dry season run into the thousands .... 
I do not be 1 i eve that it is any real answer to the 
problem to advocate fewer livestock or the mass move-
ment of population. The only real answer is to 
improve the soil to maximum carrying capacity and 
maintain its producti vi ty by proper management.68) 
In the same year, Alvord recommended a switch of policy from one of 
voluntary acceptance of improved methods, to one of enforced adoption 
through a Land Utilization and Good Husbandry Bill.69) 
Before the final step was taken, and this method resorted to, other 
attempts were made in the 1940s to develop and expand African agri-
cultural output: credit facilities were made available to Africans, 
Native Purchase Areas were developed, and cash cropping was encouraged. 
The lack of credit facilities for African farmers pri or to 1945 was 
also responsible for the inability of many Africans, particu'larly 
farmers in the Native Purchase Areas, to become involved in commercial 
agriculture. The principal reason for this was that African farmers 
did not produce a large enough surplus to ensure repayment of loans. 
If money was lent, lenders were forced to accept a pledge of future 
earnings against the loan. The only avenue open to Africans prior to 
1945 was through the sale of labour or cattle,70) or by borrowing from 
68) Ibid. 
69) Ibid. 
70) A possible reason for lack of credit facilties prior to 1945, 
was that in the 1940s the labour market was full and a commercial 
class of African farmers was needed and these could be created 
without endangering the labour supply. Further, urban areas now 
demanded a more stable and skilled labourer, and not short term 
mi gratory 1 abourers such as exi sted in the past. 
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pub 1 i c lending agencies created to ~et thei r needs. The fi rst such 
lending programne was initiated in 1945. Th.e statutory Land Bank, which 
provided low-cost loans for whites usually against mortgages on the land, 
began to make advances to Africans in Rurchase Areas - the only 
Africans who could make a pledge .against the 1and. 71 ) Purchase Area 
farmers encountered many unfor.eseen difficulties in adjusting to the 
concept of individual tenure. Under the communal system, neighbours 
and kins~n all assisted in planting and harvesting operations. In 
the Purchase Areas, nowever, this was not possible, as there were not 
often neighbours or kinsmen living in close proximity to these far~rs. 
Thus there was the necessity to employ hired assistance, and this 
avenue was not open to them prior to the advent of credit facilities. 
The development of credit facilities was part and parcel of stepping 
up this develop~nt of African agriculture in the 1940s, particularly 
in view of the fact that they concentrated on Purchase Areas farmers -
the one class with potential to become cOl1l1lerica1 fanners. 72) 
Reserve African farmers were also encouraged to improve production in 
the late 1940s. In 1948, the Native Production and Markets Development 
Act created the Nati ve Deve 1 op~nt Fund whi ch came into operati on in 
1949. This Fund was supplementary to the sums voted by Parliament 
through revenue and loan votes. 73) Money accrued to the fund in two 
ways. Firstly, by the pooling of various funds, the Native Maize 
Equalisation Fund and the District Cattle Marketing Fund, which were 
earmarked for special pur.poses prior to 1948. The releaSing of these 




M. Yudelman, Africans on the Land, p.157/8. The size and scope 
of the progranvre was small. In the first ten years, less than 70 
farmers recei ved a total of less than £6,000 (Ibid.) 
The fact that no credit faci 1 i ties were ·offered pri or to these years 
yet the existence of extension services was tolerated, ensured that 
they became self-sufficient, but not to the extent whereby they 
might beco~ potential competitors to white farmers. 
In 1940/1 £14,107 was voted for the development of agriculture in 
African areas. A paltry sum when compared with the £208,217 pro-
vided in the vote for white agriculture. After the Second World 
War, Africans received a larger portion of the vote, but the 
£2,000,000 spent on African agriculture from 1945/6 to 1953/4 was 
inSignificant when compared to the £12,000,000 voted to white 
agriculture in this period. 
R.H. Pal~r, 'Agricultura1 History of Rhodesia ' , p.244. 
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producti on and marketing. Secondly, the. government related prices of 
agricultural produce to costs of production of whi.te farmers - there 
was no discrimination b.etw.een prices paid to white and Afrtcan 
farmers. The Act created a 10 per cent levy -on all crops and cattle 
marketed by Afri.cans in order to enusre that a proportion of income 
. . lt 1 f 'l't' 74) from production would be used to lmprove agrlcu ura aCl 1 les. 
In the words of the eNe, 
Native producers do not 'plough back' as development 
capital, anything like the same proportion of their 
returns from production as Europeans do. The Act, 
therefore, provides for a contribution from native 
produce rs towards the capi ta 1 deve 1 opmen t of thei r 
areas by means of a levy on certain of the produce 
marketed by them ... the whole of the levy and pooled 
funds are to be returned di rectly to all nati ve 
producers by applying the whole of the new find to 
the improvement of their production and provision 
of better marketing facilities.75) 
In this way, then, it was hoped that Africans would accumulate' 
sufficient capital to enable them to expand production. 
The Eng1edow Report of 1950 proclaimed that the purpose of the fund 
was that it. be use'd entirely for the development of. marketing and pro-
duction. With regard to the Native Development Act, the report 




... the measure, designedly experimental, brings some 
important advantages. It provides much needed 
capital for agricultural development; consolidates 
all the existing funds which are available for 
development with the new money (from a levy on sales 
of native agricultural produce) so giving greater 
freedom of use; unifies the administration of all 
these resources; avoids price discrimination 
between European and nati ve producers; affords the 
means both of conserving nati ve produce in times of 
shortage and encouraging types of produce specially 
desirable in any area. It thus seems likely to 
promote effecti ve 1y the advi sory and educati ona 1 
encou~agements to i.mpr~v~men~ in nattve .agricu1tu~.76) 
NAR Annual Report of the eNC for tne year 1948. In an interview 
Mr .. Beaumont stated th~t the implications of those 10 per cent 
~ev1.e~ ~ere that the hlgher producers were penalised, allowing 
lnefflclent producers to benefi.t, because the 10 per cent levy 
came off gross net profit. 
NAR Annual Report of the eNC for the year 1948. 
F. Eng1edow, Report on the AgnauZturaZ DeveZopment of Southern 
~odesia3 1950, p.90. 
148. 
The Africans themselves, however, might have offset the benefits which 
accrued from the fund. For it to be successful, it required their 
co-operation and wi 11 i.ngness to adopt new techniques. That it b.ecame 
necessary to apply enforced methods in 1950 may be taken as an indi-
cation that it was not entirely successful. 
It was realised that for African production to be increased, marketing 
and transport facilities would have to be provided, and the new Fund 
met these demands. In thi s regard, the CNC wrote, 
The part played by food production by communi-
cations ... in a cash economY and in improved agricultural 
methods to promote it is largely governed by the exis-
tence of reasonable marketing and transport facilities, 
and that in the remote areas where they are negligible 
a persistant economY persists ... NC Sebungwe, "Owing to 
the distance from railhead and resultant lack of 
markets there is little incentive to grow more grain 
than is requi red for personal consumption." There-
fore, following the institution of the native production 
and marketing development fund, the highest priority 
has been given to the improvement of communications and 
from this fund and NR Fund no less than £61,000 were 
allotted to districts during the year for this purpose.77) 
Thus, in the 1940s and particularly in post-Second World War years, 
much effort was expended in attempting to facilitate growth of African 
agriculture. Yudelman has attributed the growth which took place 
during these years, not to agriculture, but white immigration. 
"Rapid growth after the Second World War," he wrote, " ... was a direct 
result of a rapid acceleration of European immigration into Southern 
Rhodesia and a large inflow of capital from the United Kingdom. 
European skills and capital, combined with a plentiful supply of land 
and labour to expand agricultural production, to raise mining output, 
and to es tab 1 i sh industry." 78) 
Yu~e1man compared growth in the money sector with that of the peasant 
sector during the years 1938 to 1956. He found that there was little 
change in the productivity of African agriculture or incomes of those 
engaged in it in those years, and an increasing number of Africans 
77) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1949. 
78) M. Yude 1 man , Africans on the Land, p.44. 
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entered the money econolllY as ~igrant labourers.. In the wh.ite sector, 
however, net incomes increased by 800 per cent from £20,700,000 to 
£177 ,000 ,000. Taki.ng into consi derati on popul ati on. growth and rising 
prices for retails, this meant an average increase of 30 per cent per 
annum in real income. Immigrants who arrived after the Second World 
War had more capi t al than those prior to this: £31,400,000 in 1946-
1953, compared with £400,00 per annum prior to the Second World War. 
These immigrants created a cemand for goods and services and high 
rates of investment were made possible by funds from abroad. 79) 
Continuing suspicion on the part of Africans to government motives 
contributed in part to the inability of this sector to respond to 
increased demand. 80) The depression and the Land Apportionment Act 
also played a role in this regard. In the early 1920s, Africans 
were able to gain a foothold in the market econolllY through exploitation 
of natural resources - the use of the plough and increased acreages. 
In the years under review, however, as population increased, it was 
no longer possible, as in the past, to devote advisory services to 
extending arable acreage and providing water supplies. Soil 
deteriorated through continuous cropping and population pressure 
necessitated intensification of land use. In the 1940s, destocking 
schemes were part and parcel of fulfilling this aim. It was not 
until 1952 that a move was made to abolish the communal system of 
agriculture and implement a system of individual free-hold tenure. 81 ) 
In addition to the provision of credit facilities, increasing attention 
was devoted to the development of Purchase Areas, in order to make 
them more viable centres of production. Prior to the 1940s, all 
available staff were required in the reserves. It was believed that 
better fanners existed in Purchase Areas, whereas in reserves, all 
Africans were entitled to land irrespective of whether they could till 
it or not. The carrying capaci ty of these areas needed to be increased 
79) Ibid., pp.44/45. 
SO) Vide supra, pp.85/86. 
81) This occurred with the passage of the Native Land Husbandry Act 
in 1952, but this is beyond the scope of this work. 
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and its usage improved. For these reasons all attention was devoted 
. 82) 
to th.e rese rves. 
In the 1940s, however, more attention was focused on Purchase Areas. 
Until this time, the only work done was that of the Land Board,83} 
which began th.e work of demarcating, surveying and selling individual 
holdings. Progress was slow, and from 1931 to 1936, 548 Africans 
bought a total of 188,186 acres, the average holding being 343 acres 
at £74. 84 ) Initially, no African could be induced to purchase land 
in these areas. Such was the situation that messengers of the Native 
Department and Post Office delivery boys were persuaded to purchase 
land in these areas in an attmept to allay suspicion. 85 ) 
Reasons for this suspicion may be attributed in part to past inter-
ferences with African land holdings. Furthennore, many Purchase Areas 
were uninhabitable, and required the developments of water supplies 
and communications. There was also the problem of squatters who would 
have to be removed if these areas were sold. In view of the already 
existing problem of congestion in the reserves, officials of the 
Land Board were reluctant to add to it by removing additional Africans 
1 i vi ng on 1 ands demarcated as Purchase Areas. 86) Furthermore" many 
Africans purchasing this land did not develop it, merely leaving it 
as an old-age insurance for when they returned from working in the 
money sector. Approximately 90 per cent were not in personal 
occupation of their holdings and in 1939 the Land Board decided to 
give priority to those who would take up immediate occupation. 87 ) 
During the 1930s, applicants for land in these areas were required to 
have between £5 and £100 in cash, cattle and small stock in order to 







R. Dinnis, Interview, October, 1979. 
The Native Land Board had been established under the 1931 Land 
Apportionment Act vide supra, p.54. 
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R. Dinni~, Interview, October, 1979. 
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years. 88) Many Africans were reluctant to purchase land in these 
years, primarily because they believed they were being discriminated 
. . 
~gainst in not getting a title deed as did whites, 
I wished to buy a farm some tirr2 back but I felt it was 
not worth doing so since the Africans were not allowed 
to have ti tle' deeds after buying the farm. 'You know 
Africans get a certificate of 'title which is the equi-
valent of a title?' 'But that is. not satisfactory, we 
prefer a proper title deed.' 'It is as good as a title 
deed. '89) 
Govemment indi fference to Purchase Areas continued throughout the 
1930s. It was only in 1939 that extension services, which had been in 
operation in the NRS since 1926, were given in these areas. In that 
year, a 'school on wheels' under command of an agricultural inspector 
began its duties of touring Purchase Areas and the reserves, giving 
aid to interested parties. 90 ) This came at an important time: many 
of those Purchase Area farmers had occupied thei r farms in the early 
1930s and had been on them for a decade; and having overcome initial 
obstacles, they wanted to make profits. The lack of extension advice 
had hampered this need; so, too, had the discriminatory marketing 
policies of the 1930s. 
In 1944, in response to renewed demands, additional African agricul-
tural instructors were appointed to assist in agricultural extension 
work amongst Purchase Area farmers. 91 ) These instructors conducted 
short courses in farming for groups of owners. Further changes 
occurred when in 1946, the govemment estab 1 i shed traini ng centres 
at each of the four experiment farms where ex African servicemen 
were given free practical training in agriculture. These were 
primarily for the training of those having made application to the 
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By 1953 a Master Fanner certificate became a prerequisite for the 
purchase of a farm. 93 ) This was partly to deal with the extremely 
long wai ti.ng-l i st for those desi ri.ng to purchase farms. 94) There-
after, many Africans became Master Farmers, with the primary intention 
of being able to move off the reserves into the Purchase Areas. "A 
sample of 286 Master Farmers in 1960 showed that 40 per cent had 
joined training schemes to purchase a farm, and only 60 per cent 
to learn better farming techniques. 1I95 ) 
From 1930 African producers in Purchase Areas had direct access to 
the marketing · board, and from 1949 were subject to deduction of the 
development levy.96) This factor acted to the detriment of improved 
production because it forced the more advanced Purchase Areas farmers 
to . subsidise the more backward cultivators in reserves. 97 ) 
The Agro-Economic Survey of Southern Rhodesian African Areas, con-
ducted in 1958, found that there was a lack of labour input in Native 
Purchases Areas, and that these farmers were using the same techniques 
of producti on as they had been using in reserves, except on a larger 
scale. 98) This may be attributed to the lack of development facilities 
until the 1950s. In 1938 a revolving fund was established to grant 
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tenn loans of £150, £100 and £25 respectively. Interest rates were 
set at 5 per cent, and repaynent over a period of up to ten years 
- -99.} 
depending on the type of loan. 
Interest in Purchase Areas and their contribution to the economY 
coinCi ded wi th_ govemnent efforts di rected to persuading peasant 
farmers to increase acreages and output to meet increasing demand. 
Simultaneously interest arose in promoting cash cropping in furtherance 
of thi s aim. Cash crops had been introduced during earlier years, but 
met with little success. 
It was not until the 1940s that persuasion to adopt cash crops was 
begun in eames t. A. Pendered, Offi cer of Nati ve Producti on and 
Marketing Branch of the Native Affairs Department, stated in 1948, 
Crop production ... (is) primarily undertaken to supply 
subsistence needs and is therefore, mainly directed 
to growing the basic food crops of maize, small grains, 
groundnuts and beans, wi th smaller quantities of rice 
and wheat. Purely cash crops such as cotton were, 
until recently; non existent with the growing demand 
for these basic foodstuffs in European areas, the 
native agricultural economY has becone a mixed economY 
of subsistence and cash crops, and as marketing 
facilities improve so the proportion of the crop that 
is sold tends to increase.100) 
Pendered emphasised the crux of the problem: the lack of markets. 
Prior to the late 1940s, this Was the largest single disincentive to 
the expansion of cash cropping in African areas. Indeed, the pro-
duction of any marketable surplus was discouraged in the years 
immediately prior to, and succeeding, responsible govemmnet, except 
where these did not conflict with white agricultural interests. 
The principal cash crop encouraged in Afri can areas prior to the late 
1940s was cotton. Cultivation of this crop in African areas started 
in 1924/5, at approximately the same tine that whites were seeking an 
alternative staple to maize. A possible explanation as to why the _ 
cultivation of this crop was advocated in the reserves, was that 
increasing interest in this crop might divert African attention from 
the cultivation of maize. This white farmers welcomed at a time when 
99) A.K.H. Weinrich, African Far.mers in Rhodesia, (1975), p.27. 
100) NAR S611 Report of the Native Production and Marketing Branch 
1948. 
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government intervention and control was neg1.igib1e in the fields of 
marketing and production. 
Although seed was supplied free of ch~rge by the Native Department, 
Africans were not easily persuaded to cultivate cotton; and in many 
instances it was abandoned in favour of food crops. 101) This was 
partly because more labour was required in its cultivation relative 
to that of maize. A further explanation was the insecurity involved 
in the cultivation of cotton: aware of the instability and lack of 
markets, Africans living in such close proximity to poverty could 
not afford to devote a 11 thei r attenti on to cash crops in the hope 
of securing a market. The feeding of their people, of necessity, took 
precedence. The following season, after insect attacks, the experiment 
was abandoned and was not revi ved until the depressi on years, when 
whi te farmers once agai n sought to domi nate the mai ze market. II In 
1935", the CNC stated, "a special effort was made to find markets for 
crops Africans can grow to their advantage without meeting competition 
from European farmers. Cotton experiments show promise. 1l102 ) 
Cotton experiments, then, resumed importance in the 1930s and the 
results achieved were more favourable than the previous attempt. 
Alvord, however, was initially reluctant to introduce this crop 
amongst Africans, believing (as did Africans themselves) that food 
crops were preferable to pure ly cash crops for whi ch there mi ght not 
be a market. Alvord, in commenting on the possible dangers involved 
in introducing cotton, wrote, 
It is very difficult to introduce cotton among the 
nati ves, due to the fact that it is a strange crop 
to them and it is not a food crop. They are reluc-
tant to substitute cotton for maize since maize is 
a crop which they know and from which they obtain 
a definite price. If a return of approximately 
£2.10 to £3.00 may be obtained from cotton there 
would be little advantage growing cotton instead 
of mai ze, where proper methods of ti 11 age are 
practised, as the yields from maize will enable the 
growers to secure a similar return from his maize 
crops even at 4/- to 5/- · per b.ag. There is no 
101) M.C. Steele, 'Foundations of a Native Policy', pp.369-370. 
102) NAR Annual Report of the Agriculturalist for Natives 1938. 
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question, however, that returns from cotton under 
ordinary nati ve methods of ti ll.age would b~ better 
than the returns they de ri ve from the, growlng of 
maize ... as the cotton give higher yields and would 
bri,ng a larger cash i'ncome than maize.103) 
The price received for cotton in 1934 was just under £2.10 an acre, 
and on these results it was concluded that cotton was a suitable 
crop for Africans to cultivate. 104) 
Furthermore, cotton had fertil i ty-res toring properties and represented 
a desirable rotation crop under Alvord's scheme. This, coupled with 
the fact that it offered no co~eti ti on to whi te farmers, led the 
Cotton Research Board in 1937 to state that, "Cotton is an ideal crop 
for natives to take up. It is a cash crop, offers no competition to 
European growers as it is an export crop, and forms an excellent 
rotation with maize." 105 ) This was the beginning of the transition 
from a focus on subsistence agriculture to one in which cash crops 
were grafted on to subsistence practises. Henceforth commercial 
farming assumed growing importance. This was more noticeable in the 
1940s, however, when a more concerted effort was made to introduce 
and popularise a variety of cash crops. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the production of cash crops other 
than cotton was stimulated. In order to induce Africans to cultivate 
crops other than maize, whose marketing was still controlled, the 
Grain Marketing Act was passed in 1950 to stimulate the growing of 
small grains in areas most suited to those crops. 106) 
Groundnut production had been encouraged by the Native Department 
since 1945. Pendered, the Marketing Officer, attributed this to the 
good prices offered for them. 107) Attempts had been made in the 
1~3~s to encourag~ African cu1tivatton o~ groundnuts. This was 
primarily to keep Africans from any markets which whites might desire; 
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to white farmers. The Assistant ,Agriculturalist commented in 1934, 
(There is) ... no fear of ,European fanners interfering 
in such a native export trade, as the price per ton 
of unshelled groundnuts would have to be over £20 per 
ton , before European farmers would be interested. The 
cost of export to England cannot very well be under 
6/6 per bag of 75 lbs. 'On ' that basi s fanners would 
only rece'ive 6/8 per bag.108) 
It was not until the 1940s, however, that encouragement o~ groundnut 
production began in earnest, and by this time white farmers had 
found a secure export and staple crop in tobacco. 
A major factor contributing to the lack of overall success in attempts 
to introduce cash cropping amongst Africans was that the predominant 
problem in those years - that of increasing congestion in reserves -
remained unresol ved. African suspicion towards demonstrators did 
little to alleviate this problem; and suspicions which had been 
allayed in the 1930s, intensi fied as the destocking scheme gathered 
momentum. In the following passage, an African comment on the opinions 
of the African population towards demonstrators, 
Were the primitive methods of fanning bad? They were 
not so bad in those days but they should be changed 
now in my opinion. Do you think the Africans are 
following the advice of the demonstrators? Not as I 
think they should because there is little suspicion 
on the part of some Africans. Their idea of demon-
strators is to crowd them in a little space and compel 
them to produce so many crops in a space which is 
not big enough ... '.The tendency to reduce the stocks of 
the Afri cans is the very thing that the Afri cans 
are today very much frightened of.109) 
Thus the influence of demonstrators appeared to have experienced a 
setback at the very time when it was desired that African production 
be expanded. 
One African stated, liThe native people who are working still plow at 
home, we don't depend on the money we earn." llO ) This was the crux 
of the problem in the 1940s: tOO, many cultivators and not enough land. 
The fact that Africans believed that demonstrators were forcing them 
to dec~ased s.maller acreages., did not make the solution any simp1er. 111 ) 





NAR S1542 A¢ Vo1.1 1934 Assistant Agriculturalist to the Secretary 
Department of ,Agriculture and Lands 18/5/34. ' 
NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission. Native Mzingala. 
NAR ZBJ 1/1/2 Wanyina 
Ibid., Nelson Charwadza. 
157. 
The answer, then, appeared to lie in enforcerrent of improved methods 
in order to curtail erosi on and termi nate the ,exi stence of the • part-
time· cultivator who spent part of each year in the urban areas and 
was thus not an efficient farmer. One NC comrrented, 
The agricultural future of the district even from the 
subs'istence point of view is not bright unless soil 
conservation and improved farming methods can be 
enforced. The idea of improvement by gradual 
education is, I fear, too slow and by the time the 
native has arrived at the desired stage there will 
be little soil left that is worth cu1tivating.112) 
In addition to the above, the limited number of demonstrators ensured 
that voluntary acceptance of improved methods would be a slow process. 
IIBy 1950 in Manica1and and S. Mashona1and'll the CNC cornrented, IIthere 
was a 50 per cent increase in the nunber of demonstration centres, 
and with an increase of only 2-3 agricultural demonstrators 
respecti ve 1y ... 113) 
The inability of African agriculturalists to meet growing demands for 
agricultural p1roduce, and the increasing degree to which soil erosion 
was depleting the reserves, culminated in the appointrrent of the 
Native Production and Trade Conmission in 1944. In the following 
passage, the Marketi ng Offi cer out1 ined the reasons for the appoint-
ment of this Conmission, 
Nati ve reserves and nati ve areas are one-thi rd of the 
economy. The agricultural potential is of importance 
to the economy. In the past these areas have not 
been relied upon to make any contribution to an in-
tegrated agricultural policy for the country as a 
whole, beyond producing for the subsistence requirements 
of their inhabitants and the sale of marketable sur-
pluses in excess of this subsistence to the European 
area. The government has, through the Department of 
Nati ve Agricu1 ture, devoted increasing attenti on and 
funds to the organisation and improvement of the 
agricultural and pastoral production of the native 
peoples for the past 22 years .... It has gradually 
become apparent that if this production is to be 
used effectively a suitable marketing organisation must 
be evolved. In 1944 the government appointed the 
Native Production and Trade Commission to examine there 
" p ~b 1 ~ms ~ 11 4 L '''''''''''' 
112) NAR 51563 NC Annual Reports, 1940, NC Inyanga. 
113) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year '1951. 
114) NAR 51611 Report of the Native Production and Marketing Branch 
1948. 
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"High priority," he later stated, "must be. given. to greatly improved 
communications to and within native production areas, 1ack .of these 
- ll5} 
is one of the. greatest deterrents to wou1 d be traders. II . 
In response to th.e demands. of the Commi ssi on, the Nati ve Producti on 
and Marketing Branch of the division of the Native Department was 
established in June 194.8. In April of the same year, the government 
set up the Native Production and Marketing Council to advise on all 
problems of African production and marketing. 116) . This Council was 
to survey the existing marketing facilities and advise on possible 
beneficial changes. The Council also decided that the scope of 
A1vord 1 s work needed to be increased and advised that his staff be 
enlarged. When Alvord retired in 1950, he was to be replaced by 
two men: a Secretary for African Economic Development who was to 
"co-ordinate and correlate the work of the Administration, Native 
Agriculture, Native Land Board, Native Engineering, Native Labour 
and Nati ve Marketing", 117) and under the control of the Secretary 
was to be the Director of Native Agriculture. The Council also 
advocated that a Land Utilization Bill with a Good "Husbandry Act be 
promulgated, which were designed to enforce the adoption of improved 
methods. 
Much time and effort was spent on examining existing conditions and 
deciding the most appropriate manner in which to initiate change. It 
was desirable not to antagonise Africans, and every attempt was made 
to avoid introducing changes which might evoke this form of response. 
Allocation of land was examined, surveys made of land potential, and 
amount of land allocated per family. It appeared that in non-
centralised areas, land was allocated by the NC. The right of use 
each fa~ily was a]10tted ~epended on the NC - the maximum being 68 
acres, 12 acres ' allotted for arable "purposes, and the remainder, 
gra~i .ng 1and. 118} ... 
115) Ibid. 
116) Ibid. 
117) LD. Alvord, IThe Gospel of the P10'..'lI. 
118) NAR ZBJ 1/1/1 Native Production and Trade Commission 1944. 
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The Conmission stated that, "approximately 1,000,000 of the 9,000,000 
acres of arable 1 and in the Nati ve Reserves was. protected by soil 
conservation works., and only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 acres 
of grazi.ng lands have been protected. ~,1l9} Alvord himself thought 
that at the rate centralisation was gOi.ng, it would be another 
twenty-five years before all African areas were centralised and under 
erosion control methods. It was obvious that something needed to be 
done to accelerate this pace and thereby alleviate the situation in 
the reserves. 
In addition, the reserves would have to acconmodate an increased 
population which was moving into them, or alternative land found for 
these people. "If indigenous families at present allocated in 
unassigned, forest and European areas," commented the CNC, "were to 
be acconmodated in nati ve areas, the native area would requi re to be 
increased to acconmodate an additional 71,182 families, which on the 
basis of 100 acres per family, means ·and additional 7,118,200 acres." 120 ) 
The allocation of additional land was not seen as the ultimate solution 
of the problem, for as the population increased, all land available 
for allocation would be allotted within the next few years. 
The solution to this problem appeared to rest on re-organisation of 
African tenurial systems. On this subject the CNC stated, 
It is pertinent to suggest at this stage that we 
should examine the basic principles of the native's 
occupation of land and make him appreciate more 
fully the fact that economics will not permit the 
whole community being agriculturalists, and that even 
if maximum agricultural occupation is to be achieved, 
this requires that natural resources must be husbanded 
and developed on lines that wi 11 enable posterity 
to carry on.121) 
It appeared, then, that whites were willing to throw caution to the wind 
in one final attempt to induce Africans to both improve the condition 
of their soil and increase their productive capacity. 
"Wi thout some form of compu1 si on in proper farming methods, II the CNC 
... . ................... . .... 
119) Ibid. 
120) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1946. 
121) Ibid. 
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stated, "he is unlikely to subscribe to any great extent to the economy 
of the colony in the export market. 11122) I't was with the intention of 
enforci,ng improved .agricultural practises that policy was formulated 
in the late 19405. In short, it had finally been realised that 
progress could no longer be made within the existing framework. And 
that in order for production to be expanded to meet growing demands, 
the existing tenurial system in the reserves would have to be trans-
formed into one more capable of meeting these demands. 
In the eyes of administrators, the only possible solution was to enforce 
individual tenure. This would create a system of permanent agriculture 
and terminate shifting cultivation. Furthermore, it was hoped this 
would bring to an end the system of migratory labour, creating both a 
permanent rural and urban African with greater efficiency in both 
areas. And it was wi th these aspi rati ons in mi nd that the Nati ve 
Land Husbandry Act was passed in 1951. This represented the culmination 
of more than a decade of slow moves towards authoritarian control, 
resulting from lack of success in the use of persuasive endeavour. 
122) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1947. 
"For some years now we have thought about them as a muss 
of indiv;duals ...... All our planning was based on an 
approach to individuals - how to change th~ isolated 
independent cultivator on his patch of land and how to 
persuade or force him to increase his productivity. 
In the first twenty years we tried to change him by 
demonstration and persuasion. When this was found to 
be u failure, policy shifted to one of Icompulsory 
planned production under discipline to ensure progressl III 
R. G. Howman, Economic Growth and Community Development, 




It has been revealed in this work that, duri.ng the period under review, 
African .agricultural policy in Southern Rhodesia was dictated and 
determined by events which occurred in the white sector of the economY. 
This analysis of the chain of events culminating in· the Native Land 
Husbandry Act of 1951, which enforced the adoption of improved methods 
of agriculture under individual tenure, has indicated that this move-
ment toward authoritarian control of African agriculture did not come 
pri.marily as a result of an inherent inability of Africans to respond 
to the necessity to change. African resistance to change came more 
as a result of hostility and suspicion towards the white sector, and 
the latter's vascillating attitudes as to the role the African 
agricultural sector was to assume in the national economY. 
Prior to the turn of the century, then, white settler effort was 
absorbed in the mineral wealth of the country and its exploitation. 
Accordingly, little tine and effort was expended in the administration 
of Africans. The latter were permitted to continue unhindered on the 
sane land and in the sane manner as they had done in pre-colonial 
days.l) The only demands made on this sector were twofold. Firstly, 
the Africans were to supply agricultural produce to the mines, which 
they were able to do by extending arable lands into as yet unoccupied 
areas of Southern Rhodesia. Secondly, the Africans were to supply 
labour for the mines. This was ensured by the imposition of a hut 
tax which forced many Africans, especially those in the more remote 
areas, to seek wage labour in order to meet their financial obligations. 2) 
When, at the tum of the century, the settlers real i sed that the mineral 
wealth of Southern Rhodesia was not as vast as was originally antici-
pated, it was deci ded that an alternati ve must be sought for the 
country's economic base. Land, an apparently abundant resource, 
therefore, came to play an increasingly important role in attaining 
this desired end; and land settlement schemes were devised in furtherance 
1) vide supra~ Ch.2.1. 
2) vide supra~ p.19. 
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of this aim. 3) At this s~age, sale of African agricultural produce 
provided undesirable competition for white farmers, and attention was 
therefore directed towards curtailing the continuation of this com-
petition. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, this 
was not achieved through the passage of direct preventative legis-
lation, but was realised through the indirect, though much welcomed, 
result of land pOlicy.4) 
The Native' Reserves COll1l1ission of 1914 had as its specific aim the 
setting aside of areas fit for African occupation. The need for such 
a COll1l1ission had arisen as white farming extended into areas previously 
unoccupied by Africans; and as a result of the Commission's recom-
mendations, Africans were frequently pushed into areas remote from 
the centres of mining activity.5) This factor, coupled with the 
i neffi cient transport network of those years, severed Afri can access 
to markets in many instances; and this forced them onto the labour 
market, which at this time was expanding owing to increased white 
farming and mining activity. 
The Native Reserves Conunission thus fulfilled two aims: it curtailed 
the sale of surplus produce by African~, thus facilitating the 
expansion of white farming; and increased the labour supply of the 
country.6) The need for Africans to enter the labour market in order 
to gain an alternative source of capital income to meet their financial 
obligations, appears to have decreased further the productivity of 
African agriculture. A large p·toportion of the African male population 
was absent from the reserves at crucial times; and they represented 
the most productive element in African society.7) 
With the attainment of se 1 f-government in 1923, atti tudes towards the 
purpose of the reserves underwent a fundamental change. They were no 
longer seen as temporary areas of refuge - enclaves for the old and 
infirm - for which the need would gradually cease as Africans were 
3) vide supra, pp.161/2. 
4) vide sup~, Ch.2.2. 
5) vide supra, pp.30-35. 
6) vide supra, pp.33 .... 40. 
7) vide supra, p.40. 
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assimilated into the exchange econoll\Y. Instead, they came to be 
seen as areas in which Africans could develop a1~ng their own lines and 
in their own direction. 8) 
The passage of the Land Apportionment Act in 1931 reinforced these 
changing opinions. The inclusion of the clause stipulating that all 
Africans residing on white land were to move into the reserves within 
six years of the Act's passage, led administrators to reconsider the 
position of the reserves. The carrying capacity of the latter had to 
be increased in order that they might accommodate more people, and 
in furtherance of this objective, they were to be developed and not 
me re 1y augmen te d as h ad been the po 1 i cy in pre vi ous ye ars . Furthe r-
more,attention was drawn to deteriorating land conditions in those 
areas owing to congestion and the practise of shifting cultivation. 
With increased population pressure in the reserves, soil no longer 
had sufficient time to recover before being brought under cultivation 
once more. 9) 
It was thus decided to introduce schemes whereby Africans could be 
taught improved methods of agriculture - not so that they might 
compete with whites for scarce markets, but that they might obtain 
a subsistence existence from the land. In th i s way, the govemment 
would be relieved of the potentially enormous financial burden of 
maintaining the African population. Hence the introduction of African 
agricultural demonstrators. 10) Demonstrator effort in those years 
was directed primarily at terminating extensive methods of cultivation. 
Thereby it was hoped to all,ow an increased population to reside in 
the reserves, and at the same time curtail the ravages of soil 
erosion which was rendering many areas uninhabitable. 11 ) 
In this manner, the apparent paradox at the base of African policy in 
those years was resolved. The decision to develop African areas, 
whi le at the same time reinforcing and conso1 i dating the movement 
towards racial segregation thereby terminating African agricultural 
8) vide supra, pp.42-45. 
9) vide supra, pp.56/7. 
10) vide supra, Ch.3.2. 
11) vide supra, Ch.3.2. 
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competi ti on, were in fact complementary rather than conf1 i cti.ng 
policies. If segregation was to be fostered, then African areas 
would have to facilitate a much larger population than were residi.ng 
there at the time, and it was for these reasons that development 
schemes were augmented in the 1920s. 
The fact that these schemes did not achieve any great measure of 
success in the years preceding the onset of the 'Great Depression' in 
the late 1920s, may be attributed not so much to the inability of 
Africans to adopt new methods, but to a combination of other 
disadvantage ous factors. More important deterrents in these years 
were the relative insignificance of the small staff assigned to this 
task of almost levi athan proporti on s, and inadequate finance. So 
small a staff could not hope to engineer a major agrarian revolution 
amongst the vast numbers of people subSisting on such wide and 
scattered areas. 
of thi s task were 
i tse If. 12) 
Furthermore, finances allocated for the executi on 
not in proportion with the nature of the task 
Land legislation in many cases also had the effect of undoing much of 
the demonstrators' success: the task of improving African agricultural 
techniques was often relegated second place to the task of restoring 
land conditions and the opening-up of previously uninhabitable land, 
for human occupation. With increased pressure in the reserves from 
population and stock, demonstrators, in most instances barely managed 
to keep abreast with deterioration in these areas. 13) Land legislation 
also had important psychological ramifications on the African populace. 
So much of their land had already been expropriated that many Africans 
quite justly feared that should it be seen that they could exist on 
even smaller areas, more land would be withdrawn from their usage. 
Expropriation of their cattle in the 1890s also made them reluctant 
to improve the quality of their stock for fear that this policy would 
be resumed. 14) 
The final contribution to African reluctance to accept demonstrator 
l2} vide supra, pp.84-89. 
13} vide supra, pp. 84-89. 
14) vide supra, pp.85-86. 
165. 
advice was the nature of their way of life itself. Livi.ng, as they 
did, so close to the poverty line made the risk involved in adopti.ng 
new techniques that much greater. 15 } Their own methods were well 
tried and had ensured their continued survival. What, then, would be 
the purpose of adopting what were for most Afri cans untried and there-
fore risky innovations? 
With the spread of the depression in the early 1930s, African policy 
was again subjected to fluctuating trends in the economic base of the 
white sector. With the drop' in maize prices in those years, white 
farmers, already in an unstable position owing to lack of a secure 
staple crop, were placed in an even more vulnerable position. 16 ) 
This culminated in government control of marketing and prices, and 
more attention came to be devoted to the termination of African 
competition. 17 ) Not only did the system of maize control operate 
against African producers, but the programme of demonstrator training 
was also cut back in order to eliminate even the possibility of 
African competition. 
Towards the end of the 1930s, however, a slight lessening' of white 
hostility towards African agriculture began to manifest itself. This 
change came not as a result of a more paternalistic concern on the 
part of the government and whi te settlers over the Afri cans I we 11-
being. Rather this change may be attributed to the growing security of 
the white fanning sector which had found in tobacco a secure export 
staple. Alongside this, the need arose for increased African agri-
cultural contribution in complimentary fields, such as maize for 
domestic consumption, the cultivation of which white farmers had 
forsaken in favour of tobacco. 18) 
Furthennore, the demands of the labour market had been modified 
slightly. With the development of a nascent secondary industrial 
factor, unskilled migrant labour was no l~nger considered to be efficient. 
Thus in the 1940s attention came to be devoted to the creation of a 
class of' semi-ski lled pennanent wage-earners ' in the urban areas, and 
15') vide supra, p.84. 
16) vide supra, p.90/1. 
17) vide supra~ Ch.4.1. 
18) vide supra, Ch.4.2. 
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a permanent sector of the African population devoted to .agricultural 
production. 19) In this regard, the CNC stated in 1948, 
To attain the maximum production and carrying capacity 
of population in African' areas and convert them to a 
cash economy which the need for increasing the Colony's 
food supplies and the spending power of the African 
demands, it is essential to have a stable population ... 
which can devote its full time to production, and to 
eliminate from Native Reserves the excess of population 
for all of whi ch 1 and is not and can never be 
available.20) 
In thi sway, it was hoped, crop producti on woul d no longer be left in 
the hands of the less productive elements: women and old men. The 
absence of able-bodied adult men meant the absence of innovators. 
With the creation of a permanent urban and rural African population, 
however, this practise would cease. 
The increasing attention devoted to the encouragement of cash cropping, 
and the development of rural credit facilities in those years, sub-
stantiates the opinion that more concern was evident in the attempt to 
increase African agricultural productivity. Simultaneous with this 
device, there occurred a growing awareness of the deterioration of 
natura 1 resources throughout the en ti re country, parti cul ar1y the 
rampant spread of soil erosion. This evil was not confined to African 
areas alone. Indeed, prior to 1945, white farmers employed essentially 
the same cultivation techniques as the African, the difference in 
those years being one of scale and not of techno10gy.21) To this end, 
the Natural Resources Act was passed in 1941 and compulsory destocking 
in African areas was begun. This Act ensured protection of the 
natural resources and the simultaneous increase in output as more 
favourable conditions returned. 22) 
Until the 1940s, all schemes undertaken in the African areas had been 
introduced on a voluntary basis. Extension services were based on 
persuasion rather than compulsion. 23} In the 1940s, however, with 
growing concern over natural resources and the need for a greater 
19) vide supra, Ch.5.2. 
20) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1948. 
21) R.H. Palmer, 'Whi te Farmers in Central Africa: A Study in Brevity', 
p. 10. 
22) vide supra, pp. 134/5. 
23) vide supra, Ch. 5.2. 
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African .agri cu1tura 1 contributi on, it came to be real ised that 
lrethods previ ous ly employed were not provi ding the requi red results. 
liThe fraction of the whole that has adopted the improved lrethods,1I 
the CNC stated, lIis so small that if the present policy is con-
tinued, the land occupied by Africans will be irretrievably ruined 
agriculturally before a sufficient number are putting these lrethods 
into practise. 1I24 ) In these years, therefore, a more authoritarian 
approach to the problem was adopted. In this regard the CNC stated, 
IIWithout SOIre form of compulsion in proper fanning lrethods he is 
unlikely to subscribe to any extent to the economy of the Colony in 
the export market. 1125) When it was finally realised that the prob-
lems of markets and communications were inhibitive factors in 
eliciting African response to growing demands, the Native Production 
and Trade Commission was appointed in 1944. This commission reported 
that compulsory planned production was the only way to ensure 
increased output. 26) 
Many of the Commission's recommendations were embodied in the Native 
Land Husbandry Act of 1951. This Act represented a complete reversal 
of all previous policies. Changes in crop production and animal 
husbandry techniques were to be enforced through the creation of 
i ndi vi dua 1 1 and ten ure in the rese rves. It had been real i sed that 
demonstrators were not maRing much headway and that further changes 
could no longer be facilitated within the existing fralrework. Increased 
productivity necessitated a change in the basic structure of the 
tribal system to one embracing more capital-and land-intensive means 
of production. That is, a structural change from one of conservation, 
and moving into hitherto unoccupied land, to intensive cultivation 
of existing land under a system of individual tenure. 27) 
In th.e final analysis, then, th.e demonstrator p.~ogramme lacked 
complete success, not as a result of an inherent flaw within the 
24) NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1950. 
25} NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1947. 
26) vide supra, pp.157/8. 
27) vide SuprcL, pp.158-60. 
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scheme itself, but l~rgely as a result of e~ogenous factors. It was 
not intended that they attempt to commercialise African .agriculture, 
but merely improve existing methods. This in itself was difficult 
to achieve when Africans themselves saw no reason to improve and 
increase production if they were to be deprived of markets. In the 
194Os, when it was desired thatAfrican agricultural production be 
increased, demonstrators themselves were no longer as efficient as 
they had been in earlier years. In order to increase the scope of 
the movement demonstrator training had been placed in the hands of 
missionaries and other bodies; and in 1951, p1otho1ders, Master 
Fanners and Co-operators were recruited on a part-time basis to 
assist regular demonstrators. 28) This resulted in a deterioration 
in the level of efficiency in the training of demonstrators which be-
caire evident in field-work undertaken in the reserves. 29 ) 
In looking at demonstrator efforts in their entirety, it must then be 
asked whether the scheme actually did lack success. If one examines 
thei r achievements wi thin the framework of preventative measures, 
particularly in earlier years, and in relation to the enormous ob-
stacles which had to be surmounted, then their achievements were 
quite remarkable. Furthermore, one must consider how much greater 
deterioration there might have been had there been no demonstrators. 
"This is the first time in the Co1ony's history," remarked the CNC, 
"that we have had a major drought and famine whi ch has cost the 
government practically nothing by way of famine relief to the native 
population." 30) In addition, many have been prone to judge African 
contribution by the quanti ty of crops marketed. It must be remenbered 
however, that these figures represent only a portion of total output: 
the bulk of production was retained in reserves for local consumption, 
which quantity whites would have had to supply if African production had 
not been sufficient. 
It is hoped that this study has provided a guide to African .agricultura1 




NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1957. 
R. Dinnis, Interview, October 1979. 
NAR Annual Report of the CNC for the year 1947. 
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ill umi nate the fact that Afri cans : were not poor .agri cu1 tura li sts, but 
that many of thei r shortcomi.ngs. were consequent upon exogenous 
influences exerted upon them by the wh.ite s.ector. Finally, it is 
hoped th.at it wi 11 be appreci ated th.at demonstrator efforts, par-
ticularly those prior to the 1940s, were not unsuccessful. Indeed 
in the light of the obstacles Alvord and his staff faced in those 
years, the successes achieved were outstanding. 
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APPENDIX 7 
COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMONSTRATION ~~ORK BY SEASONS 
178. 
COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMONSTRATION WORK BY SEASONS (1) 
NUMBER PLOTS· ACRES YIELD IN BAGS OF 200 LBS AVERAGE YIELD 
SEASONS CENTRE OF PLOTS TOT1i:L TOTAL YIELD YIELD PER ACRE ON NATIVE LANDS 
1926-27 2 11 11 139 12,7 2,4 
1927-28 11 88 90 432 4,8 1,3 
1928-29 16 196 203 2,136 10,9 1,9 
1929-30 15 198 163 1,499 9,2 1,8 
1930-31 21 255 227 2,182 9,6 1,2 
1931-32 30 491 335 4,548 13 6 1, 1 
1932-33 35 742 532 4,237 7,5 0,6 
1933-34 41 1,280 1,042 10,680 10,2 0,8 
1934-35 50 1,722 1,372 11 ,847 7,9 0,8 
1935-36 60 2,407 1,867 19,301 10,3 1 , 1 
1936-37 64 3,108 2,237 25,047 11 ,2 1,2 
1937-38 64 3,533 2,501 18,160 7,2 0,7 
1938-39 65 4,215 2,948 28,075 9,5 1,8 
1939-40 66 5,619 4,141 43,381 10,4 2,0 
1940-41 74 6,929 4,930 38,351 7,7 0,6 
1941-42 74 1,898 1,277 11,811 9,2 0,8 
1942-43 84 3,372 2,296 23,039 10,4 1,2 
1943-44 93 4,597 2,526 29,258 11 ,6 1,4 
1944-45 99 5,938 3,203 40,988 12,8 1 ,9 
1945-46 103 5,393 3,680 37,604 10,0 1 ,9 
1946-47 118 6,374 5,082 31,471 6,2 1,0 
1947-48 134 7,352 5,679 57,068 10,1 2,5 
1948-49 163 7,948 7,051 60,676 8,6 2,1 
I 
TOTALS 1,482 72,849 53,394 501,930 - -
23 YR. 
AVERAGE 64 3,167 2,321 21,823 9,4 1,3 
(1) Taken from the Annual Reports of the Agriculturalist for Natives 
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VILLAGES ONE MORE THAN CHURCH GRAIN IMPROVED MILES OF TREE 
LAID ROOMED ONE & HUTS WATER VILLAGE PLANTA-
OUT ROUND ROOM SUPPLIES ROAD TIONS 
HOUSES SCHOOL GRADED STARTED 
1 13 7 - - - - 15 
27 27 14 - 22 - - 18 
608 388 38 - 248 16 40 21 
158 2,189 74 6 1,127 22 25 103 
319 6,550 120 18 5,149 42 22 2 
306 10,439 232 23 9,512 35 29 -
285 3,804 264 42 7,370 14 15 44 
400 5,816 1,329 63 4,153 75 70 40 
324 4,910 1,415 43 2,523 51 22 18 
820 9,819 1,717 63 7,611 106 74 83 
786 11,117 1,654 55 7,482 79 83 53 
566 13,139 1 ,021 149 5,753 254 163 11 
1,338 12,310 1,663 155 4,249 283 485 15 
1,703 12,669 1,415 185 5,537 394 156 272 
999 5,279 1,738 163 3,481 930 168 144 
1,374 13,092 1,854 193 6,447 427 239 151 
1,214 16,286 3,618 302 6,775 833 266 128 
10,680 127,847 ~ 7,903 1,460 78,439 3,611 1,797 1,138 
(2) LD.A1vord,' The Gospel of the Plow'. 
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COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION FROM IRRIGATION PROJECTS 
182. 
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION FROM IRRIGATION PROJECTS (3) 
YEAR FIRST YEAR YEAR 1949 ALL TIME TOTAL NUMBER OF 
NAME OF PROJECT OPENED ACRES YIELD ACRE] YIELD ACRES YIELD FAMILIES 
MUTEMA 1931 27 418 440 1,529 6,305 30,101 125 
~YANYADZI 1934 48 422 1,111 7,688 8,280 53,588 279 
MUTAMBARA 1936 139 1,165 398 1,573 3,472 18,006 120 
MVUMVUMVA 1936 38 134 369 2,487 2,939 17 ,687 105 
~HIBUWE 1940 16 126 146 708 954 4,370 64 
MARANKE 1942 112 406 219 1,217 1,077 5,205 61 
PEVULI 1947 150 686 465 2,687 615 3,375 109 
~OTALS 7 530 3,357 3,148 17,889 ~3,642 132,330 864 
(3) LD.Alvord, 'The Gospel of the P1ow ' . 
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APPENDIX 10 
ESTIMATED GROSS VALUE OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE (1925~1957). 
184. 
ESTIMATED GROSS VALUE ' OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, 1925-1957 (£OOO's) (4) 
YEAR FIELD HUSBANDRY ANIMAL HUSBANDRY TOTAL 
1925 970 1,010 1,980 
1928 1,830 1,500 3,330 
1931 1,270 870 2,140 
1934 2,110 1,190 3,300 
1938 2,280 1,490 3,770 
1940 3,120 1,770 4,890 
1944 5,610 2,450 8,060 
1948 15,220(4) 3,400 18,590 
1952 26,980 7,030 34,010 
1956 33,465 9,668 43,133 
1957 33,912 11 ,174 45,086 
Notice the rapid increase in value of crop output from 1944-1948, 
more than doubling the total value of output in these years. The 
bulk of this increase in crop sales came from an increase in the 
output of tobacco. 
The noticeble increase in total agricultural sales in the 1940s 
explains the lessening of white fears of African competition, and 
hostility displayed towards the latter in these years. 
(4)W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Centra l Africa" P. 132. 
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SUMMARY OF SOIL CONSERVATION WORK IN NATIVE AREAS 
186. 
SUMMARY OF SOIL CONSERVATION WORK IN NATIVE AREAS, 1936-1944 (5) 
YEAR CONTOURS DRAINS & STRIPS TOTAL AREAS PROTECTED 
1936 15 2 17 379 
1937 155 8 163 3,879 
1938 542 14 556 13,550 
1939 1,501 122 1,623 37,525 
1940 2,179 86 2,265 54,456 
1941 1,901 299 2,200 47,525 
1942 1,349 238 1,587 33,775 
1943 2,548 452 3,000 64,066 
1944 863 119 981 20,530 
TOTAL 11 ,053 1,340 12,393 275,685 





STATISTICS FOR AFRICAN CATTLE NUMBERS IN NATIVE 
RESERVES. 
NUMBERS OF CATTLE SOLD TO EUROPEANS. 
188. 
NUMBERS OF CATTLE SOLD TO EUROPEANS (7) 
Sales of African Cattle increased markedly from 1931-1937 that is, in the 
years immediately preceeding compulsory destocking, thereafter, increase 
in sales was even more marked. 








(7) Yearbook and Guide to the Rhodesia and NyasaLand~ 1939-1940 
Statistics for Sales in 1950 taken from CNC Report, 1950. 
189. 
STATISTICS PERTAINING 'TO AFRICAN CATTLE IN NATIVE RESERVES OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 
. " 902~'950 (6) 
YEAR NUMBER OF CATTLE OWNED YEAR NUMBER OF CATTLE OWNED 
1902 55,000 1931 1628,299 
1911 550,000 1932 1755,610 
1913 377 ,090 1933 1748,621 
1914 406,180 1934 1708,465 
1915 445,795 1935 1853,462 
1916 491,522 1936 1547,623 
1917 551,632 1937 1582,062 
1918 610,105 1938 1555,806 
1919 652,776 1939 1590,310 
1920 744,402 1940 1636,496 
1921 854,493 1941 1768,690 
1922 864,894 1942 
1923 927,343 1943 1824,521 
1924 1005,270 1944 1915,534 
1925 1095,841 1945 1911 ,644 
1926 1197,466 1946 1884,334 
1927 1370,567 1947 1709,549 
1928 1420,913 1948 1712,346 
1929 1495,803 1949 1815,733 
1930 1558,075 1950 
(6) Statistics taken from CNC Annual Reports, 1902-1950. 
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COMPARATIVE STATEMENTS OF STATISTICS: STOCK AND AGRICULTURE 
191. 
COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF STATISTICS 
AND AGRICULTURE 
STOCK (8) 
YEAR ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CATTLE NUMBER OF PLOUGHS IN USE ESTIMATED ACREAGE 
UNDER 
CUL TIVATION 
1902 55,155 Not Recorded 534,426 
1911 330,403 3,402 843,336 
1921 854,498 16,913 1180,460 
1926 1197,466 27,584 1204,385 
1931 1628,299 53,507 1429,106 
1936 1547,623 79,015 1388,892 
1941 1768,690 108,431 1765,230 
1942 1765,919 115,688 1821,775 
1943 1824,521 118,960 1843,502 
1944 1915,534 121,081 1974,084 
1945 1911,644 132,685 2095,940 
1946 1844,334 139,705 2206,159 
1947 1709,549 144,251 2202,432 
1948 1722,346 150,782 2256,182 
1949 1815,733 168,178 2252,000 
1950 1832,415 173,690 2715,920 
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